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Abstract 
In this thesis I analyse the reporting and the reception of news about distant 
suffering in the light of John Howard Yoder‘s work on witness. Studies of news reporting 
about foreign wars, genocide and disasters commonly conclude that the practice of 
bearing witness to distant suffering contributes to a context where both journalists and 
spectators appear to have limited moral agency. I argue that the practice of bearing 
witness has ethical significance for those actively engaged in bearing witnessing. In his 
work on Christian witness, Yoder demonstrates how witness can be understood as a 
method for moral reasoning. I assert that Yoder‘s argument presents a fruitful approach 
for interdisciplinary consideration of the ethical significance found in the practice of 
bearing witness to distant human suffering. 
In chapter one, I lay the foundation of my investigation into the ethical agency 
involved in bearing witness. John Howard Yoder‘s theological approach to social ethics 
provides that foundation. Central to Yoder‘s claim that witness is a form of ethics, is the 
premise that presence testifies. Yoder calls this the ‗phenomenology of social witness‘. 
Yoder‘s work opens new ways in which to ask questions about the practice of bearing 
witness as a form of social ethics. It is from this foundation that I begin to ask questions 
about the news media practice of bearing witness to distant suffering, the subject of 
chapter two. Media practices are social practices that involve a dense interaction of many 
layers of society. In the media practice of witnessing distant suffering, governments, 
charities, news media organisations, and audiences are all involved in what I call the 
social formation of the Global Samaritan. The foundational work on Yoder in chapter one 
allows me to ask the question: How is the Global Samaritan a presence, and to what does 
this presence testify? 
In chapters three and four, I focus on two of the prominent groups which contribute 
to the formation of the Global Samaritan: audiences and foreign correspondents. News 
audiences as moral agents already seem a problem for Yoder‘s claim that presence 
testifies. Do audiences who bear witness to distant suffering have moral agency? How 
can the amorphous and fleeting presence of television, internet, or twitter audiences 
testify? In the chapter on audiences, the initial claim regarding presence makes for an 
important investigation into how audiences can potentially move beyond mere 
spectatorship and towards participation in care for the suffering. 
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Foreign correspondents bearing witness to distant suffering do not face the same 
obstacles to testifying as audiences do. After all, foreign correspondents are often live, 
on-the-scene of extraordinary circumstances of suffering. The danger and risks foreign 
correspondents face in order to report live from scenes of devastation and disaster testify 
to the fact that the situation is indeed dangerous and causing suffering. Yoder‘s claim that 
presence testifies is a claim strongly paralleled within the tradition of investigative 
journalism. In chapter four, I investigate the ethical function of foreign correspondent 
presence. I consider the foreign correspondent‘s dual role as the proxy ‗eyes and ears‘ of 
the public and the proxy voice for those without a voice. Through these two roles, I 
explore major concepts involved in the practice of investigative journalism. One 
prominent issue I explore is the tension between the principles of a liberal democratic 
press and the practice of frontline reporters live, on-the-scene of extraordinary and 
extreme situations. 
In the final chapter, chapter five, I focus on the experience of three frontline 
reporters bearing witness to human suffering. BBC [British Broadcasting Company] 
reporter John Simpson‘s reflections on his coverage of the beginning of the Iraq War 
illustrate the importance of bearing witness as involving real presence on location. 
Norwegian freelance reporter Ǻsne Seierstad‘s reflections on covering the Iraq War from 
Baghdad further contributes to the concept of ‗being there‘ as central to bearing witness. 
Focus on Seierstad also furthers discussion on women reporters bearing witness to war. 
The third reporter I highlight is BBC reporter Fergal Keane. I focus on his reflections 
covering the Rwandan genocide to illustrate how the claim to bearing witness involves 
more than spectatorship, but often involves participation. I conclude with an analysis of 
the media practice of bearing witness, involving the range of reporter presence to the 
quasi-presence of the audience, in the light of John Howard Yoder‘s claim that bearing 
witness is a form of social ethics.
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Rationale for Project 
The conceptual category under investigation in this thesis is the concept of 
witness and the practice of bearing witness. The broad question I am concerned with is: 
How do witness bearers authenticate their truth claims? This is an important question for 
many fields of inquiry such as philosophy, law, theology, and more recently a prominent 
question for investigation in studies of media, society and technology. In this thesis, I 
argue that the Christian religious practice of bearing witness to belief can provide insight 
into the modern media practice of bearing witness, particularly the media practice of 
bearing witness to suffering in distant places.  
I first investigate practices Christians draw on in order to authenticate truth 
claims. I am not primarily interested in how translatable Christian practices are into 
media practices of bearing witness. Rather, I want to know how practices in Christian life 
are understood as authenticating testimony. With that insight, I then investigate the 
practices already involved in media witnessing to determine if those practices perform 
comparative functions. Christian theology is the more established field of inquiry into the 
concept of witness, and therefore provides an important resource for the emerging 
questions of witness in the field of media studies. Since I am working with truth claims, 
my work is in the domain of ethics. As with the concept of witness, ethics is a more 
established area of inquiry in Christian theology than in media studies. My thesis is a 
project of comparative ethics in which an established field of ethical inquiry provides 
insight into an emerging field of ethical inquiry. 
Introduction to ‘Bearing Witness’ as an Ethical Act 
Bearing witness is an ethical act. Whether a person bears truthful witness or false 
witness, bearing witness involves moral agency. At some level a choice to bear witness, 
or not to bear witness, involves selectivity. Choosing to testify to an experience or event 
that may be contested by others, or contested by the established narrative of a culture, 
may alter the rest of a person‘s life. Witnessing is not without cost to both the agent 
bearing witness and possibly to the audiences, the secondary witnesses hearing or 
observing the testimony. Therefore, deciding to bear witness or not to bear witness has 
moral and cultural significance. Consider the example of two British journalists working 
in Soviet Russia and the moral and cultural significance of the witness they provided.   
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In the 1930s, Malcolm Muggeridge, an eager young reporter for the Manchester 
Guardian, left England for what he believed to be the Promised Land, Stalin‘s Moscow. 
Muggeridge soon found his hopes for utopia dashed as he travelled the Soviet 
countryside confirming underground reports of the mass starvation of peasants on the 
collectivized farms. In 1933, Muggeridge was one of few journalists to cover the 
Ukrainian famine during which conservative estimates report three to three and a half 
million Ukrainians died.
1
 Muggeridge was not a man who intended to expose the 
problems with Soviet communism—he had been a believer in the great possibilities of a 
socialist state. Instead of protecting his own position, he wrestled through the crisis of 
ideology and bore truthful witness by reporting on the deadly famine. Muggeridge wrote 
in his diary, ‗whatever else I may do or think in the future, I must never pretend that I 
haven‘t seen this. Ideas will come and go; but this is more than an idea. It is peasants 
kneeling down in the snow and asking for bread. Something that I have seen and 
understood.‘
2
  Muggeridge chose to ‗never pretend‘ that he did not see the Ukrainian 
people dying of starvation. This is in comparison to his colleague, Walter Duranty, 
Moscow correspondent for the New York Times, who denied the famine in hopes to keep 
his privileged access to Stalin. Duranty responded to the famine by sticking to the 
Communist party line of, ‗You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs.‘
3
 Duranty 
was awarded the American journalism Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on Soviet Russia‘s 
‗Five Year Plan‘. Muggeridge felt the cost of bearing witness to a contested narrative; he 
was eventually forced to leave Russia and The Manchester Guardian. While the 1930s 
public ridiculed Muggeridge and lauded Duranty, it is the testimony of Muggeridge that 
is now lauded, especially among Ukrainian communities, and the title of ‗Stalin‘s 
Western Apologist‘ associated with Duranty. 
Muggeridge‘s claim that he must ‗never pretend‘ that he was not a witness to the 
starvation of the Ukrainian people carries the moral weight which often accompanies 
                                                 
1
 Hennadiy Yefimenko, "Demographic Consequence of Holodomor of 1933 in Ukraine," ed. Institute of 
History Kiev (The all-Union census of 1937 in Ukraine, 2003). Holodomor is the Ukrainian for 
―hungerplague‖. 
2
 Malcolm Muggeridge, Chronicles of Wasted Time (New York: Morrow, 1973). 
3
 Duranty used the omelette line in reference to Stalin‘s ‗Five Year Plan‘. S.J. Taylor, Stalin's Apologist: 
Walter Duranty: The New York Time's Man in Moscow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 222. 
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witnessing versus other modes of perceiving or ways of coming to know things.
4
 
Muggeridge‘s story, and Duranty‘s as well, illustrates how being a witness can involve 
being caught up in a ‗web of complicity‘.
5
 Muggeridge and Duranty are journalists. We 
might think: surely there must be some sort of professional ethical code journalists ought 
to follow. But that is only for professionals. What about for audiences? Are we under the 
same moral obligations? We cannot pretend that ‗we never knew‘ and even more so 
given advances in media technology where audiences are invited to ‗witness destruction 
for yourself‘ as in the project between Google Earth and the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum (USHMM).  
In 1998, then US President Bill Clinton offered an apology to survivors of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide where he said, ‗It may seem strange to you … but all over the 
world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not 
fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this 
unimaginable terror.‘
6
 But what happens when the technology does allow us, sitting in 
our offices, to witness the terror?  While the project between Google Earth and the 
USHMM is not live satellite feed, it could be. The technology exists. For now, it is 
frequently updated coverage of destroyed villages and refugees of the Darfur region of 
Sudan. This genocide prevention project technologically equips news audiences to bear 
witness for ourselves—to bear witness to far more than we can respond to. 
How do we speak truthfully about suffering? How do we bear witness to suffering 
that is far removed from our own experience? Does the act of bearing witness involve the 
moral agency to help alleviate suffering? ‗Bearing witness‘ is a phrase used in the 
popular, professional, and academic discussion of journalistic coverage and audience 
reception of news media reporting on distant suffering. The media practice of bearing 
witness includes the activities of journalistic reportage on distant suffering as well as the 
audience reception of the reports. In our modern global age, bearing witness seems to be 
                                                 
4
 In Christ and the Media, Muggeridge contends that the television camera is a lying witness. ‗Not only can 
the camera lie, it always lies.‘ Malcolm Muggeridge, Christ and the Media (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1977), 30.  
5
 Witnesses caught up in ‗webs of complicity‘ is a concept that I borrow from John Durham Peters. John 
Durham Peters, Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago, 2005), 256. 
6
 William J. Clinton, "To Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. And Rwanda Officials,"  
(Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 1998). 
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an important mode of communication that involves speaking about the suffering of 
others.  
The ethical significance of bearing witness is rich territory for exploration in both 
the fields of Media studies and Christian ethics. In this thesis, I contribute to an 
interdisciplinary conversation by investigating how the Christian theological category of 
witness can provide an analytical tool for understanding the media practice of bearing 
witness. I argue that theologian John Howard Yoder‘s constructive theology of witness as 
Christian social ethics can help illuminate the ethical significance involved in the media 
practice of bearing witness. Yoder shows how the Christian practice of bearing witness to 
conviction is a way of making truth claims. Yoder is a fruitful conversation partner in 
exploring the moral agency involved in the media practice of bearing witness to the truth 
about human suffering. 
Placement of Research amongst Current Scholarship 
Broadly speaking, my research approach of using Christian theology to provide 
insight into the field of Media studies situates my work amongst those from the ‗Media, 
Culture, and Religion Perspective‘ as Robert White calls it.
7
 Stewart Hoover, one of the 
leading scholars of this perspective, explains the interdisciplinary impulses of the 
research: 
Among media scholars, attention has begun to focus on culture and 
questions of culture, opening up scope for consideration of those 
dimensions of life we traditionally have thought of as ‗religious.‘ At the 
same time scholars of religion have begun investigating ways in which 




My work broadly fits into the media, culture, and religion perspective, because I am 
interested in exploring how a signifying practice such as witness functions as a meaning-
making practice in Christian Theology and also in Media Studies. In addition to the 
media, culture, and religion perspective, I am also contributing to interdisciplinary 
research on developing the concept of witness as an analytical tool to be used in Media 
and Communication Studies. These scholars include Daniel Dayan, John Ellis, Elihu 
                                                 
7
 Robert A. White, "The Media, Culture, and Religion Perspective: Discovering a Theory and Methodology 
for Studying Media and Religion," Communication Research Trends 26, no. 1 (2007). 
8
 Stewart Hoover, Religion in the Media Age (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2. 
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Katz, Tamar Liebes, John Durham Peters, Paddy Scannell, and Günter Thomas.
9
 In 2005, 
when I began focussing my thesis on the concept of witness, this group of established 
scholars had not yet met under any formal grouping. There are more scholars involved in 
this research group, but I have only engaged the work of those listed above. In the spring 
of 2008, the research group stated their aim: 
to examine critically the topic of ‗witnessing‘ from the perspective of 
multiple disciplines and to explore its viability as a bridging concept for 
the cultural sciences. In particular, the phenomenon of ‗witnessing‘ has the 
potential for promoting an original and fruitful comparative perspective for 
a series of current cultural issues: the representation of the suffering of 
others, technology and ‗human agency‘, epistemological issues 
surrounding forms of communication, media ethics, the social organisation 
of knowledge and experience, media and alterity, and not least the 
communicative construction of cultural memory with its ethical aspects.
10
 
The research group‘s interest is in how the concept of ‗witness‘ might be 
developed into an analytical category for the Media and Communication Sciences. 
Witnessing, as a conceptual category, is predominantly found in the study of religion and 
law.  However, the research group cites changes since the end of the twentieth and 
beginning of the twenty-first centuries in how the concept of witness is now being 
explored in three other fields of practice. These three fields include 1) bearing witness as 
in relation to accounts of the Holocaust; 2) the analysis of television by the media and 




My research fits soundly within the remit of the ‗witnessing‘ research group‘s 
aims. I contribute by showing how witness as presence and participation is a mode of 
making an ethical claim. I look to Christian theologian John Howard Yoder‘s argument 
that Christian witness is ethics. I investigate the question of whether other forms of 
embodied witness prove to be ethics as well. In this interdisciplinary investigation of the 
concept of witness, I do not treat the disciplines as hermetically sealed off from each 
                                                 
9
 Some of these scholars contribute to the media, culture, and religion perspective, but contributions to 
research on the concept of witness are also explored outside of the media, culture, and religion perspective. 
10
 Günter Thomas, "Academic Goals, Conception, and Object of Investigation for the Research 
Symposium" (paper presented at the Witnessing: Cultural Roots, Media Forms and Cultural Memory, Villa 




other. Overall, each chapter has its own bibliography, but theologians appear in my 
discussion of Media and Journalism Studies and those from the cultural sciences appear 
in my discussion on Christian Theology. This is a testament to the multi-directional 
nature of interdisciplinary work. While a Christian theological understanding of witness 
can help us understand the media practice of witnessing, Media and Journalism Studies 
can help us understand aspects of witness as embodiment and mediation in Christian 
theology as well.  
In chapter one, I lay the foundation of my investigation into the ethical agency 
involved in bearing witness. John Howard Yoder‘s theological approach to social ethics 
provides that foundation. Central to Yoder‘s claim that witness is a form of ethics, is the 
premise that presence testifies. Yoder calls this the ‗phenomenology of social witness‘. 
Yoder‘s work opens new ways in which to ask questions about the practice of bearing 
witness as a form of social ethics. It is from this foundation that I begin to ask questions 
about the news media practice of bearing witness to distant suffering, the subject of 
chapter two. Media practices are social practices that involve a dense interaction of many 
layers of society. In the media practice of witnessing distant suffering, governments, 
charities, news media organisations, and audiences are all involved in what I call the 
social formation of the Global Samaritan. The foundational work on Yoder in chapter one 
allows me to ask the question: How is the Global Samaritan a presence, and to what does 
this presence testify? 
In chapters three and four, I focus on two of the prominent groups which contribute 
to the formation of the Global Samaritan: audiences and foreign correspondents. News 
audiences as moral agents already seem a problem for Yoder‘s claim that presence 
testifies. Do audiences who bear witness to distant suffering have moral agency? How 
can the amorphous and fleeting presence of television, internet, or twitter audiences 
testify? In the chapter on audiences, the initial claim regarding presence makes for an 
important investigation into how audiences can potentially move beyond mere 
spectatorship and towards participation in care for the suffering. 
Foreign correspondents bearing witness to distant suffering do not face the same 
obstacles to testifying as audiences do. After all, foreign correspondents are often live, 
on-the-scene of extraordinary circumstances of suffering. The danger and risks foreign 
correspondents face in order to report live from scenes of devastation and disaster testify 
to the fact that the situation is indeed dangerous and causing suffering. Yoder‘s claim that 
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presence testifies is a claim strongly paralleled within the tradition of investigative 
journalism. In chapter four, I investigate the ethical function of foreign correspondent 
presence. I consider the foreign correspondent‘s dual role as the proxy ‗eyes and ears‘ of 
the public and the proxy voice for those without a voice. Through these two roles, I 
explore major concepts involved in the practice of investigative journalism. One 
prominent issue I explore is the tension between the principles of a liberal democratic 
press and the practice of frontline reporters live, on-the-scene of extraordinary and 
extreme situations. 
In the final chapter, chapter five, I focus on the experience of three frontline 
reporters bearing witness to human suffering. BBC [British Broadcasting Company] 
reporter John Simpson‘s reflections on his coverage of the beginning of the Iraq War 
illustrate the importance of bearing witness as involving real presence on location. 
Norwegian freelance reporter Ǻsne Seierstad‘s reflections on covering the Iraq War from 
Baghdad further contributes to the concept of ‗being there‘ as central to bearing witness. 
Focus on Seierstad also furthers discussion on women reporters bearing witness to war. 
The third reporter I highlight is BBC reporter Fergal Keane. I focus on his reflections 
covering the Rwandan genocide to illustrate how the claim to bearing witness involves 
more than spectatorship, but often involves participation. I conclude with an analysis of 
the media practice of bearing witness, involving the range of reporter presence to the 
quasi-presence of the audience, in the light of John Howard Yoder‘s claim that bearing 
witness is a form of social ethics. 
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Chapter 1:  Witness in John Howard Yoder’s Christian Social 
Ethics 
Christian theology makes a significant contribution to the discussion on the media 
practice of bearing witness to distant suffering, by illuminating the ethical significance of 
bearing witness. In this chapter, I develop a Christian theological account of witness by 
looking specifically to John Howard Yoder‘s work on how practices such as 
reconciliation and egalitarian membership, involved in bearing witness to Jesus Christ, 
constitute the visible social ethics of Christian communities. I examine Yoder‘s argument 
that Christian witness is made visible to the ‗watching world‘ through the embodied 
presence of Christian communities. I consider criticisms of Yoder‘s claim regarding the 
possibility for the translation of Christian presence to be understood by the watching 
world. I conclude with Yoder‘s argument of how being there, presence, is a place from 
which to begin making ethical claims.  
I have divided this chapter into three large sections: first the resource of Yoder‘s 
tradition, second the practices that comprise Christian witness, and third the function of 
witness in Christian moral inquiry. In this chapter I primarily focus on the Christian 
category of witness as a way to understand how the Christian church engages with the 
world. Nonetheless, I do acknowledge that witness is not the only way in which to look at 
how Christians engage the world. What Yoder adds to this discussion is to make clear 
how witness is connected to being present and how presence itself is a form of moral 
engagement with the world. Yoder‘s work on witness as Christian social ethics yields 
important insight for a multi-disciplinary understanding of how the practice of bearing 
witness can be ethical engagement.  
Yoder wrote on many topics in Christian theology, but for the purposes of this 
discussion I will focus on his proposition of witness as a method for doing Christian 
social ethics. Yoder‘s work has received much recent attention from theologians who 
draw on his life and work as a resource to begin the discussion of witness as ethics.
12
 
                                                 
12
 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). James Wm. McClendon, Witness: Systematic 
Theology, Volume 3 (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2000). Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama 
of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2004). Michael G. Cartwright, "Being Sent: 
Witness," in Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2006).  
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Yoder began his construction of Christian social ethics with the resource of his tradition. 
He did not begin by taking a detached, dispassionate step back from the discipline of 
Christian theology to begin his project. Rather than a view from nowhere, Yoder began 
with a view from a particular location,
13
 that of his own Mennonite tradition. 
1.1 The Resource of an Anabaptist Identity 
The overarching question of this chapter is, ‗What moral agency does ‗bearing 
witness‘ involve?‘ In this section, I address the origins of Yoder‘s idea that bearing 
witness has moral agency. In essence, he derived the idea from his Anabaptist heritage. I 
will expand upon that simple statement in this section by exploring Yoder‘s theological 
training, how he sought to mine his heritage as a resource for social engagement, and 
how he dealt with charges of disengagement. 
The Anabaptist movement, a sixteenth-century branch of Christian heritage that 
includes Yoder‘s Mennonite tradition, are charged with sectarian withdrawal. Anabaptists 
belong to a religious branch not known for their social engagement or impact on the 
wider world. Yoder‘s life-work is a project of redeeming his Mennonite tradition‘s mode 
of social engagement. Stanley Hauerwas and Alex Sider observe that Yoder was part of a 
‗Mennonite ressourcement movement similar to the developments in Catholicism 
associated with Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Hans Urs von Balthasar.‘
14
 Yoder 
strived to show how Mennonite practices were actually resources for engaging the world, 
and how these practices were not just Mennonite but catholic. It is in looking to Yoder‘s 
early academic training that we can see the beginnings of his constructive project in 




1.1.1 Sketch of Yoder’s Academic Training 
Earl Zimmerman offers an insight into Yoder‘s early academic training that 
focuses on the origins of Yoder‘s social ethics and the first sparks of what was to become 
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Yoder‘s successful book, The Politics of Jesus.
16
 John Howard Yoder (1927-1997) began 
his academic study in a time when ‗Mennonites in North America lived in culturally 
separate, religious communities. … [T]hey had routinized their beliefs and practices into 
their communal life, but eschewed active social engagement.‘
17
 In Yoder‘s undergraduate 
study at Goshen College, Indiana, Harold Bender (1897-1962), the dean of Goshen 
Biblical Seminary, influenced Yoder in ‗using historical research on the Anabaptist 
movement to help Mennonites recover their radical religious heritage‘ as a response to 
social change.
18
 Bender was part of the Mennonite ressourcement movement mentioned 
by Hauerwas and Sider. Among others Bender influenced Yoder in ‗helping Mennonites 
formulate a more viable and engaged social ethic from an Anabaptist perspective in 
response to the challenges of the postwar world.‘
19
 I will discuss this idea of the radical 
reformation spirit as a resource for Christian social ethics in the next section.  
A very formative time in Yoder‘s life, reflected in the corpus of his work, was his 
engagement with theological and social questions emerging in post-war Europe. After 
quickly completing undergraduate work at Goshen College, Yoder, through Bender‘s 
connections and guidance, left the US to work in Europe from 1949-1957. His multi-
faceted work began in France where he worked with the Mennonite Central Committee 
resettling war refugees. Speaking on behalf of the peace church tradition, he worked with 
the World Council of Churches exploring the question of war. During his time in Europe 
Yoder wrote a PhD at the University of Basel where ‗he studied with Oscar Cullmann 
(1902-1999) in New Testament and Karl Barth (1886-1968) in theology.‘
20
 Yoder wrote 
on Mennonite church history. His dissertation theme from 1957 was, ‗The origins of 
radical Protestantism within the Swiss Reformation in the 1520s‘. Zimmerman contends 
that Yoder‘s early notions on the ‗politics of Jesus‘ were influenced in two important 
ways during Yoder‘s time in Europe. First, ‗Yoder began formulating his ethic in 
response to the devastating humanitarian, political, and religious crisis in post-war 
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 Second, Yoder‘s constructive effort in theology and social ethics ‗grew out of 
his historical research on the sixteenth-century Anabaptists.‘
22
 
Yoder worked out of his own Mennonite tradition, from whence he was able to 
find ressourcement for the broader Protestant Reformation tradition and beyond. Yoder 
claimed that he studied the history of the people called Anabaptist, but ‗[n]onetheless my 
conviction has always been that my normative testimony is ―catholic,‖ i.e., pertinent to 
any Christian.‘
23
 This was a radical proposition given that North American Mennonites in 
the 1950s were known for their withdrawal from public life. Yoder counters the claims 
that the Anabaptist simply represent quietism and sectarianism, and I will look at the way 
he counters the famous German American theologian Richard H. Niebuhr‘s labelling the 
Mennonites as sectarian after I look at how Yoder appealed to his tradition as a 
ressourcement. 
1.1.2 Ressourcement of the Radical Reformation 
I will not be considering Yoder‘s doctoral dissertation or work written during his 
time in Europe, but rather at his subsequent work all influenced by the theme of ‗radical 
reformation‘. Yoder‘s first impact outside of Mennonite or peace church circles came 
with his publication of The Christian Witness to the State (1964) and then even more so 
with the publication of The Politics of Jesus (1971). In these texts, Yoder claims that 
Christian social ethics should begin with Christ‘s obedience as a normative and realistic 
possibility for the Christian church.  Yoder claims that this vision throughout church 
history has been at times compromised, pushed aside and even lost. He identifies 
Constantinianism as epitomising the greatest compromise. Yoder is often criticized for 
too easily making Constantine a villain in his history of the relationship between the 
Christian church and the state.  William Cavanaugh offers this nuance to Yoder‘s use of 
Constantinianism: 
Constantine does not represent the mere ‗fall‘ of the church from some 
pristine state of righteousness … What is lumped together under the term 
‗Christendom‘ is in fact a very complex series of attempts to take seriously 
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the inherently political nature of the church and its instrumental role in the 
integral salvation of the world in Jesus Christ.
24
 
Yoder credits the Protestant Reformation with recalling the vision of Christ‘s 
obedience as central to Christian ethics, but faults many of those original protestors for 
loss of this vision. Yoder argues that the critical perspective which began with the 
Protestant Reformation should always be a mark of the church. He agrees with the 
original reformers‘ contention toward the Roman Catholic Church, but then he goes on to 
criticize Luther and Calvin for putting church renewal into the hands of civil 
governments. Yoder argues that it is at this point that the critical perspective of the 
original reformers was jettisoned. While the main reformers found themselves re-
enmeshed in the compromises of the state, the radical reformers held on to the centrality 
of Christ‘s obedience as normative for how the Christian community is to live in the 
world.  Yoder claims that the radical reformers‘ guarding of this vision provides a 
resource for the practical moral reasoning of the Christian community.
25
  
After the original Reformation the radical reformers continued to maintain a 
vigilant stance against civil government defining Christendom. One of their central 
concerns was ‗how the body of believers relates to the powers of this world.‘
26
 Yoder‘s 
claim is that radical reformers relate to the world through the practices that constitute 
Christian witness. There are some who argue that witness as a mode of relating to the 
world is an ineffectual way to relate to power. In the next section, I consider the charge 
that the radical reformers are a community of believers socially ineffective and 
disengaged from the world. 
1.1.3 Charge of Sectarian Withdrawal 
Yoder himself commented on the quietism of North American Mennonites in 
political and civic life especially in contrast to his active engagement in post-war 
reconstruction with the Mennonite Central Committee in Europe. Nonetheless, he did not 
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want the Mennonites and other peace churches of the radical reformation tradition 
characterised as ‗politically irrelevant and socially irresponsible‘ when it came to 
thinking about Christian social ethics. He believed that Anabaptists can make a 
significant and a critical contribution to Christian social ethics. Much of Yoder‘s work is 
a response to the social responsibility position advocated by H. Richard Niebuhr and even 
more so by the work of his brother, Reinhold Niebuhr. Gerald W. Schlabach describes 
Yoder‘s life work as most often seemingly shaped by answering the Niebuhrian charge. 
‗That charge: Christians who embrace the non-violent ethic of Jesus may get Jesus right, 




Yoder‘s position on how Christian witness functions as a socially engaging ethic 
was a counter position to the dominant view of Protestant social ethics characterised by 
Niebuhrian social ethics. Yoder‘s main point of contention was that the social 
responsibility ethics of the Niebuhr brothers made a person‘s allegiance to nation, state, 
or class more determinative than a person‘s membership in the body of Christ. While the 
Niebuhrs‘ approach to Christian ethics focused on social responsibility and realism, 
Yoder‘s approach focused on an ethic of discipleship or imitating of Christ. As just one 
example of Yoder‘s contention with the Niebuhr brothers, and a very prominent example 
in the academic field of Christian ethics, I will examine Yoder‘s response to H. Richard 
Niebuhr‘s book Christ and Culture in which Mennonites are characterised as ‗sectarians‘ 
who withdraw from culture. 
H. R. Niebuhr is using the word ‗sect‘ based on Ernst Troeltsch‘s typology of 
church, sect, and mystical distinction in The Social Teachings of the Christian Church.
28
 
It is clear that the Niebuhr brothers fall into Troeltsch‘s typology of ‗church‘ where 
Christ is understood as ‗the Universal Redeemer with an ethics of compromise and 
cultural responsibility‘, and Yoder falls into Toeltsch‘s typology of ‗sect‘ where an 
understanding of the Lordship of Christ leads to ‗an ethics of pure conscience and 
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obedience to the life and teachings of Jesus‘.
29
 H. R. Niebuhr expands his typologies to 
five ideal-types to characterise kinds of ethics in the Christian traditions. H. R. Niebuhr‘s 
typologies have been important teaching heuristics for theology and sociology of 
religion,
30
 but some challenge the implications of the categories as disregarding the social 
impact of traditions, such as Yoder‘s Mennonite tradition, termed ‗sectarian‘.
31
  
H. R. Niebuhr claims that the Mennonites, one of the remaining groups of the 
radical reforming Anabaptists, ‗represent the attitude most purely‘ of Christ and the 
church‘s rejection of culture.
32
 H. R. Niebuhr creates an axis with five typologies in order 
to understand the relationship between Christ and culture as practiced in different 
Christian traditions. At one end is ‗Christ Against Culture‘ and at the other end is ‗Christ 
the Transformer of Culture‘. The typology of ‗Christ Against Culture‘ is characterised by 
the position in which the appropriate way to be like Christ involves the rejection of 
culture and withdrawal from culture. H. R. Niebuhr describes the ‗transforming‘ category 
in opposition to the ‗against‘ category. 
Though they hold fast to the radical distinction between God‘s work in 
Christ and man‘s work in culture, they do not take the road of exclusive 




For Yoder, these were fighting words. Yoder contended that while H. R. Niebuhr claimed 
the five typologies are a sociologically objective synthesis of the way major Christian 
traditions interact with the issue of Christ and Culture, the radical reformers are given 
unfair treatment. Yoder believed that while H. R. Niebuhr claimed objectivity, he was 
actually advocating the ‗Transformation‘ position and eschewing the ‗Radical‘ position. 
Yoder responds to H. R. Niebuhr‘s characterisation of radical reformation ethics as an 
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ethic of social disengagement, by arguing that the Anabaptist vision can be understood as 
an ethic of social engagement and of social transformation.
34
   
 The Christ and culture problem that H. R. Niebuhr addresses is the moral conflict 
between the radical demands of Jesus (Christ) versus everything which people do 
(culture). Yoder‘s critique of Niebuhr‘s argument begins with Niebuhr‘s definitions. 
While Niebuhr states the definition of culture as ‗everything which people do,‘ Yoder 
argued that latent in this characterization was an understanding of culture as ‗a given non-
Christian civilization to the exclusion of the cultural productivity of Christians.‘
35
  Yoder 
called Niebuhr‘s view of culture ‗monolithic‘. He does not argue that Niebuhr has a 
simplistic view of culture that fails to account for the diversity of cultures. Rather, his 
argument is rooted in [the project of] Christian ethics. Yoder is critical of Niebuhr for 
placing the radical demands of Jesus outside of culture, as if followers of the radical 
demands of Jesus played no part in culture making. Yoder argues that part of the diversity 
of culture, everything which people do, includes the participation of the believing 
community, followers of the radical demands of Jesus. For Yoder, Christian social ethics 
does not only involve transforming structures of this world, but also involves creating 
forms of culture as well, such as ‗hospitals, … egalitarianism, abolitionism, feminism‘.
36
 
Yoder understands H. R. Niebuhr to say that a social ethic based on the radical 
demands of Jesus is ineffective because it will not change society. Yoder by contrast 
viewed the social responsibility ethic as identifying ‗culture‘ with political control, 
‗[t]hus government becomes exemplary for all of culture.‘
37
  A social responsibility ethic, 
as typified by the Niebuhr brothers, manages ‗society from the top‘. Yoder on the other 
hand is calling for a paradigm shift away from the Christian ethical imperative to rule the 
world and toward a discipleship ethic that transforms society through the engagement of 
Christian witness. David Fergusson points out that H. R. Niebuhr‘s Christ and culture 
typology: 
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ignores the possibility that the development of a distinctive church may be 
for the sake not of withdrawal but of witness and mission. The purpose of 
a counter-cultural distinctiveness, it may be argued, is not isolationism, but 
a proper contribution to the ideal social world. It is to be faithful as the 
disciples of Christ in the world where the mission of the church is to be 
conducted. It is world-affirming but from a distinctive perspective.
38
   
Yoder wants to reshape the Christ and culture problem in which everything which 
people do (culture) is not assumed to be autonomous of the radical demands of Jesus 
(Christ). Yoder identifies the problem of ‗Christ and Culture‘ as being when elements of 
culture (powers and principalities) claim autonomy from the Creator God, and claim 
autonomy over men and women.  Elements of culture, such as governments, are 
presumed to be monolithic when it is assumed, ‗that independently of the will of the 
Creator God they are able to provide to a person and to society a full, integrated, genuine 
existence.‘
39
 Yoder proposes that the key to engaging the Christ and Culture problem is 
concrete situational discernment based on confessing that Jesus Christ is Lord. Thus, a 
Christian community would ask itself, ‗What are the dimensions of culture that deny the 
Lordship of Christ, and what are those that confirm what Christ is doing in the world?‘
 40
 
Yoder gives an answer to this question: sometimes the church celebrates aspects of 
culture, and sometimes is condemns aspects of culture. He does offer a few concrete 
examples: 
Some elements of culture the church categorically rejects (pornography, 
tyranny, cultic idolatry). Other dimensions of culture it accepts within 
clear limits (economic production, commerce, the graphic arts, paying 
taxes for peacetime civil government). To still other dimensions of culture 
Christian faith gives a new motivation and coherence (agriculture, family 
life, literacy, conflict resolution, empowerment). Still others it strips of 
their claims to possess autonomous truth and value, and uses them as 
vehicles of communication (philosophy, language, Old Testament ritual, 
music).  Still other forms of culture are created by the Christian churches 
(hospitals, service of the poor, generalized education, egalitarianism, 
abolitionism, feminism). Some have been created with special 
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Yoder is arguing that withdrawal from one dimension of culture is not a rejection 
of all of culture. The Christian church‘s rejection of some elements of society can be a 
mode of responsible participation as withdrawal itself communicates dissent. Even where 
the church has withdrawn from certain aspects of culture, Christ is still Lord over all of 
culture. Yoder claims that the church‘s ‗assignment‘ whether through engagement or 
withdrawal is to ‗represent within society … a real judgment upon the rebelliousness of 
culture and a real possibility of reconciliation for all.‘
42
 This process of judging rebellious 
aspects of cultural powers and principalities which claim dominion over men and women, 
and the process of reconciliation, are two practices of a discipleship ethic. Yoder more 
commonly calls discipleship ethics ‗Christian witness‘. 
1.2 Christian Witness is Substantive of Practices 
Yoder is interested in the idea of specific practices constituting community ethics 
rather than appealing to universals found in creation.
43
 He does not begin his ethic from 
creation, but rather from redemption.
44
 The Christian community‘s patterns, or forms of 
life, are derived from the life of Jesus Christ in the New Testament. These practices, of 
Christ and the church, provide a specific location from which to draw norms for ethical 
behaviour. He discusses prominent practices, or traits, as the ‗particular kinds of 
behaviour that our faith requires.‘
45
 The practices are the church‘s witness. This 
enigmatic claim can best be explained by a chapter title from For the Nations, ‗The New 
Humanity as Pulpit and Paradigm‘. The church is a ‗New Humanity‘ organised by the 
politics of Jesus. The church body as a pulpit means that her body proclaims her message. 
Christians‘ actions and life together proclaim the gospel message. The church as a 
paradigm means that her ethics, her way of life together, is paradigmatic for ethics 
beyond the church. Yoder claims that the world can recognise this new paradigm through 
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the patterns of church practices. The church communicates through her actions. ‗This 
points to the awareness that the way most communication works is not by projecting and 
then reassembling a maximum number of atoms of information, nor of axioms and 
maxims, but by pattern recognition.‘
46
 After looking at some of the practices of the 
church described by Yoder, I will consider how recognisable or translatable the patterns 
of practices actually are in the wider world.  
1.2.1 Practices 
In his book Body Politics: Five Practices of the Christian Community before the 
Watching World, Yoder enumerates five central practices. In other publications, Yoder 
has condensed the list down to fewer practices and expanded the list in other places.
47
 In 
Body Politics, Yoder specifically leaves out the overarching practice of servanthood 
because he discusses this central Christian practice in great detail in The Politics of Jesus 
and The Christian Witness to the State. Here, we will look at the six practices as forming 
the substance of Yoder‘s Christian social ethic, beginning with servanthood and then 
considering the five other practices of the church discussed in Body Politics.  The 
practices that constitute the Christian faith are overlapping, so that performing one 
practice is often interrelated with the performance of another.  The Christian community 
is not a perfect community optimally performing each trait; how the church performs one 
practice can be corrective of how the church fails or underperforms another. Given that 
Yoder represented the pacifist tradition, it is interesting to note that he did not include 
non-violence among his listed practices. The reason was not because he believed that 
only some were called to the pacifist position, but rather because not being violent is not 
a practice that forms the church. The church is constituted by peaceful social practices 
such as the six that follow. 
1.2.1.1 Servanthood 
Yoder uses the Pauline vision of ‗principalities and powers‘ to describe social and 
political structures that are in rebellion against the proclamation that Christ is Lord of all.  
The church‘s relationship to social and political structures is to be the ‗conscience and the 
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servant‘ of such structures.
48
 Servanthood may be through conscientious participation, by 
helping in the ‗creation of structures more worthy of human society‘, or it may be 
through the conscientious objection to collaborating with structures that are oppressive to 
human society.
49
 Yoder uses the categories of obedience and faithfulness, rather than the 
category of effectiveness, to measure the results of the church‘s service to the ‗powers‘.  
Victory over the rebellious principalities and powers has already been achieved in Christ, 
the job of the church is to proclaim this truth not achieve it.  Therefore, the church is 
called to the practice of servanthood as a way to witness to the world that the Lordship of 
Christ is indeed true. This truth does not need to be proved by the church‘s seizing of 
worldly power.  A dominant theme throughout all of these practices includes the position 
that the ends never justify the means. Such a claim begins with the position of obedient 
and faithful servanthood.  The means is defined by the end: if the message is peace then 




1.2.1.2 Reconciliation  
For Yoder, the practice of reconciliation is a defining characteristic of how the 
church functions as a society because it has to do with the administering of justice. 
Reconciliation includes a process of judgment and forgiveness. Yoder identifies the 
following two verses as mandates for the church to practice reconciliation: ‗If your 
brother or sister sins, go and reprove that person when the two of you are alone. If he or 
she listens, you have won your brother or sister.‘ (Matt. 18:15 Yoder‘s translation), and 
‗What you bind on earth is bound in heaven.‘ (Matt. 18:18)  Further, Yoder cites Jesus‘ 
words from the gospel of John chapter twenty-three where Jesus empowers the disciples 
to forgive sins: ‗If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the 
sins of any, they are retained.‘
51
 Conflict resolution empowers a community to practice 
justice that is not only ratified on earth but also ‗bound in heaven‘. 
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1.2.1.3 Solidarity  
Yoder is exploring a ‗link between ecclesiastical practice and social ethics‘ when 
he likens the practice of solidarity in the Christian community to the Eucharist.
52
 Both are 
practices which demand ‗some kind of sharing, advocacy, and partisanship in which the 
poor are privileged, and in which considerations of merit and productivity are subjected 
to the rule of servanthood.‘
53
 The ethical significance of the Eucharist is lost when the 
church turns the Eucharist into a meal where some are exalted and some are humiliated; 
such was the Apostle Paul‘s admonishment to the church at Corinth (I Corinthians 13). 
Solidarity as a resource for moral discernment will put the Christian community 
alongside those who are being treated unjustly. 
1.2.1.4 Egalitarian Membership 
As the ecclesial practice of the Eucharist has ethical implications for the 
community, so too does the act of baptism. Yoder claims that baptism is a ‗ritual act 
whose first, ordinary meaning is egalitarian.‘
54
 The rite of baptism is the initiation into a 
new humanity, a new community that is not organised by societal hierarchies. This new 
humanity is the people who make up the Kingdom of God. Yoder says of the Paul‘s 
statement in 2 Corinthians 5:14-17 that ‗ethnic standards have ceased to count in our 
estimate of anyone.’ 
55
 In the new humanity of ‗trans-ethnic inclusivism‘ difference is not 
to be eradicated. Yoder explains that people are ‗reconciled not by being homogenized 
but by accepting one another.‘
56
  
Yoder argues that Paul‘s ‗equalization message‘ is different from an 
Enlightenment notion that all men are created equal, as Paul‘s message ‗is rooted not in 
creation but in redemption.‘
57
 Yoder points out that it is not a doctrine of creation, or an 
uncovering of natural law theory, that indicates that all people are equal, but rather the 
redemption and transformation of communities into people who do not stand for second-
class citizenship. ‗What it took to begin to free Americanism from racism a century later 
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was not a notion of equality through creation but the good news of redemption.‘
58
 An 
important aspect involved in the practice of egalitarian membership is that membership is 
voluntary. This is Yoder‘s critique of Christendom; the ethical significance of Christian 
membership is that the members have been redeemed, not forced to associate in new 
ways. 
1.2.1.5 Lay Empowerment 
As the previous practice illustrates that there is no hierarchy of citizenship based 
on ethnicity, sex or other social standing, lay empowerment emphasises that all citizens 
have roles. Lay empowerment, what Yoder calls the ‗fullness of Christ‘ is the symbiotic 
necessity of many different roles to be performed in the Christian community. Paul uses 
the analogy of the body to illustrate the interrelated functioning of the church. This trait 
of the Christian church witnesses to lay empowerment: ‗every member of a body has a 
distinctly identifiable, divinely validated and empowered role.‘
59
 Yoder reasons that if all 
have gifts, ‗we need to challenge the concentration of authority in the hands of office-
bearers accredited on institutional grounds.‘
60
 The practice of lay empowerment is behind 
the critical perspective of the radical reformers‘ wariness toward the concentration of 
power.   
1.2.1.6 Dialogical Freedom 
Dialogical freedom is the open process of communication referred to by Yoder as 
the ‗Rule of Paul‘, on how the meeting of the church should proceed, as seen in Paul‘s 
instructions to the Christian community at Corinth to ‗let everyone be ready with a Psalm 
or a sermon or a revelation. . . . As for prophets, let two or three speak, and the others 
attend to them. . . .(1 Cor. 14:26, 29).‘ Yoder suggests the modern equivalents of 
assembly, parliament, or town meeting as contemporary translations of the church 
meeting together as ‗a public gathering to deal with community business‘.
61
 Yoder‘s 
assertion is that all believers are priests and prophets, these offices are not reserved for 
some special being with a different ontological status from the rest of the community. 
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Rather, the practice of moral discernment belongs to all members of the community.
62
 
Yoder makes the distinction between the radical reformation claim to freedom of speech 
with that of Enlightenment claims to freedom of speech and assembly. ‗Whereas the 
Enlightenment call for intellectual liberty ascribed to every educated mind autonomy and 
the right to doubt, the Puritan case for the freedoms of speech and assembly appealed to 
the sovereignty of the Word of God.‘
63
 
1.2.2 Visibility of Practices 
Each practice provides a rich field to explore, and it was Yoder‘s purpose that 
they should be explored in the moral discernment process of the church, and possibly by 
others too. The practices of table fellowship, egalitarian membership, and reconciliation 
are not new practices, but Yoder claims that ‗in the gospel setting they have taken on new 
meanings and a new empowerment.‘
64
 The ethical significance of the church for the 
wider world is found in the church‘s witnessing nature. Yoder argues that the strength of 
the church‘s recommendation of these ethical practices does not come from the church‘s 
lobbying power, but from the persuasive witness of her people living out their claims.
65
 
As emphasized in the practice of servanthood, the church‘s effectiveness is measured by 
the faithfulness and obedience with which she performs the practices. Yoder is criticised 
for his discipleship ethic sliding into ecclesial triumphalism where the church is a 
paragon of perfection.
66
 His work does take on the dogged persistence of saying that the 
church has been too compromised to be distinguishably visible from the wider world 
within which it lives. He sees the church as an exemplar to be continually refined or 
reformed in order to maintain her public witness. 
Witness has to do with social visibility. Yoder argues that the church‘s belief and 
confession of the transcendent God becomes visible to the wider society ‗only if 
represented by a discrete empirical community‘.
67
 The church derives social visibility 
through Christian practices. To ‗fraternize trans-ethnically,‘ ‗share bread,‘ and ‗forgive 
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one another‘ are visible activities; ‗they are not opaque rituals.‘
68
 This way of living is 
social witness because it is recognisable beyond the Christian community. David 
Fergusson points out that Yoder‘s Christian social ethics achieves visibility in the wider 
culture through ‗counter-cultural distinctiveness‘, but Yoder argues that ‗distinctiveness‘ 
itself does not make a Christian practice Christian. What makes Christian practices 
Christian is that the practices are ‗specifically or specifiably Christian, i.e., true to kind, 
authentically representing their species.‘
 69
 Whether Christian practice is ‗distinctive‘ or 
even counter-cultural depends on what is happening in the wider culture. Distinctiveness 
is not a criterion of Yoder‘s Christian social ethic. Being present as ‗a discrete empirical 
community‘ through organising community life based on the politics of Jesus is a 
criterion for Yoder‘s Christian social ethic. Visibility begins with the social phenomenon 
of the believing community existing in the first place. 
I have considered how the practices are visible to the wider word beyond the 
Christian community. Next, I will consider Yoder‘s claim that the practices are 
translatable into the governing and organising of the wider society. 
1.2.3  Translatability 
In the title Body Politics: Five Practices of the Christian Community Before the 
Watching World Yoder claims that the practices are recognisable to the watching world. 
In this section, I will explore that claim. Note that Yoder does not say that the practices 
are performed for the watching world: because they constitute the life of the church, they 
happen regardless of audience. Yoder first focuses his discussion of Christian social 
ethics by claiming that the church is called to certain practices, but then he broadens the 
claim and states that ultimately the world is called to these practices as well. If these 
practices are indeed good news, then they can be recognised as good news by all who 
hear the news. Yoder does not mean that the practices can be coercively applied, for they 
do not make sense out of a context of belief. He simply argues that the practices can be 
recognised for their social function. Therein lies their translatability.
70
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This is an important nuance that Yoder makes; the translatability of Christian 
social ethics is in its social function. The Christian practices have social and political 
significance, function, and value in the wider world as well as the church. If they bring 
flourishing to the church, they will bring flourishing to the wider community. The good 
news of Jesus for the church is also good news for the world. The Christian practices ‗can 
be prototypes for what others can do in the wider world. … [T]hey can be commended to 
any society as a healthy way to organize.‘
71
 
Yoder claims that translation can go both ways. In fact, it is when the faith 
community sees these functions outside of the church that the state or some other politic 
becomes a corrective witness to the church. The faith community may very well ‗see 
Jesus in actions of solidarity, unity, reconciliation‘ taking place outside of the faith 
community. When the answer is yes to Yoder‘s question ‗But do we see Jesus?‘, then the 
church needs to be open to multi-directional witness.
72
 Yoder calls this ‗interworld 
transformational grammar‘ where both worlds can find ‗common turf‘ on which to talk to 
one another. Yoder acknowledges that a common moral language is more readily found 
when the two parties have shared history and other commonalities. He says that the real 
test of the accessibility of a common moral language will be its capacity to illuminate 
conversations with more than those with whom we already have good will, but ‗to 
illuminate meaningful conversations with Idi Amin or Khomeini or Chairman Mao.‘
73
  
Yoder acknowledges that some Christian practices as paradigmatic for social 
functioning in the wider world may get lost in translation. With regard to ‗servanthood‘ 
as a practice for the world, Yoder acknowledges that ‗servanthood‘ as a social practice 
may be too Christologically specific to be identifiable outside of the church. Without an 
eschatological understanding, servanthood may be too risky and scandalous a pattern to 
emulate. Yoder claims that while many leaders do argue that servanthood is part of their 
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corporate strategy, they do not really believe it.
74
 Regarding servanthood, Yoder does 
acknowledge that the life world of the believing community may not directly translate 
beyond the believing community. 
The translatability of a Christian community‘s social ethics from one life world 
to another is an important part of ecumenical and inter-faith dialogue, and practical moral 
reasoning in the pluralistic public sphere. Yoder claims that none of the practices he 
describes as the politics of Jesus require the church to think about how to translate their 
understanding to the pluralistic public sphere. He argues that the practices are public 
practices; they ‗lend themselves to being observed, imitated, and extrapolated.‘
75
 
Interestingly, this seems to be understanding through mimesis more than through 
translation. Yoder‘s scholarship has received criticism in the area of translation. How 
knowable is the meaning of Christian practice outside of Christian communities? In the 
next section, I consider criticisms of Yoder‘s simplistic, or perhaps I should say 
optimistic, claims to translatability. 
1.2.3.1 Criticism of Translatability 
Theologians influenced by the ‗linguistic turn‘ in philosophy question Yoder‘s 
claim to an ‗interworld transformational grammar‘ capable of existing between the life of 
the church and the wider world.
76
 The criticism, noticeably led by Stanley Hauerwas, is 
that these practices cannot be translated because the language world of the church, which 
Hauerwas identifies as worship, is incommensurable with the language world outside of 
the church.
77
 Hauerwas does agree with Yoder that the pursuit of a vocabulary for public 
moral discourse should not be done by appealing to ‗non-particular sources of moral 
insight,‘ such as ‗reason,‘ ‗nature,‘ and ‗creation‘.
78
 Hauerwas argues, as does Yoder that 
an appeal to universals such as reason, nature and creation removes the distinctive 
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witness of the Christian church.
79
 In the appeal to universals, what is lost in translation is 
the church. Yet Yoder is more hopeful than Hauerwas in his belief that appeals to 
particular Christian practices can be understood outside believing communities.  
Bernd Wannenwestch also questions Yoder‘s claims regarding the translatability 
of the church‘s practices. Like Hauerwas, Wannenwestch identifies worship, specifically 
experienced by performing the liturgy, as the concept that gets bypassed in Yoder‘s 
bridge from Christian practices to practices in wider society. Wannenwestch argues that 
‗Yoder seems to want more and ends up with less.‘
80
 What Yoder misses in his 
recommendation of the church‘s practices as a model is ‗the impact of worship on secular 
politics.‘ Wannenwestch argues that the worship experience of liturgy ‗employs the 
metaphorical imagination in which liturgical experience spills over in a complex and 
manifold way.‘
81
 Both Hauerwas and Wannenwestch believe that the focus on the 
practices‘ social function is to the detriment of the meaning of the practices as Christian 
worship.   
 Michael Cartwright offers a nuance to Yoder‘s bold claim to translatability and 
the criticisms of incommensurability, by suggesting that Yoder‘s thought offers a 
contrasting model to the debate that attempts engagement and acknowledges that there 
are times for withdrawal.
82
 ‗Yoder engages all invitations for dialogue as if translation is 
possible but with an openness to taking seriously the objections of a missionary in a 
world of seemingly incommensurate perspectives, ideologies, cultures, and histories.‘
83
 
Cartwright notes that Yoder does this by insisting that ‗we take each problem as it comes, 
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Theologians and philosophers continue to question claims of translatability, but 
academics from other areas of study have found Yoder‘s work applicable to their field. 
Political scientists and sociologists have found that Yoder‘s work on the moral agency 
involved in the social practices of the church can speak cross-culturally to the wider 
world. Cross discipline approaches can be helpful to consider the moral agency involved 
in social roles such as the role of the journalist in a liberal democratic society or the role 
of civil society organisations. I will be doing the work of translation in the next few 
chapters by looking at the moral agency involved in a few of the translatable Christian 
social practices as performed in the wider world by audiences and journalists. Yoder‘s 
work is increasingly gaining attention in this multi-disciplinary way, particularly among 
those in political science.
85
 Yoder‘s work is translatable to the work of political scientists 
given the common turf of how societies relate to power. Yoder argues that an 
understanding of Jesus‘ relationship to the powers can help in ‗the task of social 
discernment to which we are especially called in our age.‘
86
 Yoder claims that the 
concrete experience of Jesus remains relevant for critiquing institutional powers. Next, I 
will consider political scientists‘ particular interest in Yoder‘s work on the role of 
voluntary associations and institutional power. I will also consider some of the criticism 
by theologians questioning Yoder‘s emphasis on voluntary associations. 
1.2.2.2 Voluntary Associations 
The practice of ‗Egalitarian Membership‘ involves the conviction that all are 
equally valid members of the community regardless of sex, ethnicity or social status. 
Yoder claims that membership based on conviction must be non-coercive, and therefore, 
membership must be voluntary.
87
 Voluntary commitment was one of the central tenets of 
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the early radical reformers; church membership must be voluntary based on conviction of 
belief. Voluntary membership preserves the distinction between those who are members 
of the church because of conviction and those who are members because of an 
authoritarian decree. This is part of Yoder‘s critique of Constantinianism. Voluntary 
associations are a necessary part of transforming social and political structures because 
their minority voices can speak out against cultural ‗pressures toward an inauthentic 
morality of conformity‘.
88
 Yoder is arguing that the minority dissent should be given just 
as much of a hearing as the majority position. 
What Yoder contributes to a cross-disciplinary conversation is a way to consider 
the moral agency of voluntary associations in civil society. ‗[S]ociologists of knowledge 
will continue to note the importance of voluntary associations, of which the free church 
remains a prototype.‘
89
 Yoder‘s contribution on the impact of civil society in democracies 
is considered in recent political science scholarship. For instance, Richard Bourne looked 
at how Yoder‘s work on exilic ecclesiology, characterised by minority status and 
voluntary association, ‗parallels and exceeds some of the most fruitful understandings of 
civil society and democratic participation.‘
90
 Romand Coles found Yoder a helpful 
conversation partner in his discussion of political practices that strengthen a pluralistic 
society.
91
 In addition to the positive reception of his contribution to the understanding of 
voluntary associations in civil society, Yoder has also received criticism for this 
emphasis. 
Yoder‘s critics point out that an emphasis on voluntary association of church 
membership and participation reduces the church to just another choice of the many 
voluntary associations one could be a part of in civic life such as a workers‘ union or a 
community recycling association. Oliver O‘Donovan asks: 
Is Yoder, in the name of nonconformity, not championing a great 
conformism, lining the church up with the sports clubs, friendly societies, 
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colleges, symphony subscription-guilds, political parties and so on, just to 
prove that the church offers late-modern order no serious threat?
92
  
More sympathetically, Alain Epp Weaver notes, ‗Yoder‘s stress on the voluntary 
character of the church unwittingly mirrors the liberal capitalist reduction of all 
alternative ways of life to consumer choices and the church to the level of yet one more 
voluntary association.‘
93
  How will the church be distinguishable from any of the other 
associations? Again, we return to the concerns of translation. Can the life world of the 
church really be known outside of the church?  
 These are important concerns and Yoder does in places acknowledge that 
Christian theological claims are not fully commensurable with sociological claims. I 
discuss this below in section 1.3.1 with reference to the church as ‗first fruits‘ of the 
Kingdom of God. It seems that what Yoder appreciates about sociology is that it 
describes visible communities. Sociologists cannot measure or describe the Augustinian 
invisible church, but sociologists can measure voluntary membership.
94
 Yoder includes 
sociology as one among many forms of description that can contribute toward the study 
of Christian social ethics.  
We cannot discuss theology alone but need to interface with the human 
sciences which are talking about the same phenomena from other 
perspectives. … If love leads someone to go out and make peace with 
one‘s adversary, is this not an event which a sociologist could describe? It 
is therefore appropriate, even imperative, as we flesh out the realism of the 
message of reconciliation that we attend to those other disciplines. There is 
no room here for the kind of dualism which would avoid such cross-
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Yoder is interested in understanding human behaviour through many disciplines. He 
illuminates the ethical significance of participating in a faith community based on 
voluntary association. He illustrates how the most non-coercive form of communication 
for communities is witness, a public embodiment of belief. He illustrates how merely 
being there, in the public realm has political significance. Yoder‘s ressourcement of his 
tradition has made a significant contribution to contemporary Christian ethics and it has 
the potential to affect other fields of study concerned with community representation and 
engagement in politics and society. In this next section, I consider how simply being 
there, present amidst turmoil and strife or peace and flourishing in real locations, is 
associated with the special status given to the testimony of eyewitnesses. The testimony 
of an eyewitness is a truth claim premised on being there. 
1.3 The Moral Agency of Being There 
For Yoder, the primary meaning of witness is ‘the functional necessity of just 
being there with a particular identity.‘
96
 In Yoder‘s use of the word witness as a noun, a 
witness is a person present at a specific location. As a verb, to witness as a form of 
communication means a person‘s presence is noticeable because her identity or his 
identity is distinguishable from the surroundings. The Niebuhrian charge to which 
Yoder‘s life-work responds is the accusation that a Christian witness of ‗just being there‘ 
is a passive witness and therefore an irresponsible and ineffectual social ethic. Yoder 
believed that the word passive is far too often conflated with the word pacifist. The peace 
church tradition believes that the witness of pacifism is constituted by active participation 
in conflict resolution and justice affirming practices; pacifism does not equal the absence 
of violence. The fruit of Yoder‘s ressourcement emphasised that the witness of the peace 
church tradition is not quietism, a passive withdrawal to the bucolic life, but rather 
engagement with the world through the ‗politics of Jesus‘. 
In this section, I investigate how bearing witness is contingent upon the act of 
being there. I look at Yoder‘s argument that witness as the embodiment of conviction and 
belief, is a method for making truth claims that emphasises truthfulness rather than 
securing claims to the Truth. I end this third section by investigating Yoder‘s concerns 
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about how the effectiveness of Christian ethics is measured, and how a method of witness 
measures up to concerns about efficacy.  
1.3.1 Being There as Testimony 
Yoder claims that just being present with a particular, and at times distinctive, 
identity is a recognisable witness to the wider world. As I mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, this is what he means by the metaphor of the church body as a pulpit. The 
church‘s practices are her social witness. For instance, the practice of reconciliation is 
public when the ‗watching world‘ sees an ethnic divide that is prevalent in the wider 
world overcome in the church‘s life together. Recognition comes through patterns of 
action, repeat performances over an extended period of time. These repeat performances 
are performed not because there is an audience of the ‗watching world‘, but because these 
practices are what constitute the social nature of the church. Simply by being, the church 
is a public witness, ‗just being there as an unprecedented social phenomenon‘.
97
 Yoder 
explains his phenomenology of social witness:  
The simple fact that the church is intractably present on the social scene as 
a body with its own authority, economic structure, leadership, international 
relations, openness to new members, conscientious involvement in society 
at some points, and conscientious resistance at others means that the social 




Yet Yoder is claiming more than the church as a social phenomenon.
99
 The 
church‘s example of inter-ethnic reconciliation is not simply a matter of soliciting 
voluntary membership for people interested in learning how to practice reconciliation. 
Yoder is making the far greater claim that the future Kingdom of God is present now 
among the people of God. While the church is ‗a sociological entity in its own right‘ 
measurable by sociologists, Yoder does not reduce the social ethics of the church to just 
                                                 
97
 Ibid., 41. 
98
 Ibid., 187. 
99
 Yoder acknowledges that every claim to do phenomenology is ‗avowedly ambiguous … in that it 
suggests the reliability or commonality of appearances as I see them, as if my proposing ―simply to 
describe‖ were a recourse to ―objectivity‖ and thus not subject to anyone‘s second guessing.‘ John Howard 
Yoder, "Walk and Word: The Alternatives to Methodologism," in Theology without Foundations: Religious 
Practice and the Future of Theological Truth, ed. Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, and Mark Nation 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 79. 
 32 
another voluntary association based on common conviction.
100
 Yoder‘s claim is that 
when churches practice reconciliation they are not only participating in behaviour that 
has noticeably positive benefits for society, but ultimately that they are participating in 
the Kingdom of God. Yoder claims that the existence of the church is the ‗first fruits‘ of 
the Kingdom of God. The existence of the ‗first fruits‘ is a promise that more is to come. 
Yoder explains: 
This means both that the church‘s presence constitutes a part of the 
promise that more is to come (what is meant by the biblical word 
‗earnest‘); but also that its quality and direction have begun to be manifest. 
The church does communicate to the world what God plans to do, because 
it shows that God is beginning to do it.
101
  
 Yoder‘s project in constructive theology is Christian ethics. He wrote about the 
church at a level of prescription, what ought to be based on the norm of Christ as the 
starting position for Christian social ethics. At the level of description, the church has 
failed and failed miserably at times. Yoder was not unaware of this. His work began as a 
critique first of his own tradition for becoming complacent and neglecting the critical 
edge of Mennonite testimony. Nonetheless, Yoder emphasises that witness has to do with 
longevity and patterns of recognition, of correction, confession and forgiveness, that 
witness to the character of the church. The practices that Yoder enumerates as public 
witness are only witness when enacted in real, historic situations. While the church might 
have been an exemplar in one attitude, she may have been repressive in another. At no 
point in history is the church a perfect exemplar, but it is through the particularity of 
history that the church‘s witness testifies. This is part of the fragility of witness; if the 
church is not present she does not participate in the social phenomenon of bearing 
witness. 
 Emphasised throughout Yoder‘s Christian ethics is that the church‘s very 
existence testifies to the Christian kerygma, the good news that the Kingdom of God has 
come. As I mentioned above, Yoder‘s work is criticized for too easily sliding into 
‗ecclesial triumphalism‘. The charge is reasonable given his claim of the church as ‗first 
fruits‘. Yet, Yoder‘s use of the word ‗earnest‘ presents the eschatological tension of the 
now, but not fully realised coming of the Kingdom of God. Being there is public 
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testimony, but testimony of what? Yoder claims that the church‘s presence testifies to 
‗the promise that more is to come.‘ In that promise is the acknowledgement that not all is 
fully realised and that includes claims to the Truth. 
1.3.2 Witness as a Method for Ethics 
The Christian church makes a truth claim in her proclamation of the kerygma, the 
good news that the Kingdom of God has come. In the task of doing ethics, questions of 
methodology are important. Methods for how truth claims are made play a determining 
role in determining which truth claims get a hearing in society and even which truth 
claims are believed. In Yoder‘s project of Christian social ethics, he is interested in 
removing the determining function of methodology as much as possible. Yoder uses the 
words ‗non-methodological‘ and ‗non-foundationalist‘ in proposing a repair to the 
problems he sees in the academic discipline of Christian social ethics.
102
 He uses these 
words playfully and antagonistically. He is not making epistemological claims that he can 
actually propose a ‗non-foundationalist‘ approach to ethics or that his method for ethics is 
‗non-methodological‘. Yoder is critical of universal claims as the beginning point for 
doing Christian ethics and he proposes a foundation of particular claims instead. Yoder 
critiques what he calls the ‗methodologism‘ emphasised in text books on Christian social 
ethics for neglecting to attend to the determining function of methodology. Thus, he 
proposes that witness is the least coercive method of ethics for making truth claims. 
Yoder‘s use of the words ‗non-methodological‘ and ‗non-foundationalist‘ is not 
descriptive of his project in Christian social ethics. His use of these words is actually an 
argument against the dominant positions in Christian social ethics. His chapter on the 
‗alternatives to methodologism‘ was published in a collection called Theology without 
Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of Theological Truth.
103
 
1.3.2.1 Witness as ‘Truth Claim’ 
How does the church make truth claims? Moral philosophers and theologians 
have offered many methods for moral reasoning. Yoder questions ‗the relative adequacy 
of‘ beginning ethical inquiry from the methodological position of ‗ends, means, contract, 
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virtue, story, and/or whatever else as modes of elucidation or even of validation.‘
104
 He 
offers a ‗non-methodological‘ method contingent on being non-coercive. Yoder reasons 
that because the message is peace, the means of communication must be peaceful. In his 
writing he does not focus on ‗truth claims‘; rather, he uses ‗the more biblical phrases 




Yoder is concerned about coercive communication practices. It is fruitful to 
consider the etymology of the word coerce given the importance Yoder ascribes to the 
word in his criticism of methodology in social ethics. It comes from the Latin coercēre, 
from co- and arcēre this second word the root for the word ‗ark‘ meaning to shut up, 
close off, and restrain.
106
 Coercive methods of ethics are a zero-sum game of making 
truth claims. If I claim the Truth, then all other claims to truth lose. Witness as a method 
to making truth claims is not done by forcibly constraining all other moral agents. 
Witness is a claim to truthfulness and faithfulness. When witness ceases to be truthful 
and faithful, it is no longer called witness. It is then called false witness, a coercive and 
oppressive form of communication the Decalogue warns against.
107
  
Yoder explains that witness is a non-coercive form of communication because it 
works from particulars to universals. The radical reformers criticised Christian moral 
reasoning which began from universal concepts such as ‗reason‘ and ‗nature‘ or 
‗creation‘ rather than the particularity of Jesus for Christian ethics. Yoder finds his 
tradition‘s approach to moral reasoning from particulars a more hopeful and a less 
coercive way to communicate in a pluralistic and relativistic environment: 
To say that all communities of moral insight are provincial, that there 
exists no nonprovincial general community with a clear language, and that 
therefore we must converse at every border, is in actuality a more 
optimistic and more fruitful affirmation of the marketplace of ideas than to 
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project a hypothetically general insight which we feel reassured to resort 
to, when our own particularities embarrass us, but which is not substantial 
after all when we seek to define it.
 108
  
Yoder recognises his approach is biased too. It is biased toward the particular, but he 
prefers the bias toward particulars since such a method ‗is less subject to a priori bias‘ 
found in universal foundationalist claims.
109
 Yoder argues that the reason the radical 
reformers can give the advice to begin ethical inquiry from existing communities, is 
because they were never in the privileged position of established religion where they 
could appeal to universals. For Yoder this is the special ressourcement that his tradition 
can offer the Christian church universal today. The Christian church is no longer in the 
position of establishment. Yoder is offering a method for Christian ethics to proceed from 
a minority position. The method for proceeding begins by looking at what communities 
already value. 
Yoder proposes his particularistic method for doing Christian ethics as a way to 
proceed in the project of ethics in a pluralistic world. His proposal is a continuation of his 
ressourcement of the Radical Reformation insight that since God potentially speaks 
through all people in the church, the practice of giving minority voices an opportunity to 
be heard should be a routine practice of the church. By expanding this claim beyond the 
church, Yoder allows for other voices to be heard from outside of the church, but he is 
not arguing for relativism. Yoder is arguing that the church may find, and has found, 
other voices of truthfulness outside of the church, but this is a method of ethics for the 
church. Yoder is not doing ethics for the whole world; he is doing ethics for the church. 
The particularist foundation from which the church begins moral inquiry is from the 
historically-contingent life of Jesus Christ. The foundation to which the church appeals 
for discerning the truthfulness of minority or other voices outside of the church is Jesus. 
Yoder argues that when ―we do see Jesus‖ in people and communities outside the church, 
that these people and communities are tactical allies. When God‘s grace is revealed by 
other sources, Yoder argues that the church should follow it:  
We may be tactical allies of the pluralist/relativist deconstruction of 
deceptive orthodox claims to logically coercive certainty, without making 
of relativism itself a new monism. We share tactical use of liberation 
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language to dismantle the alliance of church with privilege, without letting 
the promises made by some in the name of revolution become a new 
opiate. For the reconstruction we shall find other tactical allies. … We 
may then find tactical alliances with the Enlightenment, as did Quakers 
and Baptists in the century after their expulsion from the Puritan colonies, 
or with the Gandhian vision, as did Martin Luther King, Jr.
110
 
This quote is from an essay Yoder titled, ‗But We Do See Jesus: The Particularity of 
Incarnation and the Universality of Truth.‘ The phrase ‗but we do see Jesus‘ comes from 
Hebrews 2:8-9, Yoder translates: ‗As it is, we do not yet see everything in subjection to 
him. But we do see Jesus, who for a little while was made lower than the angels, now 
crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death.‘
111
 Yoder explains that 
while Christ reigns as sovereign over all of creation, ‗we do not yet see everything in 
subjection to him.‘ Since the church does not yet see everything in subjection to Christ, 
there is an eschatological tension involved even in the truth claims made by the church. 
Yoder therefore suggests that beginning with particular, existing communities is less 
coercive than beginning with universal claims. 
1.3.2.2 The Fragility of Witness 
There is no universal template or perfect form of Christian witness. There are 
‗patterns of human action‘ that are faithful to sharing in the testimony of Jesus.
112
  
Witness emerges out of daily faith, a living out of faith, and this lived experience is 
particular history not universal history.
113
 Theologian Susan Frank Parson argues that 
witness is fragile because it is particular. Witness is not passed on by inheritance, by 
symbolism, or paradigmatic example, but out of the ‗lived experience‘ of each person‘s 
conversion and discipleship. The truth claims made by a Christian or a Christian 
community are verified by their everyday practices over time. The Christian witness 
cannot coerce anyone to believe, the persuasive impact of a Christian‘s truth claims 
comes through the real experience of communities. 
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Bearing witness as a method for ethics is not contingent upon forcefulness or 
power. It is contingent upon the vulnerability of the servant being present as an 
embodiment of her beliefs. Bearing witness in the Christian tradition is inextricably 
linked with the body. The New Testament Greek word martur was transliterated into 
English as the word ‗martyr‘.
114
 Third century Christian theologian Origen wrote that 
‗everyone who bears witness‘ to Christ ‗may properly be called a witness [Gr. martur].‘ 
He wanted to correct the church practice of reserving the name martur only ‗for those 
who have borne witness to the mystery of godliness by shedding their blood for it.‘
115
 
Because bearing witness involves the physical risk of being there, the phrase ‗bearing 
witness‘ remains inextricably linked to martyrdom. 
According to theologian David Bentley Hart, Christian martyrdom is the Christian 
practice of persuasion. Hart argues that the ethical significance of Christian persuasion 
must always correspond to its message of peace and the effectiveness of the persuasion is 
lost when ‗subordinated to some other discourse of power and violence‘ as Christian 
history has proven.
116
 Christian martyrdom is an imitation of Christ‘s renunciation of 
violence. Thus, Christian practice ‗must always obey the form of Christ, its persuasion 
must always assume the shape of the gift he is, it must practice its rhetoric under the only 
aspect it may wear if it is indeed Christian at all: martyrdom.‘
117
 Christianity‘s ‗own 
peculiar practice of persuasion‘ is made visible through difference, ‗the powers of the 
world can suppress only through violence that creates martyrs, and so confirms—contrary 
to all it intends—the witness of a peace that is infinite.‘
118
 Hart claims that while the gift 
of the martyr, his or her life, is received in violence, the martyr‘s gift cannot be returned 
violently. Hart expains: 
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Christian rhetoric can be only a declaration of witness, and a gift. A gift of 
martyrs … can never be returned violently, as the Same; because this gift 




Theologian Duncan Forrester uses the analogy of the martyr as absorbing and removing 
some of the violence and suffering of the world: ‗the martyr who dies is often understood 
as one who absorbs in her suffering a little of the rage and terror of the enemy. Her dying 
as a martyr diverts some of the terror from the weak and the vulnerable.‘
120
 What is 
significant to point out in Hart and Forrester‘s understanding of martyrdom is the moral 
agency of the martyr to transform violence. There is no proliferation of violence in the 
gift of the martyr, and martyrdom may signal an end of violence. 
Yoder argues that Christian witness must be an act of servanthood and completely 
free of exerting power. Because it does not claim power, witness is not annihilated even 
if the Christian disciple is. Persuasive influence comes from serving, not from forcing. 
While Yoder claims that witness is the most persuasive form of communication, shared 
interpretation cannot be forced. The death of a Christian disciple is not a guarantee that 
his death will be interpreted as a case of martyrdom. Sociologist Émile Durkheim 
classifies martyrdom as a type of suicide. He characterises martyrdom as an ‗over 
integration into one‘s society.‘
121
 Writing about early Christian martyrdom, Durkheim 
says, ‗All these neophytes who without killing themselves, voluntarily allowed their own 
slaughter, are really suicides. … [T]hey had completely discarded their personalities for 
the idea of which they had become the servants.‘
122 
 Interestingly, in Durkheim‘s 
description of martyrdom, the notion that the person died in service to an idea retains the 
communicative agency that Yoder points out is involved in bearing witness. The death 
may not be interpreted as ‗martyrdom‘, nevertheless, it is recognised as service to a 
belief. This communicative agency of recognition is not linked to force. 
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Durkheim addresses early Christian martyrdom. What would he make of 
Christian martyrdom in more recent history? Would he classify the deaths of Oscar 
Romero, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Martin Luther King Jr. as suicides provoked by over 
integration into the ideas of their societies? These men knew that witnessing to their 
beliefs could very likely lead to their ‗slaughter‘. The concept of martyrdom in the 
modern church focuses not only on confessing Christ under the threat of death, but also 
on denouncing coercive practices. ‗Many modern martyrs … are not killed for admitting 
to the name of Christian, but for preaching the faith in a way that threatens vested 
interests.‘
123
 The deaths of Romero, Bonhoeffer, and King may not be interpreted as 
Christian martyrdom outside of the church, but many may recognise the social function 
of their struggle against hegemonic powers. Their ‗lived experience‘ bears witness to the 
truth claim that being present does threaten ‗vested interests‘.  
1.3.3 The Efficacy of Witness 
In his ground breaking Politics of Jesus, Yoder characterised the field of Christian 
social ethics as far too focused on effective results. He was writing this in a time when 
Protestant Christian social ethics predominantly focussed on social responsibility ethics. 
Christians in our age are obsessed with the meaning and direction of 
history. Social ethical concern is moved by a deep desire to make things 
move in the right direction. Whether a given action is right or not seems to 
be inseparable from the question of what effects it will cause. Thus part if 
not all of social concern has to do with looking for the right ‗handle‘ by 
which one can ‗get a hold on‘ history and move it in the right direction.
124
  
Yoder offers a corrective to this focus. His position is that efficacy as a measure of 
Christian engagement with the world is coercive and incongruent with the inherent 
vulnerability in the Christian practice of bearing witness. He argues for a discipleship 
ethic regardless of its efficacy.  
Essentially for Yoder the church‘s means of influence correlates directly to her 
obedient faithfulness.
 125
 Part of this faithful obedience is simply being present as a sign 
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to the world of what God is doing in the world. Witness as a presence that confronts 
social forces may at times unmask idols. The witness of the church may pioneer practices 
that cultivate peace over protectionist measures, or the witness of the church may simply 
be a sign of hope. How can a sign of hope be an effective form of engagement? Yoder 
gives an example of the efficacy of signs: 
Much of the achievement of the civil rights movement in the United States 
must be understood by means of this category of symbolic evaluation. A 
sit-in or march is not instrumental but it is significant. Even when no 
immediate change in the social order can be measured, even when persons 
and organizations have not yet been moved to take a different position, the 
efficacy of the deed is first of all its efficacy as sign.
126
  
What Yoder means by the deed itself having effect, relates to his contention that 
dissent, or even protest or withdrawal, is a position in and of itself. Yoder claims that the 
act of dissent is itself an action that communicates. He argues that conscientious objectors 
or nonconformists, ‗do not have to give an alternative social strategy, just by saying ―no‖, 
they unmask idolatry.‘
127
 Withdrawal does not necessarily equal disengagement with the 
world. Withdrawal from one aspect of culture or several specific aspects of culture can 
witness to dissent with those particular positions, yet not a wholesale denunciation of 
culture. For instance, Yoder himself refused to pay a percentage of his income tax 
proportionate to what US tax payers contributed to US nuclear proliferation.
128
 
The efficacy of witness, Yoder argues, begins with the achievement that other 
voices, minority voices, get a hearing. Yoder found this Christian position emphasised by 
the radical reformers. Practices such as egalitarian membership, lay empowerment and 
dialogical freedom meant that the Holy Spirit potentially spoke through any and all 
Christians, and therefore, all should have the right to speak in turn. Yoder‘s Christian 
social ethic is peaceful engagement with the world through a discipleship ethic. 
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Christians engage the world through practices that are specifiably Christian. Sometimes 
these practices are distinguishable from what is going on in the wider world and 
sometimes they are not. Yoder emphasised that the point of Christian distinctiveness is 
not to be unique simply for the sake of nonconformity, but simply to be Christian.
129
 The 
efficacy of Christian witness is correlated to faithful discipleship. 
Conclusion     
Yoder provides a body of work in which he posits that the natural resources for 
Christian social ethics are the practices of Jesus, or as Yoder declared them The Politics 
of Jesus. Christ as normative for Christian ethics is Yoder‘s starting point and he 
illustrates how this historically contingent foundation for Christian ethics has been 
neglected and remembered at different times during the history of the Christian church. 
Yoder cites his own church tradition that came from a line of radical reformers, not only 
as a resource for considering how the church should engage with culture from a minority 
position, but also as a model for hearing voices from outside the church. The method of 
engaging with culture that Yoder offers is witness. Witness is a method of ethics that is 
biased toward subjective particulars rather than objective universals. It is a method of 
ethics in which the witness bearers are not responsible for determining whether or not 
their message was effective; they are responsible for the truthfulness of their messages. 
The persuasive power of witness does not lie in forced acceptance. The persuasive power 
of the witness lies in the vulnerability of the witness who is present and engaged in 
culture, and yet has the conviction of a particular identity. 
Yoder helps us see how some Christian practices can be recognised outside the 
church as ethical ways of organising life together. Issues of translation remain. The 
understanding of the church as ‗first fruits‘ may be incommensurate outside of 
communities which proclaim that the Kingdom of God has come. Nevertheless, Yoder 
shows us how some Christian practices can be recognised as forms of practical moral 
reasoning for use beyond the church. The social function of some Christian practices can 
be seen in the media practice of conveying news of distant suffering. Public servanthood 
and dialogical freedom, for example, are recognisable in the practice of journalists giving 
voice to those who have little access to publicity. The practice of lay empowerment is 
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recognisable in the role of the journalist holding office bearers to account. The practice of 
egalitarian membership with an emphasis on voluntary association is recognisable in the 
formation of audiences into active members of civil society organisations. I explore all of 
these forms of practical moral reasoning in the next few chapters. The ultimate reason for 
appealing to Yoder, however, is that he shows how bearing witness to a belief is a way to 
make truth claims. 
 Bearing witness to distant suffering proclaims the truth that human beings should 
be free from torture, genocide, starvation, and civilian bombing, as well as the belief that 
human beings should be cared for in the aftermath of natural disasters. Yoder makes the 
argument that truth claims are authenticated through the community‘s public presence 
and engagement with the situation. Yoder provides the groundwork for considering how 
a community‘s practice of bearing witness to their belief is a form of social ethics. Thus, 
I consider the moral agency involved in the media practice of bearing witness to distant 
suffering. I begin by looking at the media practice of bearing witness to distant suffering 
first as a community of actors under the umbrella name of the Global Samaritan, and then 
I consider audiences and journalists as moral agents.  
John Howard Yoder is a valuable choice for conversation partner regarding the 
practice of bearing witness. He is not the only theologian with whom to have this 
conversation, but his work particularly underpins the moral agency involved in the act of 
bearing witness. I end this chapter with a question which I address in the next chapters 
and that I will return to in the conclusion: How does Yoder‘s argument for bearing 
witness as a form of social ethics help us understand the moral agency involved in the 
media practice of bearing witness to distant suffering? 
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Chapter 2:  The Narrative of the Global Samaritan 
In this chapter I introduce the character of the Global Samaritan bearing witness 
to human suffering in the global media sphere. In order to explain who the Global 
Samaritan is and the space in which the Global Samaritan exists, I draw on literature from 
several fields: Media and Journalism Studies, Christian Theology, Political Theory and 
Sociology. This chapter provides the framework for normative understandings of the 
public realm and the Western humanitarian community. The figure of the Global 
Samaritan functions as a metaphor for the ‗chain of intermediaries‘
130
 involved in 
delivering humanitarian aid to people suffering in distant lands. The conveyance of 
humanitarian aid includes everything from raising awareness of the need, motivating 
political action, and actually delivering care to the people.  
I carry forward John Howard Yoder‘s claim that bearing witness is social ethics, 
into this and subsequent chapters to see if Yoder‘s claim serves in the investigation of the 
moral agency of the Global Samaritan. Yoder argues that the existence of a community 
organising their life based on their convictions is public testimony, that is, social witness. 
Their action together bears witness to their belief; this is what Yoder called the 
‗phenomenology of social witness‘. In this chapter, I consider normative understandings 
of the public realm primarily in the work of Hannah Arendt and with some attention to 
the work of Jürgen Habermas. Both Arendt and Habermas have concepts that parallel 
Yoder‘s phenomenology of social witness. Arendt describes public realms brought into 
existence based on common cause. The result of these public realms is political action 
that bears witness to the community‘s shared belief. Habermas describes the social 
function of civil society organisations in the public sphere. These organisations of 
voluntary association communicate their convictions based on their ‗programmatic 
character‘.  The common cause which brought them together in the first place, will be the 
basis for what they do when they are together. 
The Global Samaritan, representing the Western humanitarian community, bears 
witness to the belief that human beings should be free from starvation, genocide, and 
torture, as well as other human-made or natural causes of mass suffering. The Global 
Samaritan bears witness in the global media sphere. In the final section of this chapter, I 
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consider technological and sociological changes that have contributed to the cultivation 
of a global media sphere as a place to bear witness to distant human suffering. I begin my 
discussion of the Global Samaritan with an introduction to the narrative of global 
compassion. 
2.1 The Narrative of Global Compassion 
The narrative of global compassion is a political and journalistic frame helpful in 
its explanation of how to understand the world from a Western gaze after the end of the 
Cold War.  During the Cold War, journalism coverage of foreign news was framed by the 
politics of the Communist world versus the Democratic world.  News media editors and 
scholars have used the metaphor of a chess board—there were major countries creating 
two teams.
 131
 There were those on the side of the communists and those on the side of 
the democratic countries. Countries not clearly aligned were pawns between the major 
players ready to fall to one side or the other. Such was the interpretive frame from which 
journalists reported on stories from Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.  Under 
the narrative of the Cold War, geopolitics guaranteed Western journalistic coverage of 
distant and unfamiliar places. With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the Cold War 
narrative no longer provided a frame for foreign news coverage. A new rationale was 
needed in order to justify Western news agencies travelling to foreign and distant places 
to perform the expensive task of news gathering.  
The experts to whom I refer to in this chapter, argue that the Cold War narrative 
was replaced by a hopeful narrative of moral intervention and humanitarian care, the 
narrative of global compassion.
132
 The narrative of global compassion, of course, is a 
product of its time. The 1990s began with wars and genocide in Bosnia, Rwanda, and 
Somalia and Western humanitarian intervention in these places.
133
 There are other 
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narratives used to explain foreign news coverage in the West,
134
 but for the purposes of 
this thesis, I am focusing on the narrative of global compassion. This narrative is not 
without criticism; for instance Michael Ignatieff claims that the challenge is that the 
narrative of global compassion cannot sustain continued coverage of chaotic death and 
destruction in far away places. He argues that without an overarching narrative such as 
the Cold War or interests of the British Empire, identification with the viewers is made 
on the ‗lines of pure emotional empathy with the starving the suffering, the dying and the 
massacred‘. Ignatieff goes on to argue that these ‗very flimsy lines of identification‘ are 




For television journalism, the heuristic of the narrative of global compassion is a 
frame for international coverage in which complex issues in distant and unfamiliar places 
can be covered in a way that is still relevant to national interest. If foreign news coverage 
is not made relevant to national interests, then it is not broadcast. I discuss the importance 
of public relevance in section 2.3 of this chapter. The essential point is that which is not 
made relevant does not receive a public hearing let alone a public voice. The players 
involved in the narrative of global compassion include more than news media 
organisations. The narrative is populated by a full cast of members. 
2.1.1 Cast Members 
The narrative of global compassion is populated by a cast of characters.
136
  I 
identify these characters in five groupings. First, there are the news organisations with the 
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leading roles played by the war reporter and foreign correspondent. In chapters four and 
five, I provide in-depth analysis of the role of the foreign correspondent in the narrative 
of global compassion. A second grouping central to the cast is played by aid workers of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also called charities. A third grouping of 
characters includes the peacekeepers of international political bodies such as the United 
Nations. These bodies can provide both physical presence at sites of suffering as well as 
policy regarding suffering such as the UN resolution called the ‗Responsibility to 
Protect‘.
137
 A fourth group includes diplomats and elected-government officials of 
individual States. And fifth, not to be excluded from the ensemble is the public, many 
people constituting a singular persona ficta. The public is involved in the funding of the 
aid agencies, the voting in of the politicians, and the viewing of the media news 
organisations. In chapter three, I direct my focus primarily on the public. Excluded from 
the central cast of the narrative of global compassion is the object of compassion, the 
victim of suffering. The ‗victims‘ are not included in the final grouping of public because 
the victims are the object of the gaze of the public.   
The roles required of the cast members are inter-related, for example the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would like to put pressure on 
diplomats or governments to act, so they invite a journalist along to a restricted area to 
cover a story. The reporter, who would like access to the restricted area, happily 
accompanies the ICRC and mediates the story to both government officials and the 
public.  The hope is that the public will exert pressure on politicians to do something for 
the suffering of the distant strangers. Once news media organisations get involved in 
disseminating the images of suffering people, then relief agencies begin to receive 
donations.  I will illustrate the next three chapters with variations on this script and I will 
question the axiomatic claims and conventional wisdom that accompany the narrative of 
global compassion. In this chapter, I consider news audiences and news reporters 
together, whereas, I devote the subsequent chapters to individual groupings. 
I focus this thesis on investigating the narrative of global compassion as 
represented in the genre of televisual foreign news coverage. There are other genres of 
media which could be explored using this frame as a method for investigating cultural 
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practice.  The narrative of global compassion could also be investigated through other 
genres such as popular films, including Blood Diamond (2007) and Hotel Rwanda 
(2004), but also in documentary films like Paul Freedman‘s Rwanda – Do Scars Ever 
Fade? (2003), or his film on Darfur Sand and Sorrow (2007).
138
 Live Aid campaigns and 
the Make Poverty History campaign are cultural artefacts of a further genre that could be 
investigated with the framework of the narrative of global compassion.
139
 These 
campaigns are often accompanied by commercial brands linking company names like 
GAP to t-shirts in support of campaigns. Even the book-of-the-month at Starbucks, A 
Long Way Gone by former child soldier Ishmael Beah, is a cultural artefact which could 
be categorised under the broad heading of global compassion. Starbucks is promoting this 
book by a former child soldier as a way to promote ‗community and conversation‘ about 
global suffering in Starbucks‘ coffee houses.
140
 In foreign news coverage, the 
entertainment industry and other culture-making enterprises, the West is cast as a global 
citizen. 
2.1.2 Global Citizenship 
Birgitta Höijer situates the discourse of global compassion ‗at the intersection 
between politics, humanitarian organizations, the media and the audience/citizens.‘ All of 
the cast members in global compassion share the same citizenship, that of global 
citizenship. Anthony Giddens describes globalisation as creating ‗the intensification of 
action at a distance‘ and this generates new forms of identities.141  Journalism 
practitioners and scholars Howard Tumber and Frank Webster argue that globalisation 
contributes to global citizenship and the ‗globalisation of conscience‘. Globalisation has 




                                                 
138
 Paul Freedman made the distinction between his documentary film on Rwanda and his film on Darfur. 
He clearly distinguished the film on Rwanda as a ‗documentary‘ film, whereas he called the Darfur film an 
‗advocacy‘ film. I recorded this in a conversation with Freedman on 25 September 2008 following the 
screening of both films. 
139
 Kate Nash, "Global Citizenship as Show Business: The Cultural Politics of Make Poverty History," 
Media Culture Society 30, no. 2 (2008). 
140
 "Riveting True Story of Hope and Redemption ―a Long Way Gone‖ Is Next Starbucks Featured Book," 
Starbucks Press Release, January 11 2007.  
141
 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 4. 
142
 Howard Tumber and Frank Webster, Journalists under Fire:  Information War and Journalistic 
Practice (London: Sage, 2006), 4. 
 48 
Höijer‘s research on audience reaction to humanitarian news coverage in Sweden 
revealed a local audience with a global conscience. She concludes that the narrative of 
global compassion is an attractive framework for citizens because it encourages civic and 
political interaction while bypassing the partisan involvement required in the Cold War 
framing of international reporting. Höijer notes the trend that people would rather 
become a member of a humanitarian non-governmental organization (NGO) than a 
political party because of NGOs‘ ‗apolitical character‘.
143
  
With their philanthropic and altruistic messages and practices, they are 
apparently above the power games and hypocrisy of ordinary politics. 
They exist to serve humanity, they always side with the victims and they 
appeal to our most noble feelings—compassion and altruism.
144
 
As I noted in the roll call of cast members above, the victims of suffering are not included 
as players in the narrative of global compassion. Feelings of compassion and altruism 
begin with cast members. Compassion is a subject-centred or subject-directed emotion 
and form of reasoning done by the cast members of global compassion.
145
 The object of 
compassion may be a victim of any combination of what media organizations call the 
‗Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse‘—disease, famine, war and death.
146
   
The picture of the world that cast members of the narrative of global compassion 
paint is a picture of the West as global citizen. Epitomising this picture of the world 
shaped by the narrative of global compassion is in the title of civil action organizations 
like, Not on Our Watch, and the accompanying book Not On Our Watch: The Mission to 
End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. Actor Don Cheadle, of Hotel Rwanda (2004) fame, 
and John Prendergast, a former official in the US Clinton administration, co-wrote the 
book and co-founded the organization that encourages citizens to influence their 
governments to act. The picture of the world generated by the narrative of global 
compassion is that there are global citizens who can stop genocide and suffering in 
distant places. The responsible global citizen is the modern day Global Samaritan. 
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2.2 Global Framing of the Parable of the Good Samaritan 
In literature on the topic of witnessing distant suffering, the parable of the Good 
Samaritan is invariably invoked.
147
 Western humanitarianism has roots in the West‘s 
Christian tradition. The parable of the Good Samaritan is a story in the moral imagination 
of most Westerners. Whether or not a public imagery of the parable is cultivated through 
hearing the Gospel of Luke 10:29-37 or through watching the season finale of the 
television show Seinfeld (1998),
148
 the West associates the parable of the Good Samaritan 
with a humanitarian impulse. The Samaritan was moved by compassion and he aided the 
suffering man. In this section, I will look at the West as Global Samaritan, and at 
problems that arise with assigning the Samaritan global agency. I then consider how 
audiences in the first centuries of the Common Era may have understood Jesus‘ parable 
of the Samaritan in contrast with twenty-first century understanding. 
2.2.1 The Analogy of the Good Samaritan and Humanitarian Action 
Social critic Luc Boltanski argues that the framing of the West as the Global 
Samaritan is a helpful frame because the important point of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan is that pity ‗must rapidly give way to action.‘
149
 Boltanski cites the parable of 
the Good Samaritan as a fruitful way to describe forms of compassionate relationships 
because the story is realistic:  
It is realistic first of all because it focuses on the situation with its inherent 
constraints and on the ends with which individuals must come to terms if 
they are to commit themselves. It is also realistic because it places itself at 
the level of action, and specifically of an action directed towards the relief  
of the unfortunate‘s suffering which must consider both its practicability 
(taking into account the constraints on the person providing help) and 
effectiveness (the likelihood of effectively changing the condition of the 
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The analogy of the Good Samaritan is problematised when pity cannot be followed by 
rapid action which is the case of witnessing suffering at a distance. Boltanski argues that 
news of distant suffering is not new to the last two centuries, but because of technological 
innovation in global communication systems the witnessing of distant suffering is far 
more prevalent. The problem is that global spectators who react with pity to suffering 
conveyed by a global media system have little recourse to act immediately. 
The spectacle of the unfortunate being conveyed to the witness, the action 
taken by the witness must in turn be conveyed to the unfortunate. But the 
instruments which can convey a representation and those which can 
convey an action are not the same.
151
  
Boltanski goes on to say that there exists a ‗chain of intermediaries between the spectator 
and the unfortunate‘ in order for any action to be achieved.
152
 While response via 
intermediaries is an incredible obstacle to action and almost a complete limitation on 
direct action, response through intermediaries is not a complete negation of any action. 
The ‗chain of intermediaries‘ is what I have described as the players in the narrative of 
global compassion. The spectator, or the public, is only one among many cast members. 
Nonetheless, Boltanski‘s concern remains: the spectator‘s reaction of pity cannot be 
followed-up by immediate action.  
Eventually Boltanski justifies the media practice of witnessing distant suffering. 
He acknowledges that the humanitarian promotion of the spectacle of suffering provides 
an avenue for the public to ‗denounce‘ the perpetrators of violence as well as a way for 
the public to express ‗sentiment‘ for the unfortunate victims in a manner that is linked to 
a call to action. The link to the call for action involves the long chain often starting with 
humanitarian aid organisations, both NGOs and UN bodies, encouraging journalist 
reportage on the suffering, the public‘s reception of the news and then movement to put 
pressure on officials and more charity organisations to become involved. It is the fragile 
link between spectator‘s pity and the possibility for real action, on-the-ground, that 
allows Boltanski to justify the humanitarian promotion of the spectacle of suffering. He 
argues that action ‗exercised from a long way off‘ is ‗useless‘ and an ‗illusion‘ of action 
if it is not connected to real presence. ‗Ultimately what justifies the humanitarian 
movement is that its members are on the spot. Presence on the ground is the only 
                                                 
151




guarantee of effectiveness and even of truth.‘
153
 Boltanski is interested in what possible 
action is available following the sentiment of pity.
154
 In the end, action requires 
somebody to be there, on the scene. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, the only 
people present to the man‘s suffering were the priest, the Levite and the Samaritan. 
Audiences to the parable do not know whether the first two had pity, only that they did 
not act. Audiences learn that the Samaritan had pity and did act. What is the position of 
the audience? Is the audience present to human suffering in their role as spectator? 
2.2.2 First Century Audiences to the Parable 
To begin with, Jesus told a parable about a man suffering on the side of the road 
and the author of Luke recorded that story. The parable was not a news story hurriedly 
filed for the evening news. It was not a live or direct call for action for any audience to 
rush to the aid of the man suffering on the side of the road. It was a parable told to a 
specific audience at a specific time. The modern audience of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan gives the preferred reading of the parable as an analogy for how to act in a 
humanitarian crisis; this was not the case for audiences of the first few centuries.  Biblical 
scholar Riemer Roukema traces theological writings from the first centuries illustrating 
that the parable was understood allegorically, ‗the Samaritan being seen as Christ the 
Saviour of sinners, who had been robbed by the devil.‘ Early Christian audiences to this 
parable ‗were ready to identify themselves with the wounded man helped by the 
Samaritan, who was represented by other Christians.‘
155
 Given the modern prevalent use 
of the parable of the Good Samaritan as a call to humanitarian action, I think it is worth 
renewing our modern understanding of the parable by revisiting earlier interpretations of 
the parable in the Christian tradition. In the next chapter I ask the question of televisual 
audiences: How far do audiences make Good Samaritans? I will turn to insight on first 
century audiences to assist in the evaluation of twenty-first century audiences. 
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Twenty-first century audiences identify with the Good Samaritan. To consider 
how first century Jewish and Samaritan audiences might have identified with the parable 
of the Good Samaritan, I primarily consider the work of New Testament scholar Ian 
McDonald.
156
 He provides a socio-historical telling of the parable of the Good Samaritan 
in which he explains the social context a Jewish audience and a Samaritan audience 
might encounter in the story. McDonald begins by describing ‗the social and economic 
upheavals of Herodian times,‘ and the effects on the people of Israel: 
dispossession of land Jews held in the North (a policy with an uncanny 
resemblance to what is known today as ethnic cleansing), and the 
consequent creation of a massive pool of unemployed urban poor in the 
South with all the symptoms of distress that go with it (not to speak of 
fiscal and temple taxation), then we not only place the robbers in their 
social context … but priest and Levite could be seen by many as 
ecclesiastical oppressors, extracting through the Temple tax money the 
poor could ill afford and imposing the cruellest sanction on Jewish people 
who could not pay: exclusion from Israel‘s life and worship.
157
  
2.2.2.1 Jewish Audience 
A Jewish audience, many of whom have travelled the dangerous roads before, 
have the perspective of the ‗view from the ditch‘ with the traveller.
158
 New Testament 
scholar Howard Marshall notes that the man in the ditch ‗is intentionally left undescribed; 
he can be any man, although a Jewish audience would naturally think of him as a Jew.‘
159
 
For the Jewish audience, here is the parabolic subversion of the story: help must come 
from outside, but to have it come from a Samaritan is like being kicked when you are 
already down. McDonald cites the Mishna, ‗He that eats the bread of Samaritans is like 
one that eats the flesh of swine.‘ McDonald draws from Biblical scholar Robert W. Funk 
who writes, ‗all who are truly victims, truly disinherited, have no choice but to give 
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themselves up to mercy.‘
160
  Funk argues that in order for the audience, the audience then 
and now, to understand the parable is to take up the position in the ditch: ‗it does not 
suggest that one behave as a good neighbour like the Samaritan, but that one become the 
victim in the ditch who is helped by an enemy.‘
161
  
2.2.2.2 Samaritan Audience 
To continue on in McDonald‘s socio-historical telling of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, the Samaritans are not observing the action of the story from the ditch with 
the traveller. Many Samaritans had found opportunity to prosper economically during 
Herodian upheavals.
162
 Biblical scholar Michael Knowles argues that audiences of the 
first centuries would recognise the particular cues embedded within or implied by this 
text as depicting the Samaritan in this manner: ‗the parable depicts a Samaritan oil and 
wine merchant travelling a regular commercial route, which would account for his cargo, 
his beast, his access to funds, his apparent destination, and his planned return.‘
163
 
Knowles acknowledges that this depiction is not a new finding, but this interpretation 
‗finds important confirmation in recent archaeological research.‘
164
 So a Samaritan 
audience, which McDonald argues was part of Luke‘s intended audience, would observe 
the action of the story from a place of relative safety and prosperity. They are in the 
position where they could do something, but why should they, given the racial and 
ecclesiastical tension between themselves and the Jews?  McDonald claims that for the 
Samaritan audience, the parabolic subversion is a call to remembering the past, an earlier 
Jewish recording of the actions of good Samaritans.  McDonald summarizes the actions 
of the Samaritans recorded in 2 Chronicles 28.5-15 when the prophet Oded persuaded the 
Samaritans to return Jewish women and children wrongfully taken in war: 
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They clothed them, gave them sandals, provided them with food and drink, 
and anointed them; and carrying all the feeble among them on asses, they 
brought them to their kinsfolk at Jericho, the city of palm trees …
165
  
McDonald is not offering this comparison as original insight. Marshalls and Knowles cite 
that this is a well-accepted interpretation in Biblical Studies.
166
 For the Samaritan hearer 
the ‗parable summons the hearers to obey the best in their tradition.‘
167
 For the 
Samaritans it was a reminder of who my neighbour is, even in acrimonious times. 
2.2.3 Twenty-First Century Audiences to the Parable  
Modern Western audiences to the telling of the parable of the Good Samaritan are 
closer to the position of the Samaritan audience simply because neither the Samaritan nor 
the modern audience is in the ditch. Readings of the Biblical passages may actually have 
a wider audience outside of the West, but I am focusing on Western audiences given the 
tie of this parable to the Western narrative of global compassion. I have never heard an 
appeal to the parable of the Good Samaritan used in the parabolic subversion intended for 
the Jewish audience—that help will come from the despised. While it is perfectly 
applicable and we often hear vignettes of someone being forced to accept help from her 
enemy, we do not hear an invocation of the parable, ‗Remember the Good Samaritan.‘ 
More likely, we would hear an aphorism such as beggars can’t be choosers. The West 
reads the text through the experience of predominantly being in the position to give 
charity and mercy rather than to receive it. I think it is helpful to have another angle on 
this situation and a Dalit perspective can provide that contrast. 
2.2.3.1 A Dalit Theological Perspective of the Parable 
In the modern Western reference to the Good Samaritan, the meaning of the 
Samaritan as the despised one liberating the righteous one is lost. The West is not a 
monolith. There are groups among Western audiences who may relate more to the 
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Samaritan as the despised one, rather than the Samaritan as the economically advantaged 
one. Such groups within the West might relate more to modern interpretations of the 
parable coming from outside of the West. A Dalit perspective on the parable is a modern 
interpretation for a community that might experience a variation on the parabolic 
subversion intended for the Jewish audience. Indian theologian, and specifically of Dalit 
Christian theology, M. Gnanavaram contextualizes the parable where the Dalit, the 
lowest Indian caste, is likened to the Samaritan. The Dalit is like the Samaritan not for 
being in the privileged place to give charity, but rather for being of a despised people. 
The parabolic subversion intended for the Dalit audience Gnanavaram argues is a 
realization of a Dalit consciousness:  
It makes Dalits realize that they should not simply suffer their lot but that 
they should take responsibility for themselves. We [Dalits] can learn from 
the parable that when they become aware of the situation, as the Samaritan 




Here compassion and charity for the victim comes through the liberation of the oppressed 
to show solidarity with the suffering. Gnanavaram compares Western theology which 
reads the parable of the Good Samaritan through charity as a responsibility of the 
economically secure, with that of Dalit theology which reads the parable through 
liberation of the oppressed and liberation via the oppressed.   
Both McDonald and Gnanavaram take a socio-historical view of the parable. 
When they speak of the parable‘s meaning for contemporary audiences they are talking 
about the process of the Christian church continually reading the Biblical parable and 
grappling with what it means for modern audiences of the Gospel. Given the association 
of the parable of the Good Samaritan with a Western humanitarian narrative of global 
compassion, I will look at a few interpretations of the parable of the Good Samaritan at a 
wider, popular level in the West. 
2.2.3.2        Popular Culture uses of the Parable 
The parable of the Good Samaritan has influenced the moral imagination of 
Western society as we can see through the continued use of the reference in legal and 
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media practices. The Western audiences‘ understanding of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan can be illustrated by briefly considering laws that reference the phrase ‗Good 
Samaritan‘ and news coverage that uses the phrase ‗Good Samaritan‘ in the headlines. 
Good Samaritan Laws 
We can see what a culture within a civil-law country values by the laws they 
enact.  Many Western countries have a ‗Good Samaritan Law‘, either under that name as 
in the US and Canada, or some other name that thematically fits into the category of 
Good Samaritanship.
169
 Jan M. Smits finds it helpful to look at these laws under the 
single category of Good Samaritanship because the parable‘s ‗biblical origin has ensured 
the discussion of the case in nearly every Western legal system.‘
170
 Good Samaritan laws 
are intended to encourage citizens toward a practice of neighbourliness, extending 
compassion beyond dependent relationships, when in the proximity of somebody in 
distress. Jesus told the parable of the Good Samaritan in response to the lawyer‘s 
question, ‗Who is my neighbour?‘ The lawyer wanted to know the limits of his duty as 
neighbour. So too do the Good Samaritan laws answer the question of who is my 
neighbour and what are the limits of duty required. According to the laws, neighbours 
have to do with proximity and time; whoever is near at the time of danger is the victim‘s 
neighbour. Eye-witnesses are neighbours.  In the general duty to rescue laws, European 
countries and individual US states and Canadian provinces vary on who is obligated to 
render assistance. In some cases, it is only the eye-witnesses, and in other cases passers-
by within the time-span of the distress are under obligation too. And, in the case of the 
law in Belgium: ‗everyone informed of the danger‘ is under a general obligation to 
provide assistance to the person in peril.
171
 Howard Marshall points out that Jesus‘ 
parable illustrates that you cannot define neighbour in the casuistic manner the lawyer 
seeks to define neighbour, you 'can only be a neighbour.'
172
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Good Samaritan Headlines 
As discussed above, Western theological interpretations of the parable of the 
Good Samaritan emphasise the aspect of those with resources charitably and generously 
giving to those in great need. A glance at BBC headlines from 2007 using the phrase 
Good Samaritan retain the emphasis of charitable acts but also reveal the dangerous 
world of acts of charity and mercy to strangers. Only two of the headlines from the BBC 
news website referencing Good Samaritanship were simply about the act of charity, 
rather the predominant use of the phrase Good Samaritan was used when the rescuer 
became the victim: Addict stole from Good Samaritan; Good Samaritan beaten 
Unconscious; 'Good Samaritan' tourist stabbed; 'Good Samaritan' raped by convict; 
'Good Samaritan' left in coma; Crash man knifed Good Samaritan.
173
A US headline from 
The New York Times has similarly dubious view of Good Samaritanship and encourages 
readers toward reconsidering neighbourliness altogether: Samaritan's Death Raises 
Questions About Her Choices.
174
  
The parable of the Good Samaritan, or a general reference to the Good Samaritan, 
is still evident in the moral imagination of the West and the parable‘s critical question of 
‗Who is my neighbour?‘ remains a central meaning in the reference‘s popular use. I do 
not really think the Good-Samaritan-turned-victim news headlines are scare tactics trying 
to discourage neighbourliness, but rather a narrative framing of news coverage which 
highlights good versus the audacity of evil.
175
 The headlines highlight that the miracle of 
neighbourliness, in a dangerous world where even the one you consider your neighbour 
may beat, stab, rape, or kill you, still exists. 
McDonald argues that the modern audience perspective is much more like the 
perspective of the Samaritan audience who could find in the parable a: 
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narrative concept of morality in which the question of identity – ‗Who am 
I?‘ – and that of goal or telos – ‗What ought I to become?‘ – are brought to 
the fore and subjected to the criterion of ‗neighbourly‘ initiative towards 
‗the man in the ditch‘.
176
  
McDonald is articulating an active audience response to the hearing of the parable. The 
audience of the parable of the Good Samaritan was given a lesson in sociality rather than 
procedures for emergency and hospice care. McDonald says that the parable is more 
about questions of identity formation than about providing a principle or rule of care. The 
parable provides a narrative for audiences to work out what kind of communities they are 
and what they hope to be. In order to have a narrative concept of morality, there must be 
some kind of community being shaped by the narrative. The parable has to be heard 
within some sort of community. Can a Western television audience be a community? I 
take up this concern in the next chapter where I concentrate on audiences. 
 In this section I have investigated the claim of the West as Global Samaritan 
through looking at how the parable of the Good Samaritan works as a way to frame 
foreign news coverage of suffering in distant places. I pointed to the contrast in how 
audiences of the first centuries and contemporary audiences might interpret the parable. 
The frame of the parable of the Good Samaritan as a frame for news coverage of disasters 
and suffering has communicative value, people moved by compassion act: pick the man 
up from the side of the road, tend to basic emergency aid, and transport the man to an Inn 
for hospice care, and then return again to check on him. The West as Global Samaritan 
problematises personal care in a one-to-one method. In order for the Global Samaritan to 
administer person-to-person care, a whole system of action is involved for the 
conveyance of care. This system of conveyance, or Boltanski‘s ‗chain of intermediaries‘, 
begins with the lawyer‘s concern of limits, ‗Who is my neighbour?‘ Global compassion 
begins by introducing new neighbours into the neighbourhood in order to be cared for by 
the Global Samaritan, constituted of news organisations, NGOs, international political 
bodies, State government officials, and the public. In the next section, I argue that the 
neighbourhood in which the Global Samaritan resides is the global media sphere. In the 
narrative of global compassion, direct action is delivered at the far end of this system. 
The system begins with a visible representation of a neighbour on whom to have pity. 
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Without such publicity, the system that makes up the Global Samaritan has nowhere to 
direct compassion. Publicity proves the beginning of a lifeline for those men, women, and 
children suffering on the side of the road. 
2.3 Publicity as a Lifeline 
In order to achieve anything like the proximity of the Good Samaritan to the 
suffering man in the ditch, the Global Samaritan begins with raising awareness, casting 
public light on distant suffering. As I discussed above with reference to New Testament 
scholarship, the Samaritan figure in Jesus‘ parable was likely equipped with oil, wine, 
and money ready to minister to the needs of the suffering man. The Global Samaritan of 
the twenty-first century is equipped to begin to minister to the needs of mass suffering 
with global, networked communication. The first aid response given to victims of distant 
wars, famines and natural disasters is publicity, awareness at a global level of the 
existence of particular instances of suffering. In this section, I consider how raising 
awareness of humanitarian crises is the beginning of how the Global Samaritan acts. 
Before I investigate the global media sphere as the vehicle for raising awareness about 
humanitarian disasters, I begin with a theoretical investigation into the nature of the 




I am interacting with the ideas of Hannah Arendt primarily for her articulation of 
the public realm and secondly, for her understanding of the difficulty of making the 
private emotion of pain relevant to a large public. I use the language of the public sphere 
or the public realm realising that the public realm is not a monolith.
178
 There are many 
publics in every country let alone within international bodies. In fact, my use of the 
phrase global media sphere as the place of conversation for global compassion is a sphere 
made up of many different publics while excluding other publics. Arendt‘s public realm 
need not be considered a monolithic realm subsuming all publics and claiming a central 
and single public sphere. Her definition of the public realm as a place created by human 
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hands makes room for multiple publics created by various communities as places to 
practice politics and coordinate action. Arendt‘s articulation of the public realm provides 
a normative description of the important roles played by publicity and privacy in the 
public realm. Thus, Arendt provides a helpful framework for understanding the public 
function of appearance and lack of appearance in the discourse on global compassion. In 
Arendt‘s use of the word ‗public‘ she is concerned with two issues: first, the ability of a 
person to ‗appear‘ before others, and second, the social relevance of some people‘s 
‗appearance‘ compared to other people‘s ‗appearance‘. I look to Arendt‘s work with my 
concern in mind, that the public appearance of the suffering in the neighbourhood of the 
Global Samaritan is the beginning of action in the narrative of global compassion.  
2.3.1   Publicity as Appearance 
Arendt argues that in the public realm, ‗appearance—something that is being seen 
and heard by others as well as by ourselves—constitutes reality.‘
179
 Crucial to Arendt‘s 
understanding of the public realm is that this is where the action of politics takes place, 
the action of word and deed. To be denied appearance in this place is to be denied reality. 
In Antiquity, being denied public appearance was the fate of slaves, women and 
foreigners.  
To be deprived of it [publicity] means to be deprived of reality, which, 
humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the 
reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others by its 
appearing to all; ‗for what appears to all, this we call Being,‘ and whatever 
lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and 
exclusively our own but without reality.
180
 
Arendt‘s argument, that to be deprived of appearance is to be deprived of life, is 
not far from the sentiment Alan Johnston expressed when he was released from 114 days 
held hostage in the Gaza Strip by Palestinian militants known as the Army of Islam. 
Johnston, a BBC foreign correspondent to Palestine, said that being held in captivity was 
like ‗being buried alive, removed from the world‘.
181
 Johnston thanked news 
organisations for keeping his story ‗alive‘ during his captivity. The publicity supplied by 
the news organisations served as an umbilical cord to sustain his connection to the real 
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world. Johnston uses figurative language suggesting that without the lifeline of publicity, 
he would have been extinguished. Johnston had access to a radio for fourteen of the 
sixteen weeks in captivity. He said hearing messages of support gave him a 
‗psychological boost‘. ‗It was amazing to be lying in solitary confinement and hear 
people from Nigeria, Malaysia or friends from London, colleagues sending messages of 
support.‘ Former hostages Terry Waite, John McCarthy and Brian Keenan recorded 
messages for broadcast on BBC World Service encouraging Johnston during the 
captivity.
182
 Keeping the story public, Johnston, in his dark cell, could feel the social 
solidarity in the world beyond his cell. Johnston needed witnesses to his ordeal. Arendt 
argues that the reason we need witnesses has to do with the connection of appearance to 
reality: ‗The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of 
the reality of the world and ourselves‘.
183
 As for the public reception of Johnston‘s story, 
this was not an unfamiliar story in Western media—Western journalist, or aid worker, 
working in a volatile foreign location taken hostage by extremists—therefore the public 
acknowledgement of Johnston‘s plight was not a contested reality. Former hostages 
Waite, McCarthy and Keenan provided credible confirmation of Johnston‘s reality 
because they too had experienced similar captivity. In this case, while they were not first-
hand witnesses of Johnston‘s kidnapping or captivity, they are credible witnesses able to 
verify Johnston‘s experience because in this situation, they are expert witnesses. 
McCarthy, Waite, and Keenan could say it really is like this. 
2.3.1.1 Contested Testimony 
Solidarity, the presence of others, confirms reality, but not all reality is easily 
confirmed and some realities are even contested as Arendt observes regarding the public 
reception of the first Holocaust survivor testimonials. The pain and horror communicated 
by survivor testimony took time before it acquired a shape recognisable to those outside 
of the concentration camps. As I quoted above, Arendt writes, ‗whatever lacks this 
appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but 
without reality.‘
184
 The problem with our experiences seeming like a dream is that if there 
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is no one to confirm the reality of our experience, we too may become convinced that it 
was indeed only a dream. Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism of the doubtful 
public reception of Holocaust concentration camp survivor testimony: 
There are numerous reports by survivors. The more authentic they are, the 
less they attempt to communicate things that evade human understanding 
and human experience—sufferings, that is, that transform men into 
‗uncomplaining animals.‘ None of these reports inspires those passions of 
outrage and sympathy through which men have always been mobilized for 
justice. On the contrary, anyone speaking or writing about concentration 
camps is still regarded as suspect; and if the speaker has resolutely 
returned to the world of the living, he himself is often assailed by doubts 




Arendt derives these observations from hearing testimony of survivors at the 
Eichmann trials and reading testimonials. Arendt was interested not only in the doubt 
expressed by the public in receiving the testimony, but the doubt of the actual eyewitness 
of his or her own experience. She cites survivor Bruno Bettelheim‘s essay ‗On Dachau 
and Buchenwald‘, he writes: ‗It seemed as if I had become convinced that these horrible 
and degrading experiences somehow did not happen to ―me‖ as subject but to ―me‖ as an 
object.‘
186
 He goes on to say that of course those in Paris, London, and New York were 
incredulous at the reports of gas chambers, because even the prisoners standing right 
outside of the crematoriums were incredulous until five minutes before they were 
marched inside to the gas chambers. 
The reception of Holocaust survivor testimony has changed since 1951, the 
publication date of The Origins of Totalitarianism. In the section below on sociological 
changes to the public realm (2.5), I consider how the acceptance of news reports of 
genocide are far more readily accepted, less ‗suspect‘, in the public realm given that the 
narrative frame of the Holocaust is part of the Western humanitarian collective memory. 
What is important to understand from Arendt‘s observation on the reception of Holocaust 
testimony is that because the experience seemed so unreal, and therefore non-existent, to 
both the hearers and the speakers, there was little chance for the ‗mobilization of political 
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 Central to Arendt‘s understanding of the importance of public appearance is 
to be a part of a body politic that can act. Alan Johnston‘s release from captivity came 
with the uniting of Western media and political pressure on Palestinian politicians and the 
Palestinian people themselves organising in protest on the streets in support of Johnston 
whom they believed to be their proxy representative to the wider world (a concept I 
explore in great detail in chapter four). 
2.3.1.2 Privation of Testimony 
As a point of contrast to the nature of publicity, I will briefly consider what 
Arendt means by privacy or the private realm. Arendt considers the private sphere from 
both an ancient understanding of privacy and a modern understanding of privacy. I 
consider the modern understanding of privacy, the privacy of our intimate lives being 
sheltered from the public gaze, in section 2.3.3. First I discuss how relevance is the 
bottom-line criteria for why some issues appear in the public realm and some issues do 
not. First, I turn to Arendt‘s description of the ancient understanding of privacy. 
In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the word itself, 
was all-important; it meant literally a state of being deprived of something, 
and even of the highest and most human of man‘s capacities.
188
  
That capacity, according to Arendt is the capacity to act in political life, the life that takes 
place in the public realm. The private realm was the place of slaves and women. Privacy 
meant being deprived access to representation, appearance and thus reality. While slaves 
are captives, being held captive does not equate privation of publicity as we see in the 
cases of kidnapped Western reporters or aid workers. Johnston, in captivity, received 
publicity not privacy, a prime reason why he and other journalists are targets for 
kidnapping. His kidnappers gained access to publicity through Johnston. Johnston was 
twice made to read a transcript prepared by the group Army of Islam, once while wearing 
a ‗bomb vest‘. The kidnappers posted the video-recorded message on an obscure website 
used by militants. Johnston gave voice to the Army of Islam‘s position condemning 
Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and their demand for the release of Abu 
Qatada, a Palestinian-born Islamic cleric held by the UK government.
189
 More 
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importantly, Johnston gave global internet traffic, essentially publicity, to their publicity-
deprived website. 
The Army of Islam had privacy in the sense of privation from a voice in political 
life, and certainly in international political life. A press release or a letter to a news 
organisation stating their political requests would have gained them little attention, but 
kidnapping a UK reporter and forcing him to broadcast their message on an obscure 
website afforded the Army of Islam global publicity. If all publicity is good publicity, it 
is because of the ancient understanding that privation is bad and complete privation is the 
life of a slave, a life of non-existence. Thus, pursuit of publicity by those in the realm of 
privation is often an asymmetrical pursuit characterised by tactics such as kidnapping and 
suicide bombing of culturally significant targets. In order to appear in a public realm 
from which the kidnappers believe they are deprived, they hijack publicity by making 
their voice relevant based on the social relevance of the target, a person or a publicly 
significant place.  
2.3.2   Publicity as Relevance 
I have discussed ‗appearance‘ as the first aspect signified by the term public, I 
will now look at ‗relevance‘ the second aspect that Arendt identifies. Arendt calls the 
public realm an artefact, a world created by human hands. The public realm is not a 
physical location; it is rather ‗the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and 
speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, 
no matter where they happen to be‘.
190
 This world, or polis, is determined by things held 
in common. Among the multiple publics, worlds fabricated by human hands, is the world 
of global compassion where values such as compassion and human rights are held in 
common and where creeds have been codified, governing bodies elected, social action 
groups mobilized and moral imaginations formed. ‗To live together in the world means 
essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is 
located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and 
separates men at the same time.‘
191
 Arendt‘s metaphor of those who gather round the 
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table is a fitting and very contemporary metaphor for the public realm in which the 
discourse of global compassion takes place.
192
  
The tables of global compassion, plural for there are multiple tables co-existing, 
inter-relating, and cooperating to various degrees, are observable and measurable 
artefacts. Around these tables sit politicians and diplomats, non-governmental 
humanitarian aid organisations, journalists and media organisations, activist 
organisations, religious communities and various other publics. The public realm of 
global compassion is a place of politics, for human action, in words and deeds have 
emanated from decisions made at these tables. To further illustrate that the public realm 
of global compassion is indeed a place of politics, these multiple tables together have 
produced the political by-product of strange bedfellows as in the case of Gary Bauer and 
Richard Gere. Bauer, President of the Washington D.C.-based Family Research Council, 
shared a stage with Hollywood actor Richard Gere to urge the US congress to pass the 
Freedom From Religious Persecution Act in 1997. Bauer advocated for the right of 
Sudanese Christians to be free from the religious persecution by their government while 
Gere advocated for the end of persecution of Tibetan Buddhist monks. This was not a 
typical alliance for Bauer, the president of a US conservative Christian organisation, to 
align himself with the Buddhist religion, but in the public realm of global compassion he 
found common cause at a new table of global concern.
193
 
The narrative of global compassion is a helpful frame for explaining how the 
modern experience of witnessing human suffering is done through television or computer 
screens. It is worth returning to Arendt‘s understanding of the nature of the public realm. 
She asserts that human suffering is not such an easy topic for citizens to gather around. 
She argues that the reason human suffering is a difficult topic for the public realm is 
because pain is a private emotion. What does it take for human suffering to be publicly 
evident on our television screens? Arendt argues that the intimate pain of the body must 
be put on display. 
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2.3.3 The Public Appearance of Suffering 
 Arendt describes the ancient understanding of privacy as privation of the means to 
a political life. She describes the modern understanding of privacy as a means to ‗shelter 
the intimate‘. The private realm shelters the world of subjectivity, shelters the things that 
do not thrive in the light of publicity. Arendt argues that some experiences cannot bear 
the harsh light of publicity such as the subjective emotion of pain.  
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of 
blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily 
pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable of all. 
… Pain … is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men 
that it cannot assume an appearance at all.
194
  
Yet, we clearly see that the public appearance of the pain and suffering of victims of 
humanitarian crises is not just the mainstay of NGO fundraising campaigns and 
journalistic coverage of famine, genocide, tsunamis, plane crashes and many other natural 
and man-made disasters, it is seemingly the sine qua non of coverage. Without the 
appearance of suffering, how is the story to appear in the public realm? Arendt deals with 
the issue of what is required to make the experience of pain fit for public appearance. In 
order to make a public appearance, private emotions must be ‗transformed, deprivatized 
and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape fit for public appearance.‘
195
  
How can the subjective experience of pain be made public for a wide audience to 
hear and to see? In order for publicity to work, the material presented before audiences 
must be made relevant to those audiences. Pain is made visible Arendt argues, through 
bodily suffering.
196
 ‗[I]t is striking that from the beginning of history to our own time it 
has always been the bodily part of human existence that needed to be hidden in 
privacy‘.
197
 In the case of suffering through famine, disease and war, no longer do people 
have recourse to the privacy of four walls and a roof. Once the walls of privacy are 
destroyed, all the things of a private, intimate, nature are relevant for public viewing. We 
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see this in journalistic news coverage of refugees who have fled their homes. News media 
organisations rely on recording the refugees‘ labour in Arendt‘s sense of the word labour:  
the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human 
body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are 




They are presented labouring in the open, maybe in lean-tos but rarely within walls and a 
roof, breastfeeding, eating and cooking, washing bodies and clothes, and even dying 
without the benefit of privacy. While these necessities of everyday life may already be 
performed in more of an ‗outdoor‘ setting than what is practiced in Western cultures, the 
necessities are not performed for the external gaze and do not signify pain and suffering 
until captured and captioned as such by global media practitioners. Susan Moeller in her 
book Compassion Fatigue gives the extreme example from the 1992 famine in Somalia 
of a camera crew trying to record the sound of dying by pushing a microphone into the 
face of a starving child about to die.
199
 Yet, we need not focus on the most extreme 
example to show the kind of coverage, the kind of imaging of bodily suffering it takes to 
shape the private experience of pain for public appearance. There are standard images 
that represent famine, war, and disaster all portraying a person in need of some biological 
necessity. This is a pragmatic exchange, privacy for the necessity of publicity because it 
is in the realm of the public in which action can take place. While it is a pragmatic 
exchange, it is also an exchange for those promoting the politics of global compassion—
their promise of some sort of intervention to justify the invasion of the intimate. The 
subjective experience of pain cannot take up physical space in the public realm or visual 
and audio space in the mediated public realm, but bodies do, and bodies deprived of the 
biological necessities to flourish particularly give public appearance to suffering. 
 Through Arendt‘s concept of the public realm, I have demonstrated how publicity 
can function as a lifeline to reality. In this thesis, Arendt provides a normative framework 
for understanding the public realm as a place to participate in political life. She 
characterises the public realm as a construct by people who hold common cause together 
in order to act. That which appears within the public realm is that which is socially 
relevant to those around the table. Early testimony of Holocaust survivors did not receive 
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ready reception in the public realm. Today, because of the legacy of the Holocaust and 
the West‘s historical consciousness of failing to act quickly, bearing witness to genocide 
is a relevant topic in the public realm. In the next two sections, I look at how 
technological and sociological changes to the public realm have made it a place where 
genocide is readily discussed and displayed. How did the victims of genocide and other 
suffering become a part of the Global Samaritan‘s neighbourhood? I will begin to answer 
this question by looking at technological changes to the public realm. 
2.4 Technological changes to the Public Realm 
I consider how technological changes have altered the nature of the public realm 
by looking at the work of social and political theorist, John B. Thompson. Thompson 
argues that electronic mass mediation alters the public realm. He argues that 
mediatisation changes the ability to appear before the eyes and the ears of the public. The 
dominant way to appear before the public realm today is through the ‗new visibility‘, a 
mediated visibility.
200
 Arendt‘s concerns were with how human suffering can appear in 
the public realm when issues like pain are so difficult to communicate in public. 
Thompson adds to this discussion how human suffering in far away places becomes 
public focus. Thompson begins his investigation of the ‗new visibility‘ in the public 
realm, with Jürgen Habermas‘s notion of the public sphere. Habermas‘s public sphere is a 
place of reasoned, public deliberation. Thompson asks the question: Has the modern 
technical media of mass communication altered the ideal-type of the Habermasian public 
sphere?
201
 Thompson is interested in the new visibility in the public realm not 
‗understood simply as an extension of the traditional model‘ of visibility, thus he 




Thompson concludes that the new visibility no longer depends on spatial co-
presence and face-to-face conversation as characterised in Habermas‘s public sphere; 
now publicity is connected to the ‗distinctive kind of visibility produced by, and 
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achievable through, the technical media of mass communication.‘
203
 Thompson identifies 
three main changes resulting from the mediatisation of the public sphere. The new 
visibility achieved is non-localized, non-dialogical, and open-ended. I consider these 
three aspects of mediatisation by looking at the opportunities and risks opened up for the 
global public sphere, the virtual neighbourhood of the Global Samaritan. 
2.4.1 The Global Public Sphere is Non-Localized 
Regarding the first alteration to the public realm, Thompson describes the new 
public space as non-localized, a space not contingent on local space or local time. 
Thompson emphasizes the word space over place since, ‗the sphere of mediated 
publicness is extended in time and space, and is potentially global in scope.‘
204
 
Thompson‘s description of a mediated public sphere does not lose Arendt‘s importance 
of the public realm as a space manufactured by humans. Arendt too emphasized space 
over place; the public realm‘s ‗true space lies between people living together for this 
purpose, no matter where they happen to be‘.
205
 Space is extended by creating virtual real 
estate not connected to the finite capacity of local real estate. In addition to space, time 
too is altered through compression or extension. Through extension of the local we can 
see ‗live‘ events taking place far away and through compression of time we can witness 
events from the past taking up space in the public sphere all over again. In the media 
coverage of human suffering, current events are often framed by significant events from 
the past. I explore this issue more in the next chapter. 
A global public sphere is the optimistic possibility provided by global networked 
communication systems. More and more spaces, or Arendt‘s tables of common causes, 
can be created as well as more and more time can be created since people need not 
simultaneously sit down to global networked common tables to join the conversation. 
Possibilities for creating Arendt‘s tables at which people gather round to determine their 
capacity for action seem limitless. This is the hopefulness of the democratisation of the 
public realm through technological advancement, but the story is not such a direct 
correlation between increased technological means and universal representation in the 
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public realm. Tables of common cause are not simply products of technological 
advancements. The mediated global public sphere is highly managed and those who feel 
under-represented have to struggle for visibility. 
Visibility, commonly referred to as media publicity, is not just the vapid pursuit 
of celebrity culture. Visibility is necessary in order to contribute to the public realm.
206
 
The struggle for visibility returns us to Arendt‘s publicity as a lifeline; existence is 
contingent upon appearing in public. There are groups who have to struggle for visibility. 
Thompson acknowledges this central concern: ‗The struggle to make oneself heard or 
seen (and to prevent others from doing so) is not a peripheral aspect of the social and 
political upheavals of the modern world; on the contrary, it is central to them.‘
207
 
Sociologist Leon Mayhew is in agreement with Thompson that public communication 
today is synonymous with mediated communication. Mayhew notes that the struggle for 
visibility in the West is not against totalitarian strong-arms censoring dissonant voices, 
but rather against a sophisticated media environment managed by the privileged authority 
of ‗professional communications experts‘.
208
 Such is the managerialism of publicity 
today with its own professional offices of public relations specialists. 
A characteristic of the modern mediatised public sphere is that those in possession 
of the technology have an advantage over those without access to it. The story is not so 
very bleak, however: there are two rather bright spots. First, many NGOs and other 
groups of common concern have voluntary or paid communication officers who are 
committed to the group‘s mission and skilful at publicity management. Mayhew‘s view 
of professionalised media access does not need to be completely pessimistic. The second 
bright spot is that with new media technologies new opportunities of access abound. 
Thompson believes that it is in the struggle for visibility that modern social movements 
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have made themselves particularly adept at creating mediated events to counter the 
dominant ideology in the public sphere.
209
  
Thanks to the development of multiple forms of mediated communication 
and the rise of numerous media organisations which are relatively 
independent of state power, the information environment is more 
intensive, more extensive and less controllable than it was in the past.
210
 
In a chapter called ‗Further Reflections on the Public Sphere‘, Jürgen Habermas 
revisits his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (published in 1971)
211
 and 
reconsiders his conceptualization of the public sphere in the light of new media 
technologies. Concurring with Thompson, he concedes that civil society organisations 
‗constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy‘ can 
achieve visibility in the modern mediated public sphere.
212
 Habermas writes that elements 
of civil society can: 
manage to have a political impact via the public media because they either 
participate directly in public communications or, as in the case of projects 
advocating alternatives to conventional wisdom, because the 
programmatic character of their activities sets examples through which 
they implicitly contribute to public discussion.
213
 
Mayhew‘s analysis was overall pessimistic: only the highly managed messages by 
professionals will be heard or seen in the mass mediated public sphere. Habermas‘s 
analysis on the other hand, holds out hope for civil society organisations, people gathered 
for a common cause. Habermas identifies the possibility of being heard through the 
‗programmatic character of their activities. This is a hopeful and optimistic observation 
for those gathered round the table of global compassion. A community heard through 
their ‗programmatic character‘ parallels John Howard Yoder‘s argument for how a 
community‘s practices bear witness to their beliefs. In the conclusion of this thesis I will 
consider together Arendt‘s social phenomena of tables of common cause, Habermas‘s 
claim that communities implicitly contribute to the public sphere through the 
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‗programmatic character of their activities‘, and Yoder‘s phenomenology of social 
witness. 
 In the previous section, I mentioned that cast members of global compassion, such 
as NGOs, have public relations specialists who ensure that distant human suffering 
remains relevant in the public sphere. Even so, the publicity managers of NGOs still 
struggle for visibility in the mass mediated public sphere. Former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair offered a critique of access to the mediated public sphere in a speech delivered to 
Reuter‘s Headquarters in London ‗On the Challenge of the Changing Nature of 
Communication on Politics and the Media‘. He accused the media of reports in which:  
Things, people, issues, stories, are all black and white. Life‘s usual grey is 
almost entirely absent. ‗Some good, some bad‘; ‗some things going right, 
some going wrong‘– these are concepts alien to today‘s reporting. It‘s a 
triumph or a disaster. A problem is ‗a crisis‘.
214
 
Given the ‗black and white‘ environment of reporting in the public sphere, Blair said that, 
‗Non-governmental organisations and pundits know that unless they are prepared to go 
over the top, they shouldn‘t venture out at all.‘
215
 NGO public relations managers in the 
struggle for visibility are faced with the dilemma that Blair highlights. 
There are both positive and negative aspects to the democratization of the media: 
alternative media research shows how public spheres open up when multiple forms of 
mediated communication are available to a civil society engaged in promoting their 
activities.
216
 On the other hand, even though a democratization of mediatised public 
realms results in more venues for creating public communication, there is little control 
over the civility of the communication style. Violence and threat may be the style of 
communication a group uses to gain publicity. As I discussed in section 2.3.1, the Army 
of Islam took Alan Johnston hostage in a struggle to make their message visible. Taking 
foreigners as hostages and suicide bombings are mass mediated events designed to 
achieve publicity.
217
 This is an increased risk in the modern mediated public realm that is 
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not tied to a central location. Central and physical locations allow for more control of the 
local sphere. The stakes of hi-jacking the global media sphere pay huge dividends in 
global media coverage. 
Brigitte L. Nacos, professor of political science and a former US foreign 
correspondent, defines terrorism in relation to its goal of publicity.
218
 She argues that 
terrorism and media have an inextricable link—violence is committed or threatened for 
the goal of exposure.
219
 Forced publicity returns us to Arendt‘s account of ancient privacy 
as the privation of publicity, no publicity is bad publicity. The goal of terrorism is that 
previously ignored grievances are discussed; mass-mediated terrorism furthers political 
agendas. Nacos describes terrorism not as vengeance over a personal vendetta, plucking 
out the eye of the one who plucked out your own, but rather as choosing a symbolic 
target to garner the most publicity. While there may be revenge or retribution involved in 
the attack, the revenge is at an abstracted level since the act is not done as a personal 
vendetta against that particular person. The act symbolically represents the group‘s 
message in a so-called universal language. Nacos illustrates with a quote from Osama bin 
Laden speaking of the September 11
th
 attackers:  
Those young men (…inaudible…) said in deeds, in New York and 
Washington, speeches that overshadowed other speeches made 




It is a universal language only in so much as global cultures interpret the destruction of 
property and the killing of people as an expression of grievances. Audience 
interpretation and translation of events is of course varied. An alternative interpretation 
might be offered that it is an act of liberating citizens from a dictatorial regime. The 
ambiguity is prominent in the popular saying one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
‗an occasion which is planned in advance and broadcast live, which interrupts the normal flow of events 
and which creates an atmosphere of solemnity and high expectation.‘ John B. Thompson, Political 
Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 75.  
218
 Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
219
 In a quarterly edition of Communication Research Trends, Biernatzki investigates current 
communication research on the unwitting collaboration of mass media with terrorism. William E. 
Biernatzki, "Terrorism and Mass Media," Communication Research Trends 21, no. 1 (2002). 
220
 Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 
41. Nacos‘ source is from archived material from The Washington Post. 
 74 
freedom fighter. I took up this issue of translatability in chapter two with regard to 
interpreting a death as suicide or Christian martyrdom.   
Thompson and Mayhew argue that modern visibility requires mediated visibility. 
Modern ownership patterns of global media organisations determine who has access to 
visibility, thus creating an asymmetrical balance.  Nacos identifies the terrorist bombing 
of the U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole, as a text-book case of garnering public 
sympathy for those without the material means to gain access to publicity. This was a 
David against Goliath fight by two men in a twenty foot boat against a 9,100 ton warship. 
While a non-localized public sphere on the one hand allows for the flourishing of diverse 
voices, those in control of public spheres on the other hand cannot control the forceful 
means by which some make their voices heard. More important than making their voices 
‗heard‘ is the need to be ‗seen‘, or on display, in the global public sphere. 
2.4.2 The Global Public Sphere is Non-Dialogical 
Thompson argues that the public sphere expanded through the technical media of 
mass communication is predominantly non-dialogical. Global public spheres are 
characterised by display, which is the visual. Habermas idealises the early eighteenth-
century public sphere of local coffee houses where learned gentlemen read newspapers 
and then rationally engaged in dialogue about the politics of the day. Habermas argues 
that the new public sphere is a re-feudalized public sphere.
221
 The modern public sphere 
is a global-mediated public sphere in which ownership of communication systems resides 
in a few, powerful hands. Habermas argues that this concentration of power by the few 
returns the character of the public sphere to the middle ages where the powerful few 
displayed their power, or exhibited themselves like peacocks, before the people under 
rule in the kingdom. His argument is that today‘s public sphere once again relies on 
display or spectacle over dialogue. Tony Blair‘s chastisement of news media 
organisations was along the lines of Habermas‘s argument. Blair argued that, ‗Non-
governmental organisations … know that unless they are prepared to go over the top, 
they shouldn‘t venture out at all.‘
222
 In the raising of humanitarian awareness to respond 
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to global crisis, NGOs find themselves going ‗over the top‘ in their struggle to create a 
spectacle dramatic enough to force space in the global public sphere. 
Must Thompson and Habermas‘s identification of the mediated public realm as 
non-dialogical be construed as wholly negative? Communications scholar, John Durham 
Peters gives a positive account, in a peculiar way, of non-dialogical communication. He 
is trying to nuance the over-correction of the ‗ideal speech situation‘ of Habermas‘s 
rational discourse taking place in the traditional public sphere by claiming that non-
dialogical communication is what we are already doing most of the time, even in our 
face-to-face communications. Peters‘ bold claim is rooted in the title of his book, 
Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. He argues that at some 
level, all communication is mono-logical dissemination, speaking into the air, rather than 
an exchange of interiorities. Peters calls this ‗a permanent kink in the human 
condition‘.
223
 He claims that a true exchange of interiorities is sought after in 
communication modes such as telepathy. Telepathy is a communication of mind-to-mind 
and not in need of any mediation. Telepathy, in theory, is information exchange of 
interiorities, but such an account of the ultimate form of dialogical communication 
bypasses bodies or any other form of medium. Spirit to spirit communication bypasses 
bodies, but the human condition is one of embodied spirits. Peters argues: 
media are not mere ‗channels.‘ Media matter to practices of 
communication because embodiment matters. The body is our existence, 
not our container. … Any adequate account of the social life of word and 
gesture—of ‗communication‘ in the broadest sense—needs to face the 




Peters comes to the conclusion that one-way transmission need not always be 
trumped by dialogue.
225
 This has important implications for the common world of global 
compassion that holds that to witness the distant suffering of others is not simply about 
information transfer, but also about building more humane modes of life together. These 
practices can be developed in gatherings around Arendt‘s tables of common cause. Peters 
makes room for the role of mediatisation in the gathering of people around common 
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tables. He provides a defence for the use of mass media by defending the use of actual 
human bodies as channels of communication, an incontrovertible necessity. ‗In the 
ethical nervousness about criticizing dialogue, it becomes clear just how much rides on it 
as a principle of justice and authenticity.‘
226
 He is not eschewing dialogue, but rather 
claiming that both tools of humankind‘s life together, dialogue and monologue, can be 
used in service to ideology or be informed by justice. Just as there is the possibility for 
both monologue and dialogue in the public realm, there is also the wide range of possible 
meaning interpreted by participants in the global public sphere. 
2.4.3 The Global Public Sphere is Open-Ended 
The final characteristic of the new global public sphere that Thompson identifies 
is the vastly more open-ended potential of message reception. While all three of these 
characteristics of the global public sphere—open-ended, non-dialogical, and non-
localised—were present before electronic global network communication, Thompson 
highlights these characteristics as the most altered. What Thompson means by open-
ended message reception is that symbolic material prepared for mass dissemination now 
has ‗an indefinite range of potential recipients.‘
227
 Message production flows primarily 
one-way, from producers to receivers with the cultural and material means to receive it. 
While this is mono-logical interaction compared with the Habermasian preference of 
dialogical communication, Thompson like J.D. Peters argues that there is some kind of 
interaction that contributes to the agency of the audience. 
The possible agency that Thompson perceives the audience to have is what he 
calls ‗mediated quasi-interaction‘. He acknowledges that compared to the intimacy of 
face-to-face interaction, this second option is poor, but nevertheless, it is some kind of 
interaction: 
But mediated quasi-interaction is, nonetheless, a form of interaction. It 
creates a certain kind of social situation in which individuals are linked 
together in a process of communication and symbolic exchange. It also 
creates distinctive kinds of interpersonal relationships, social bonds and 
intimacy (what I call ‗non-reciprocal intimacy at a distance‘).
228
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It is important to consider this quotation with reference to the narrative of global 
compassion, for it explains why Western publics are subjected to images of human 
suffering in far away and unfamiliar places. Western audiences would rarely have 
occasion to call these people ‗neighbour‘ if it was not for cultivating the symbolic 
exchange that puts human suffering on display in Western living rooms. In the text 
quoted above, Thompson illustrates the point that ‗individuals are linked together‘ by 
witnessing the same social situation of distant human suffering. He points out that the 
social bonds created work in two directions. First, some audience members exposed to 
the symbolic material may now share a common cause of obligation to relieve the distant 
human suffering. The global publication of news coverage of distant suffering can help 
create new and wider common worlds. New common worlds are relationships. What it 
takes for a shared sense of obligation to result in people coming together in order to act 
together, is still a far off, and is the topic of the next chapter.  
The second kind of relationship created by mediated quasi-interaction is 
characterised by a kind of social bond that Thompson calls ‗non-reciprocal intimacy at a 
distance.‘
229
 Thompson‘s work is useful when considering the kind of non-reciprocal 
intimacy at a distance that is created by the coverage of the distant suffering of others. 
While the conscience of the Good Samaritan may be pricked by the filmed or 
photographed suffering of a distant other, does the fact that the Samaritan‘s vision is 
mediated, uni-directional, and lacking co-presence alter the experience of compassion? 
These issues of audience agency are the topics for investigation in the next chapter. 
In this section on technological changes to the public realm, I have demonstrated 
how technological advancements in global networked communication systems have 
altered a normative understanding of the public realm. In this research, I do not espouse a 
position of technological determinism. Technology in and of itself is not an agent of 
change. Throughout this research, I discuss technological and sociological changes in 
tandem. The modern act of witnessing human suffering in distant places has been shaped 
by both sociological and technological changes. Technology helps shape attitudes and 
values already present in a culture. This is what is meant by calling television a cultural 
form (a heading in section 3.1.3 of the next chapter). Thompson claims that television as 
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a medium is particularly suited to a society of self-disclosure. It is important to point out 
that it was the human production values that went into creating the style and content of 
television broadcasts, that have produced a public realm of self-disclosure, not the mere 
invention or advancement of technological equipment able to transmit a close-up of a 
talking head into our living rooms. Thompson describes social and technical 
considerations working together which create the possibilities of ‗new types of 
interaction‘: 
Seeing is never ‗pure vision‘, it is never a matter of simply opening one‘s 
eyes and grasping an object or event. On the contrary, seeing is always 
shaped by a broader set of cultural assumptions and frameworks, and by 
the spoken or written cues that commonly accompany the visual image and 
shape the way in which the images are seen and understood.
230
 
The narrative of global compassion is a story told in the global media sphere. In the next 
section I focus on the social changes to the Western public reception of distant human 
suffering. Arendt argues that people only appear in the public realm because they are 
deemed relevant to the eyes of the public. The lawyer was keen to define limits to where 
the boundaries of his neighbourhood began and ended when he asked, ‗Who is my 
neighbour?‘ The answer to this question should determine who was relevant to be 
addressed as a neighbour. The application of the law to ‗love your neighbour as yourself,‘ 
was not relevant to those who resided outside of the lawyer‘s neighbourhood. In this next 
section I look at how cultural experiences influence who achieves visibility in the 
neighbourhood of the Global Samaritan.  
2.5 Sociological Changes to the Public Realm 
In Regarding the Pain of Others Susan Sontag argues that ‗[b]eing a spectator of 
calamities taking place in another country is a quintessential modern experience.‘
231
 
Sontag‘s claim is far from Arendt‘s observation that the problem with presenting pain in 
the public realm, is that it is not always believed. Since the publication of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, there has been a positive shift in the reception of Holocaust testimony in 
public realms. Witnessing the Holocaust has been a central cultural experience that has 
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contributed to the display of human suffering, particularly genocide, in the global media 
sphere. 
2.5.1 The Legacy of Survivors Bearing Witness to the Holocaust 
Public acceptance of Holocaust survivor testimonial has changed. Historian 
Annette Wieviorka traces that change along a sociological and technological path to 
arrive at the act of modern televisual witnessing. She cites the Eichmann trial as the 
advent of the modern impulse to witness televised testimonials of human suffering. 
Every era finds a different material support for testimony: paper, 
videotape, court of justice, documentary. Even when the story remains 
identical in its factual components, it is shaped by collective 
considerations, by the circumstances surrounding the act of bearing 
witness. It becomes part of a larger story, part of a social construct, as the 
Eichmann trial demonstrates with particular clarity.
232 
 
It is the act of bearing witness, and the dissemination of those testimonies through the 
video recordings of testimonies that have helped shape what it means to provide 
historical witness today. In The Era of Witness, Wieviorka is concerned with how 
recorded oral testimonies about the Holocaust affect historical discourse on the 
Holocaust. She looks at how both the historian and the witness find one another in each 
other‘s spaces during the writing of history: 
For how can a coherent historical discourse be constructed if it is 
constantly countered by another truth, the truth of individual memory? 
How can the historian incite reflection, thought, and rigor when feelings 
and emotions invade the public sphere?
233
  
The modern technological era of the witness, Wieviorka argues, began with the 
Eichmann trials. ‗With the Eichmann trial, the witness became an embodiment of 
memory, attesting to the past and to the continuing presence of the past.‘
234
 There were 
just over one hundred witnesses called to give testimony, vetted like a casting call from 
an enormous pool of applicants. The ‗majority of the witnesses (fifty-three) came from 
Poland and Lithuania, territories over which Eichmann had little jurisdiction or 
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 They were chosen to testify to their personal experience. Wieviorka gives a 
helpful comparison of the Eichmann trial with the Nuremberg trials:  
Whereas Nuremberg sought to cast light on the perpetrators and on the 
mechanisms that generated the war, and sought to criminalize war 
instigators—to cast them as war criminals—[in the Eichmann trial] the 
spotlight was now exclusively on the victims. Whereas Nuremberg sought 
to intervene in history by establishing the principle that political actors can 
be judged and by attempting to create a new basis for international law, the 
Eichmann trial undertook to create a memory rich in lessons for the 
present and the future.
236
 
Wieviorka identifies the function of the Eichmann testimonies as a way ‗to return a name, 
a face, a history to each of the victims of mass murder.‘
237
 Her contention as a historian is 
that recording history is secondary to recording individual memory. She goes on to say 
that this function ‗is not confined to Holocaust testimony. Instead, it is at the heart of how 
our society and our media function.‘
238
  
Sociological changes to testifying to the Holocaust have transformed ‗the witness 
into an apostle and prophet.‘
239
 It is not enough for Holocaust survivors to just record 
their testimonies before a video camera; they need ‗converts‘ to keep the testimony alive 
before the public. We see this in the discipleship practice of young people visiting 
extermination camps such as Auschwitz or Dachau. Wieviorka writes that visiting real 
sites gives the third generation ‗a lived experience‘ from which they can take up the 
mantle and become ‗witnesses for the witness‘. ‗This model seems to recall the Gospels: 
these young people will be the apostles who, once the witnesses have disappeared, will be 
able to carry on their word.‘
240 
 Such apostolic succession is what keeps the testimony 
alive in the public realm. The public reception of Holocaust testimony, of any testimony, 
Arendt wrote, can ‗survive the coming and going of the generations only to the extent 
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that it appears in public.‘
241
 Earthly immortality is pursued in the Holocaust survivor 
practice of cultivating public realms that will ‗never forget‘.  
2.5.2 The Legacy of the Holocaust Frames Modern Genocide 
The modern public realms of human rights activists involved in the narrative of 
global compassion are public realms in which the mandate to ‗never forget‘ is taken 
seriously. Michael Ignatieff, former journalist and Director of Harvard University's Carr 
Center for Human Rights Policy, like Sontag claims that the modern story of witness and 
testimony is to give witness to human suffering.
242
 He agrees with Wieviorka that the 
Holocaust has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the demand for testimonials, as 
well as how testimony of suffering appears in the modern public realm. Ignatieff notes 
that the technological and the sociological changes since the Holocaust were not the 
beginnings of the testimony of suffering in public, but they helped exploit and accelerate 
the already present public interest in the suffering of strangers. He contends that the 
public would not be interested in pictures of piled corpses if they were not already pre-
disposed to a narrative of concern for the stranger. Ignatieff is interested in explaining the 
narrative behind the conviction that the suffering of strangers really does matter.  
Ignatieff calls the story the ‗moral interventionist story‘. He tells the story along 
these lines: the narrative of universal human rights that began with Christianity was 
worked out in natural law ethics and the doctrine of toleration, a universalist pre-cursor to 
the concern with discrimination on any grounds. There is no longer a ‗narrative of 
imperial rivalry or of ideological struggle‘ left, but rather a ‗narrative of compassion‘.
243
 
At the time of the codification of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, there were two sets of human rights cultures: the socialist narrative and the 
capitalist narrative. Post-Cold War there is only one, the capitalist narrative. The end of 
the Cold War, Ignatieff argues, began the era of intervention, that is, the moral 
intervention to relieve the suffering of distant victims. In The Needs of Strangers, 
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Ignatieff explores the question: When is it right to speak for the needs of others?
 244
  In 
The Warrior’s Honor, he explores why we speak for others at a global level: 
If we take it for granted now that suffering strangers are our responsibility, 
it is because a century of total destruction has made us ashamed of that 
cantonment of moral responsibilities by nation, religion, or region that 
resulted in the abandonment of the Jews. Modern moral universalism is 




Those who speak for the needs of others, I have called the cast of the narrative of 
global compassion: foreign correspondents, aid workers, peacekeepers, diplomats and the 
public. Ignatieff describes the subject of the narrative of global compassion as the ‗pure 
victim‘ of genocide, famine or other disaster, a victim with no recourse to family, tribe, 
faith, or nation. Dependence is upon the charity of strangers and often that chain of 
strangers begins with the foreign correspondent on assignment in some far away and 
unfamiliar place. Belief in the narrative of compassion necessitates that suffering must be 
witnessed and not forgotten. In the narrative of compassion, strangers will speak for the 
needs of the ‗pure victim‘ in the public realm. I explore this fiduciary role, or proxy role, 
in the conclusion of the thesis. 
Suffering people do not just appear as ‗pure victims‘ on our television screens. 
The narrative of global compassion frames the coverage of humanitarian crises whether it 
is famine, war or genocide. The images of crisis are not objective views outside of the 
historical experience of the West. Modern images of genocide and the labelling of images 
as genocide already exist in the public imagination, framed by the legacy of the 
Holocaust. The Western image of genocide already includes the equation that with 
knowledge of human suffering comes complicity. Once suffering is introduced into our 
neighbourhood, our global public media sphere, spectators have neighbourly obligations. 
Ignatieff explains this equation: 
Television images cannot assert anything; they can only instantiate 
something. Images of human suffering do not assert their own meaning; 
they can only instantiate a moral claim if those who watch understand 
themselves to be potentially under obligation to those they see. Behind the 
seemingly natural mechanics of empathy at work in viewers‘ response to 
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these images lies a history by which their consciences were formed to 
respond as they do.
246
  
John B. Thompson argued that social and technical changes work in tandem, creating 
opportunities and risks for ‗new types of interaction‘. Ignatieff has made a career of 
trying to unravel the contradictory new interaction between ‗promiscuous voyeurism‘ and 
‗internationalization of conscience‘ produced by the narrative of global compassion. With 
no intention of declaring news coverage of distant suffering verboten, or even tossing out 
the porous language of universalism, Ignatieff cynically observes that coverage is not 
‗suffering with‘ but rather a ‗cruel mime of immediacy‘.
247
 Like the other scholars 
highlighted in this chapter, Ignatieff ends with a moral claim of the need to move ‗from 
voyeurism to commitment‘.  
Conclusion: 
In this chapter I demonstrated that technological advances alone do not determine 
how we see the world. Nor do technological advances alone broaden neighbourhood 
boundaries. Social values shape how technologies are used. The Global Samaritan may 
consider suffering people in Darfur, Congo and Myanmar to be neighbours, yet not 
acknowledge human suffering in certain neighbourhoods of London or New York. 
Neighbourhoods are sites for the struggle of representation or publicity because the cost 
of not appearing in the public realm, as Hannah Arendt strongly stated, can be the matter 
between life and death. 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, New Testament scholar McDonald pointed out that 
the parable of the Good Samaritan may be a story that communities tell about themselves 
as a reminder of what kind of people they have been in the past and what kind of people 
they want to be in the future. Given the West‘s failure to help save the Jews of modern 
Europe from mass slaughter, what might the West do the next time they are witness to 
genocide? In order to bear witness to past genocide, in the narrative of global 
compassion, there is a strong emphasis on bearing witness to new genocides.
248
 The 
mantra of ‗never forget‘ is practiced through raising awareness of new human suffering. 
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Collective memory of the Holocaust is often recalled in the introduction of new atrocities 
into the public realm.  
The witness of the Good Samaritan involved presence with the victim, as did the 
witness of the Priest and the Levite. The witness of the Good Samaritan also involved 
engagement, while the witness of the Priest and the Levite did not. In the modern era of 
global networked communication many people witness human suffering. Very few 
people can claim ‗I never knew.‘ Even so, not all who witness human suffering are 
understood to be involved in the process of bearing witness on behalf of the victims. 
Bearing witness involves more than spectatorship; it also involves engagement in the 
story told. In this chapter I worked with the concept of the Global Samaritan as the figure 
who bears witness to distant suffering. In the next three chapters I consider the moral 
agency of audiences and journalists who also participate as the Global Samaritan. I turn 
first toward audiences. Can television audiences who witness distant human suffering be 
more than spectators? 
 85 
Chapter 3:  Televisual Witness as Spectatorship and 
Participation? 
In the previous chapter, I identified the cast members of the narrative of global 
compassion as: diplomats and elected-government officials, non-governmental 
organisations, peacekeepers of international political bodies, foreign correspondents, and 
news audiences. In this chapter, I focus on televisual audiences, the spectators of distant 
suffering. I use the word ‗televisual‘ over ‗television‘ simply to acknowledge the many 
forms of news media delivery. I evaluate the analogy of the audience as the Global 
Samaritan I argue that the analogy works when spectators actively judge suffering to be 
worthy of compassion. I argue that the analogy breaks down when televisual spectators 
are put under moral obligation to relieve the suffering of every object of their gaze. I 
argue that spectators‘ participation in active reception is measured not by their direct 
reciprocal interaction with the person whose suffering they see on television, but in their 
participation in work to alleviate this human suffering. The claim that audiences are 
bearing witness to distant suffering requires engaged, not passive spectatorship. 
In the previous chapter I discussed the parable of the Good Samaritan. In the 
parable, neighbours are witnesses moved by compassion. Neighbours move from the 
position of proximate spectator to the position of participator. Today the most 
predominant way in which we witness the suffering of others is through the electronic 
mediation. This modern cultural practice of witnessing distant suffering problematizes 
the relationship between neighbour and proximity as understood in the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. Everyone who passed by the man on the side of the road in the parable 
of the Good Samaritan was complicit simply by the virtue of being in the same place at 
the same time. Being present engages witnesses. The privileged status of an eyewitness in 
a court of law is contingent on time and space. With proximity drastically altered and 
temporality altered to a lesser degree, are televisual eye-witnesses under the moral 
obligation to act in a neighbourly manner?  If so, any attempt to enforce the Belgian 
Good Samaritan law holding ‗everyone informed of the danger‘
249
 under the general 
obligation to rescue would be ludicrous and futile. Nevertheless, complicity comes with 
knowledge. In this chapter I explore three topics.  First, I begin by investigating an 
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accusation that gazing at television violence is itself a violent act. The other two major 
themes I investigate have to do with audience agency. I argue that audiences have the 
agency to respond to unjust suffering, beginning with their compassionate response. 
Finally, I consider potential audience agency through the formation of ‗publics‘. By 
‗publics‘ I mean a particular body of people, real or imagined, who have some kind of 
collective purpose. I begin with the accusation of impotent audiences.  
3.1 An Accusation: Spectatorship of Violence is Violence 
To focus the discussion on the complicity of the televisual witness, I consider this 
question: What kind of witnesses do spectators of suffering make?  Theologian John 
Milbank claims that watching violence is violence. In a chapter titled ‗Violence: Double 
Passivity,‘ Milbank deals with the concern of modern violence and spectatorship.
250
 He 
discusses three sites of the violence of spectatorship. I concentrate on the first site, 
recorded or televisual violence, but it is worth briefly considering the other two. The 
second site of gazing on violence is the morally superior gaze at the past. History is the 
place where savage acts took place, and where such savagery still continues in the 
modern world, those are marginal places exhibiting a ‗historical hangover‘.
251
 The third 
site of violent spectatorship Milbank identifies is found in the practice of pacifism. He 
claims that the position of Christian pacifism is indefensible. According to Milbank, 
pacifism is a counterintuitive position because the pacifist‘s ‗gaze at violence‘ is 
violence.
252
 There are some very helpful aspects to Milbank‘s essay as well as some 
problems.  
Milbank‘s language in the essay on the double passivity of violence is 
provocative. To be fair to Milbank, he wrote the essay as a response to Stanley Hauerwas 
who presented an essay on the Christian pacifist position.
253
 Hauerwas, in his own 
provocative fashion, opened his remarks by claiming that he was tempted to commit 
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metaphysical violence against Milbank simply by presenting his argument first.
254
 
Hauerwas‘ defence of Christian pacifism is much indebted to the work of John Howard 
Yoder. Milbank‘s accusation of spectatorship passivity involves equating the witness of 
pacifism with passivity. This has been a prevalent charge against Christian pacifism that 
Yoder and now Hauerwas argue against. In this chapter, I consider how analogous 
Yoder‘s argument, that witness involves active engagement and participation, can be with 
the witness of televisual audiences.  
3.1.1 The Spectatorship of Televisual Violence 
With regard to televisual violence, Milbank writes that the wealthy middle-class 
west is an onlooker of violence, ‗scenes of violence in wild nature, human violence in 
remote places, or else of simulated, fictional violence.‘
255
 In the case of viewing the 
distant suffering of others, we often witness the aftermath of violent acts, not the actual 
acts of violence.
256
 The presence of suffering leads us to believe that violence has just 
happened. Milbank‘s metaphor of the double passivity of spectatorship as violence is 
helpful because it emphasizes that mere spectatorship is not a neutral position; viewing 
violence involves judging it as violence. The double passivity of his description of 
viewing violence involves two passive acts. The first passive act is the viewing of 
violence and judging it as violence, often done at a distance. The second passive act is 
doing nothing to remedy the privation of the good, all the more likely when the violence 
and suffering viewed is far away.   
Milbank arrives at this judgment of double passivity through a privation theory of 
violence like that of an Augustinian privation theory of sin, which views evil not as a 
separate force that triumphs over the good, but evil is simply the withholding of the good. 
From this perspective, violence is not only committing the act of violence, but violence is 
also withholding remedy from violence.
257
 Thus, being a spectator of violence, 
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particularly in our modern cultural form of viewing violence from a significant distance, 
according to Milbank, involves withholding the good. He concludes: ‗looking at violence 
is actually more violent than participating in violence – that to be violent is actually to 
survey in a detached, uninvolved fashion a scene of suffering‘.
258
   
While I acknowledge the debate setting in which Milbank first gave his paper, I 
still take issue with Milbank‘s claim that ‗gazing at violence is the greatest violence, 
indeed the very essence of violence‘.
259
 In his conclusion, Milbank takes the focus away 
from the victim; this alone is problematic. But, he also removes agency from the 
audience. He claims that audiences are ‗confined to a telos of mere reception‘ because 
there is no possibility for reciprocal participation.
260
 I believe he is too hasty in declaring 
that there is no participation in reception. I agree that there are problems in the 
spectatorship of violence, but I do not think the problem is lack of reciprocal participation 
with the object of the spectator‘s gaze. There are times when a viewer‘s life can be 
dramatically changed without ever interacting with the original object of the viewer‘s 
gaze.   
Reception itself is not an end of the televisual experience. In the next sections, I 
investigate the issue of the telos of television news. I argue that mere reception is not the 
end goal of the cultural practice of broadcasting televisual news of distant human 
suffering. I argue that the ritual of television news reception involves a continuum with 
multiple ends possible. The most robust possible end of audience reception of distant 
human suffering is in the potential for news audiences to form ‗publics‘ who collectively 
can effect change. Nevertheless, not every act of televisual news reception will result in 
reciprocal participation. Such impossibility leads me to question what is meant by 
reciprocal participation by televisual audiences. But, first I emphasise an important 
insight that I do take away from Milbank‘s argument on the spectatorship of violence.   
3.1.2 Spectators Judge Violence 
What I find helpful in Milbank‘s metaphor of the double passivity of viewing 
violence is the moral concern raised over the issue of judging violence, yet doing nothing. 
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I also agree with his charge that a morally superior gaze at the past is a violent act done 
not just to those in the past but to those presently suffering from the ‗antiquated‘ violence 
of civil war and genocide. This superior gaze on the past corresponds to Western 
televisual viewing of suffering in unfamiliar, foreign places as products of ‗foreign‘ 
places. Michael Ignatieff acknowledges this problem with regard to television news. 
‗Television has unfortunate strengths as a medium of moral disgust. …  television news 
is more adept at pointing to the corpses than in explaining why violence may, in certain 
places, pay so well.‘
261
 Ignatieff claims that Western moral disgust results in an often 
racist misanthropy toward the people in Africa or the East, as well as resulting in a 
generalised misanthropy ‗that the world has become too crazy to deserve serious 
reflection.‘
262
 This could also be called spectator compassion fatigue as defined by Susan 
Moeller: ‗[u]ndifferentiated mayhem leads to emotional overload‘.
263
   
Milbank, Ignatieff, Moeller, and I argue from the position of Western 
spectatorship. Before continuing from this position, it is important to acknowledge that 
the spectatorship of suffering is not only the prerogative of Western television audiences. 
Reflection on Western consumption of the spectacle of violence tends to be a cynical 
critique, but this must not be applied to spectatorship world-wide. Social critic Susan 
Sontag calls this ‗breathtaking provincialism‘. She argues: 
[I]t is absurd to identify the world with those zones in the well-off 
countries where people have the dubious privilege of being spectators, or 
of declining to be spectators, of other people‘s pain, just as it is absurd to 
generalize about the ability to respond to the sufferings of others on the 
basis of the mind-set of those consumers of news who know nothing first 
hand about war and massive injustice and terror. There are hundreds of 




Sontag rightly argues that not all spectators of violence are viewing from zones of 
privilege. If cynicism is the over-correction of moral disgust, Sontag helps rein-in 
cynicism by reminding well-off spectators that many who will be simultaneously 
witnessing these events have themselves suffered grave injustice. In fact, the news 
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coverage of civilian casualties in war may depict the war taking place in their own 
country. This is not often considered in the scholarship on the spectatorship of violence. 
3. 1.3 The Televisual as a Cultural Form of Witnessing 
When Milbank judges the act of spectatorship of recorded violence as violence, 
he is judging the use of the cultural form of television as violent. Milbank describes 
violence as violence when it ruins how something should be or diverts from how 
something should develop.
265
 He is critical of television spectatorship as having a ‗telos 
of mere reception,‘ rather than allowing for reciprocal participation. I believe Milbank‘s 
argument lacks the insight that a media-centred critique provides. A media-centred 
critique considers the technological and sociological formation of audiences witnessing 
distant human suffering. I make this argument by looking at the medium of television as a 
cultural form, and more specifically the genre of television news broadcasts. 
Milbank posits that by being passive spectators of violence is a violent act. This 
position is based on the lack of reciprocity between the spectator and the person viewed 
on television. A similar problem is present in the analogy of ‗the audience‘ as the Good 
Samaritan; the audience lacks direct reciprocity with the person viewed on television. 
Both lines of thought require a view of the television broadcast as an extension of face-
to-face communication. Here is where a media-centred view of the televisual, that is, all 
mediums providing electronic delivery of the visual such as television and internet 
computers, can be of help. Televisual witness is not the extension of face-to-face 
interaction; it is not giving the Good Samaritan the super-human, but nonetheless 
embodied, ability to travel the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, followed by near 
instantaneous stops in Darfur, Congo, and Burma which would be a very likely flow of 
the nightly news.
266
 Such a view requires audience reception to develop into a direct 
extension of the good from the viewer to the person suffering. What if the reciprocal 
participation that televisual spectatorship provides is not reciprocity between the viewer 
and the individuals who are suffering, but rather between the viewer and other viewers?  
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What if the good, therefore the telos, which televisual witness provides is the social 
integration of audiences which may unite into publics of common cause in which such 
collective attention may result in humanitarian aid, policy change or physical 
intervention?  
The cultural form of televisual media has not most prominently developed into a 
mode of communication which extends face-to-face, dialogical communication. It is only 
within the last decade that the televisual has been readily accessible outside of 
institutional use, at least for those with computers and internet access, as a tool to extend 
face-to-face, real-time communication in video-conferencing programs like Skype. A 
prominent Communication theorist known for research into news reporting and reception 
as a cultural form is James W. Carey. He contrasts a transmission view of communication 
theory with a ritual view of communication theory.
267
 The transmission view sees 
communication as an extension of messages in space. This would include the 
technological extension of face-to-face communication. The ritual view is 
communication as the maintenance of society and representation of shared beliefs. 
According to a ritual view of communication, a television genre such as news broadcasts: 
creates an artificial though nonetheless real symbolic order that operates to 
provide not information but confirmation, not to alter attitudes or change 
minds but to represent an underlying order of things, not to perform 
functions but to manifest an ongoing and fragile social process.
268
  
Carey views communication taking place in the everyday over a single dialogical 
exchange. He defines communication as ‗a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, 
maintained, repaired, and transformed.‘
269
 Carey gives the example of a ritual view of the 
role of newspapers in social life; I think this ritual view can be expanded to include the 
role of watching televisual news as well. A ritual perspective will ‗view reading a 
newspaper less as sending or gaining information and more as attending a mass, a 
situation in which nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is 
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 The nightly news is then a projection of community ideals 
and their embodiment in a cultural form. 
As I discussed in the last chapter (2.2.2), J. Ian H. McDonald‘s interpretation of 
the message intended for the Samaritan audience was a remembrance of their tradition 
and their past righteousness in order ‗to manifest an ongoing and fragile social process‘. 
McDonald argued that hearing the parable is an integrating social practice where the re-
telling of the parable contributes to the: 
narrative concept of morality in which the question of identity – ‗Who am 
I?‘ – and that of goal or telos – ‗What ought I to become?‘ – are brought to 
the fore and subjected to the criterion of ‗neighbourly‘ initiative towards 
‗the man in the ditch‘.
271
  
Does McDonald‘s insight apply to the cultural practice of foreign news coverage of 
distant human suffering?  Of course the parable of the Good Samaritan was a parable and 
not a live report of a man suffering in the ditch. Nonetheless, the cultural practice of 
reporting on suffering in far away places does tell us something about our society‘s 
identity, goals and concerns. There are problems with making the ‗man in the ditch‘ an 
abstraction or the generalised other of a social issue. I address this later in the chapter. 
The cultural form of the televisual, through technology and social use, has most 
prominently developed into a mode of perception called witnessing.
272
 The focus is not 
on dialogical interaction, the focus is on the viewer‘s experience of coming to know 
things. Media Studies scholar John Ellis argues that our cultural news conventions allow 
viewers to delegate their ‗look‘ to that of the television‘s look at the world outside.
273
 
Television news is communication staged for witnesses. Face-to-face communication 
might be simulated as in the case of BBC news analysis show presenter Andrew Marr in 
London having a one-to-one video phone conversation with Alex Salmond MP in 
Scotland, but the purpose of the conversation is for the broadcasting to UK audiences. 
Marr and Salmond‘s conversation is scripted, in an open question-and-answer format, a 
staged performance for spectators, for witnesses. Television is a cultural form that 
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provides the opportunity for witness; it is public communication, optimistically intended 
in Western democracy, to be for public deliberation. John Durham Peters points out that 
public communication is never ‗purely‘ two or three people having a conversation. 
‗Every public act or utterance engages third parties, whether as eavesdroppers, spectators, 
inspectors, police, judges, enemies, or friends. … This communicative constellation—




While television viewing makes us witnesses, John Ellis argues that the cultural 
form of television also provides a process for ‗working through‘ what we witness by 
offering citizens through multiple genres of television formats. He draws the term 
‗working through‘ from Freudian ‗psychoanalysis where it describes the process whereby 
material is continually worried over until it is exhausted.‘
275
 Ellis finds that broadcast 
television can serve this function of working over the unintelligible as well. ‗Television 
attempts definitions, tries out explanation, creates narratives, talks over, makes 
intelligible, tries to marginalize, harnesses speculation, tries to make fit, and, very 
occasionally, anathemizes.‘
276
 The nightly newscast works through new and 
unintelligible material by anchoring it into understandable and familiar segments 
presented by a news anchor. While the story may have no resolution, the segment within 
the television program will have an ending, but news is on-going and tomorrow night 
more material will be worried over in each segment. For Ellis, television‘s ‗process of 




Ellis argues that the ‗essence of this sense of witness‘ experienced through the 
televisual is that ‗we cannot say that we do not know.‘
278
 Peters agrees with Ellis, that 
informed audiences ‗means their capture within webs of responsibility or complicity. 
Being informed can be a profoundly life-transforming event.‘
279
 Being informed, having 
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witnessed creates moral agents out of viewers. I began this thesis by introducing the 
theme of complicity and witness by telling the stories of journalist Malcolm 
Muggeridge‘s experience of reporting on the Ukrainian famine and former US President 
Bill Clinton‘s apology to Rwanda. Muggeridge claimed that he could ‗never pretend‘ that 
he did not know of the starvation of the Ukrainian people. To do otherwise would be 
false witness. Clinton never came out and said that the international community ‗never 
knew‘ what was happening in Rwanda. His language was hedging, we ‗did not fully 
appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this 
unimaginable terror.‘
280
 The prevarication is evident in Clinton‘s awkward apology. He 
never denies the international community‘s failure to act, but neither does he 
acknowledge the international community‘s complicity in the Rwandan genocide.  
What kind of moral agency is involved in the cultural practice of televisual 
witnessing? I have argued that it does not forge a direct relationship between the witness 
and the images of individuals viewed. John Milbank‘s accusation, therefore, that 
spectators of violence withhold the good and that spectator reception is confined to ‗mere 
reception‘ needs to be reconsidered. Media scholars such as Thompson, Carey, Ellis, and 
Peters argue that televisual witness creates common symbolic interaction among the 
members of the audience. The spectators are partaking in a shared set of symbols. The 
spectators‘ reading of the set of symbols will be ‗polysemic‘.
281
 Nevertheless, it is 
significant that spectators focus attention on the same text. Thus far, I have emphasised 
that audience agency involves the focusing of collective attention. Collective attention 
begins the journey toward creating tables of common cause. In the narrative of global 
compassion nascent tables of common cause begin with collective attention and the 
shared judgment of compassion. 
3.2 Compassion as Reasoned Judgment of Violence 
Milbank‘s explanation of the ‗double passivity of violence‘ actually involves a 
very active first step of making a judgement: judging violent images as violence. 
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Passivity only enters the equation when the first act of moral judgment is not followed by 
the second act, that of alleviating injustice. My purpose in the last section was to change 
the second half of Milbank‘s equation. Instead of an audience responding directly to the 
object of their gaze, I argue that the kind of reciprocity television news creates is 
collective attention potentially for collective action. In the third section of this chapter I 
look at the possibilities for collective action, but first I focus on how compassion can 
itself be active audience reception. Compassion, like the judgment of violence, is a two-
step process: first judging the situation to be worthy of pity, and second doing something 
to relieve the suffering.
282
 
Regarding the cultural harm of the incessant production of and exposure to violent 
images, various media scholars and cultural critics have argued for the viewer practice of 
distancing our gaze, but this is not to be conflated with a non-evaluative gaze. Sontag 
called for an ‗ecology of images‘ in her early book, On Photography, and she does not 
completely give up that argument in her later work.
283
 Bernd Hüppauf calls us as 
spectators to ‗defamiliarize our gaze‘ in order to avoid knowingly empathizing with 




 and Lilie Chouliaraki
286
 
propose an aesthetic gaze which allows for detached reflection. These scholars call for a 
reflective gaze but not at all for a non-evaluative gaze. Hüppauf calls a non-evaluative 
gaze a process of ‗emptying the gaze,‘ becoming ‗morally indifferent to that which is 
represented.‘
287
 A gaze that does not include judgment does not fit the remit of what it 
means to be a ‗witness.‘ To claim to bear witness requires the judgment of joining the 
side of the good.
288
 An interpretation of an image as a documentation of human suffering 
by the hand of violence and oppression, requires the moral agency to judge evil. Recall 
the moral agent is the audience. 
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The judgment of violence can be the beginning of compassion. Is this what moved 
the Samaritan? The Samaritan judged that the man on the side of the road had 
experienced violence, and he ‗was moved with compassion‘ (Luke 10:33). Compassion is 
not just awareness of another‘s suffering, but the deep hope to relieve the suffering. The 
good is hope; what is in question here is the actual possibility to make that hope 
operational. In the spectatorship of distant suffering the response of compassion is a form 
of reasoning and a judgment that someone has suffered by the violence of nature or 
humanity. Moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues that compassion is an emotion 
based on thought and evaluation, and that ‗compassion is a certain sort of reasoning.‘
289
 
Compassion is an activity based on the spectator‘s point of view.  Nussbaum says that the 
spectator‘s perspective is: 
informed by the best judgment the onlooker [spectator] can make about 
what is really happening to the person being observed – taking the 
person‘s own wishes into account, but not always taking as the last word 
the judgment that the person herself is able to form.
290
  
Compassion is a spectator-centred perspective. This is in agreement with my earlier 
discussion on how televisual witnessing is a viewer-centred mode of perception. It is the 
spectator judging that the other person is deprived of some aspect (or aspects) of the 
good. Moral philosopher Lawrence A. Blum observes that although compassion is for the 
person, it is the condition of deprivation that is ‗the focus of compassion,‘ the pain, 
misery, hardship, suffering and affliction.
291
 The one receiving the compassion of the 
spectator may not know she is in any sort of deprivation. Criteria for judging another as 
an object of compassion is based on the spectator‘s concept of human flourishing, the 
spectator‘s ‗picture of the world‘.
292
 Nussbaum identifies three criteria in which 
spectator-centred compassion is reasoned and judged as an appropriate response to 
suffering: 1) How serious is the situation? 2) Who is at fault for the situation? 3) How 
likely would I find myself in similar possibilities?
293
 I will consider her criteria with 
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reference to news coverage of distant suffering as an example of ways in which 
compassion is reasoned judgment.    
3.2.1 A Reason for Compassion: Seriousness of Situation 
The first criterion Nussbaum identifies is the seriousness of the situation.  In the 
case of the spectatorship of famine victims, for example, distant audiences witness late 
stages of famine because the preliminary stages of drought, political corruption, and 
military and civil unrest are too difficult to visually represent.
294
 Journalistic coverage of 
humanitarian disasters, particularly of famine, relies on the production of stock images. 
The stock famine image is the starving child. The starving child also represents the 
ultimate innocent victim of humanitarian disasters. Former foreign correspondent Susan 
Moeller reveals the trade‘s shorthand for the stock photo:  BB, an acronym for bloated-
belly.
295
 Moeller explains that images are needed in the appeal to spectator compassion 
because images legitimize the seriousness of the situation:  
Images help to legitimate the use of the word ‗crisis‘ for an event. A 
‗crisis‘ occurs when the abstractions of injustice or racism or prejudice of 
pain, violence or destruction become concrete on a scale large enough to 
attract attention. It is the role of imagery to make the incorporeal, 
corporeal. That is how images tap so easily into our emotions, which 




As I discussed in the previous chapter, Hannah Arendt argued that it is in the appearance 
of men, women and children‘s physical labouring for biological needs that pain is most 
readily represented for public appearance. Biological need is the lowest common 
denominator with regard to the best conception of human flourishing to which spectators 
might appeal. Victims of late-stage famine make ‗ideal victims‘ because their biological 
needs are visibly evident to help the spectator in her judgment of compassion. 
3.2.2 A Reason for Compassion: No Fault of Victim 
A second characteristic of compassion as a reasoned response is the lack of fault 
or culpability of the victim. Who is at fault for the situation? Birgitta Höijer conducted 
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audience research in Sweden on how audiences responded to televisual news coverage of 
humanitarian suffering during the Kosovo war in 1999. The result of her audience 
analysis was that audience compassion was highly dependent on visual images of the 
representation of ‗ideal victims‘.  She found that spectators considered middle-aged men 
pleading to be evacuated from refugee camps as the victims least worthy of their 
compassion.
297
 Michael Ignatieff argues that the category of crimes against humanity 
created the public imagery of ‗the pure victim‘: 
[G]enocide and famine create a new human subject—the pure victim 
stripped of social identity, and thus bereft of the specific moral audience 
that would in normal times be there to hear his cry. The family, the tribe, 
the faith, the nation no longer exist as a moral audience for these people.  
If they are to be saved at all, they must put their faith in that most fearful 
of dependency relations:  the charity of strangers.
298
 
Innocent victims of crimes against humanity strongly represent the seriousness of 
the situation and the problem that no one in their proximity can help them. To be reliant 
on the compassion of strangers is to be in a very vulnerable position; this was Funk‘s 
point about the man in the ditch‘s reliance on the compassion of the Good Samaritan, ‗all 
who are truly victims, truly disinherited, have no choice but to give themselves up to 
mercy.‘
299
  Yet conversely, what makes the needs of strangers our obligation is our 
emotional response of compassion. Moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argues that our 
moral obligations, a commitment to just generosity, begin with those of our families and 
multiple communities, and then extends to welcoming the stranger who comes among our 
communities, and further extends beyond our boundaries when prompted by compassion. 
MacIntyre claims that compassion is a virtue that ‗extends beyond communal obligations 
[and] is itself crucial for communal life.‘
300
 The virtue of compassion is cultivated 
through ‗attentive and affectionate regard for that other‘.
301
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3.2.3 A Reason for Compassion: Similar Experience  
The third criterion Nussbaum identifies in the judgment of compassion is the 
realization of similar possibilities. How likely is this going to happen to me? On a 
motorway if we come upon an accident that has just happened, we might think that it just 
as easily could have been us. This aspect of compassion, similar possibility, is related to 
proximity. In order for us to consider ourselves potential victims of a similar tragedy or 
injustice, there needs to be some kind of approximation of our own life to the victim‘s 
life, such as the likelihood of travelling on the same road or similar social vulnerability. 
Proximity is both a physical and social approximation. For instance US citizens living in 
hurricane-vulnerable coastal cities may share the same city but not necessarily the same 
risks. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 highlighted the line between the similar possibilities 
shared by the vulnerable and the much less vulnerable. The latter were able to leave town 
with at least a car-full of possessions while the vulnerable were trapped in the city. 
Compassion based on identifying with the victim is further removed when the 
victim is physically far away as well as victim to the suffering of famine, genocide, or 
war. Most Western audiences have not suffered such large scale devastation in recent 
history, but this is not to say that there are not many people marginalized from the fruits 
of Western affluence. Actually, it is from the marginal places where the cultural practice 
of compassion is refreshed as in the case of Dalit theology‘s contextualisation of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan (discussed in the last chapter, 2.2.3.1). Nonetheless, 
similarities can still be made in drawing on life experiences of tragedy and of flourishing.  
A mother watching television coverage of famine may empathise with the mother on 
television who has no food for her children. Compassion resulting from the reasoning that 
you could be in a similar position remains spectator-centred emotion.  Nussbaum 
explains: 
But even then, in the temporary act of identification, one is always aware 
of one‘s own separateness from the sufferer – it is for another, and not 
oneself, that one feels; and one is aware both of the bad lot of the sufferer 
and of the fact that it is, right now, not one‘s own. If one really had the 
experience of feeling the pain in one‘s own body, then one would precisely 
have failed to comprehend the pain of another as other.
302
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Nussbaum‘s important insight raises concerns regarding the nature of solidarity. Does 
solidarity require similar experience? The cast of Global Compassion is largely 
constituted of those who have not had like experience. Efforts to reduce the gap of 
physical proximity, such as war reporters on-the-scene or aid workers on-the-ground, 
does not as easily address the concern of social proximity.  
3.2.3.1 Link to Justice 
It is in this third characteristic of compassion that Nussbaum identifies a link to 
justice. While there is self-interest involved in the criterion of ‗similar possibilities‘, this 
aspect of compassion may be the spur to the just distribution of goods. Nussbaum argues 
that reasoning based on the criterion of vulnerability to similar possibilities connects 
‗prudential concern and altruism,‘ and provides an ‗egalitarian raising of the floor‘.
303
 
Prudential concern and altruism is the kind of compassioned reasoning appealed to in the 
Good Samaritan laws—offer assistance to your neighbour, because the next time it could 
just as likely be you. An egalitarian raising of the floor provides a level of justice for 
everyone with regard to the prudential concern that one day those on the upper rungs of 
the ladder may end up on the vulnerable lower rungs. Thus, if the bottom level of society 
is raised up, the chance for falling into vulnerability is reduced. Here is where Nussbaum 
offers a fragile connection from compassion to justice.  She writes that compassion ‗is 
not sufficient for justice, since it focuses on need and offers no account of liberty, rights, 
or respect for human dignity.‘
304
 Compassion is judgment that victims do not deserve the 
violence done to them, but ‗it does not entail that the person has a right or a just claim to 
relief.‘ Nussbaum believes that, ‗compassion at least makes us see the importance of the 
person‘s lack, and consider with keen interest the claim that such a person might have. In 
that sense it provides an essential bridge to justice.‘
305
  
Compassion‘s link to justice is already fragile. Compassion‘s link to justice is 
made that much more tenuous given audiences‘ physical distance from victims. 
Audiences witnessing crimes against humanity may be motivated to want to do 
something, but the possibility for action is limited. In televisual witness, awareness does 
not guarantee action. Ignatieff tells the story of travelling to Rwanda in July 1995, with 
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then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who was there to address the genocide 
survivors. Ignatieff reported that the secretary-general told the survivors that the 
‗international community has not forgotten them.‘ Ignatieff observed that the only time 
the audience applauded was when the secretary-general said that the guilty ones will not 
escape: ‗They will be punished.‘ After the secretary-general left, Ignatieff stayed and 
listened to some of the survivors discussing the visit:  
At least he came, one says, and he expressed sorrow. Yes, that is true, 
someone else says, but he did not listen. He did not ask any of the 
survivors to speak. They know the murderers‘ names. They were once 
neighbors, even friends. The survivors need justice now, as much as they 
need bread, and they do not believe they will get it.
 306
 
The reasoned judgment of compassion has little resemblance to judgment when 
the follow through of justice is not within reach. Is this cultural form of witnessing distant 
suffering simply a ‗cruel mime of immediacy‘ as Ignatieff at one point suggests? Or, 
might compassion be an emotion worth cultivating in a society when there may be some 
occasions where compassionate responses to news about suffering result in public action 
and the pursuit of social justice?  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan attributed the very 
positive and immediate international response toward the victims of the December 2004 
Asian tsunami to the global visibility that televisual coverage gave to the actual event, 
aftermath and rebuilding efforts.
307
 He called the global publicity ‗a unique display of the 
unity of the world.‘
308
 How do we move from the activity of judgment to action? The 
way to judge the quality of compassion is by its fruit. A tugging of the heartstrings alone 
does not result in the emotion of compassion. Nussbaum claims that when compassion 
affects our lives by influencing our beliefs, patterns of life, motivations and expectations, 
then it is a form of judgment and reasoning.
309
 Compassion is a form of life that needs to 
be cultivated. 
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3.2.3.2 Cultivation of Compassion 
A central critique of the politics of compassion is that as a basis of reasoning and 
as a prompting for public deliberation, compassion is partial and narrow.
310
 The politics 
of compassion will lead to action in some places and not in others producing unbalanced 
and inconsistent results. Secretary-general Annan lauded the display of global unity 
following the Asian tsunami, but one of the reasons that the tsunami was given such 
televisual visibility and relevance world-wide was because over forty countries suffered 
the loss of citizens in the disaster. Another reason for the world-wide compassionate 
response had to do with timeliness—it was during the Christmas holiday season. 
Audiences had more time to give to the spectatorship of suffering victims of the tsunami, 
and more time to reflect on a compassionate judgment that led many audience members 
to participation in public fundraising campaigns for disaster relief and rebuilding. 
Nussbaum acknowledges the criticism that compassion is partial and narrow moral 
reasoning. Generally, the issues we understand and that have relevance to us are the 
issues that matter to us most. Therefore, the task of moral development, which includes 
the ‗intelligence of compassion‘, is to build on the understandings of justice that we 
already have to make justice make sense in a broader context.
311
 McDonald gave this as 
the likely interpretation the Samaritan audience was meant to take from the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. 
How does a culture learn and develop patterns of life influenced by the emotion of 
compassion? Nussbaum‘s answer is through the spectatorship of tragedy: developing the 
moral imagination through the stories of tragedy will help educate a society in becoming 
compassionate spectators. Nussbaum cites the use of tragedy in Greek society‘s civic 
education. The role of tragic theatre is to cultivate compassion in the youth:   
Such a spectator is learning pity in the process. Tragedies acquaint young 
people with the bad things that may happen in a human life, long before 
life itself does so: they thus enable concern for others who are suffering 
what the spectator has not suffered.  Moreover, they do so in a way that 
makes the depth and significance of suffering, and the losses that inspire it, 
unmistakably plain – the poetic, visual, and musical resources of the drama 
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thus have moral weight. … the drama sets up pity; an attentive spectator 
will, in apprehending it, have that emotion.
312
   
Nussbaum describes the process of the spectatorial role as seeing things from the 
sufferer‘s point of view while acknowledging the common humanity between them as ‗an 
education in social justice,‘ not that people will make radical social changes, ‗so powerful 
are the dulling forces of habit.‘
313
 What Nussbaum presents us with is an argument for 
compassion as a form of reasoning that is developed in an ad hoc manner where the 
understanding and cultivation of compassion begins from the spectator‘s conception of 
human flourishing and changes as she. Can this be extrapolated? Can Nussbaum‘s 
reasoning for the spectatorship of tragedy on stage work as a possible justification for the 
spectatorship of the actual human suffering of people in distant places?   
Susan Sontag addresses this in her book Regarding the Pain of Others. Her 
argument for viewing images of distant suffering parallels Nussbaum‘s argument. An 
education in social justice requires the awareness of social injustice. Sontag asks: What is 
the purpose of photographing and viewing suffering? She argues that the ‗photographs 
are a means of making ―real‖ (or ―more real‖) matters that the privileged and the merely 
safe might prefer to ignore.‘
314
 The underlying pedagogy is that social and psychological 
maturity requires the understanding that depravity exists. She argues that acknowledging 
the existence of suffering ‗caused by human wickedness‘ is a good in itself.  
Someone who is perennially surprised that depravity exists, who continues 
to feel disillusioned (even incredulous) when confronted with evidence of 
what humans are capable of inflicting in the way of gruesome, hands-on 
cruelties upon other humans, has not reached moral psychological 
adulthood. No one after a certain age has the right to this kind of 
innocence, of superficiality, to this degree of ignorance, or amnesia.
315
  
While Sontag forthrightly states that such ignorance is ‗moral defectiveness,‘ she 
offers a nuance to the purposes for witnessing suffering. Sontag argues for the ‗more 
general understanding that human beings everywhere do terrible things to one another.‘
316
 
She is not claiming that images of suffering should function as a remembrance of specific 
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grievances because that leads to perpetual vengefulness. The images are not for the 
purpose of creating guilt, nor are the images ‗supposed to repair our ignorance about the 
history and causes of the suffering it picks out and frames.‘
317
 Sontag claims that the 
images ‗cannot be more than an invitation to pay attention, to reflect, to learn, to examine 
the rationalizations for mass suffering offered by established powers.‘
318
 She believes that 
the justification for witnessing distant suffering is in order to ask these questions: ‗Who 
caused what the picture shows? Who is responsible? Is it excusable? Was it inevitable? Is 




John Durham Peters argues that exposure to suffering as civic instruction is part 
of the heritage of the tradition of a free press. A founding principle of the freedom of the 
press tradition is objectivity, and in the test case of exposure to suffering through the 
images of the dead and dying, the role of objectivity is ‗understood as the imperative to 
hold disgust for the sake of education‘.
320
  Exposure to trauma as civic instruction is a 




In her book Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News About 
Violence, Media Studies scholar Jean Seaton traces the public representation of suffering 
from ancient Romans through Communist Russia to today's spectators of suffering on 
television. Her argument corresponds with the reasoning of Nussbaum, Sontag and 
Peters. The spectatorship of suffering is part of our moral development: 
On the whole we believe that our willingness to witness suffering is to our 
credit. It is not merely that our knowledge of their pain may be useful to 
those subjected to it: we like to believe that there is a virtue in frankly 
confronting a difficult subject…being a spectator may sometimes bring out 
the best in us – and echo a long, even ancient tradition of bearing witness – 
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so that the task of the news is to catch our attention with accounts of 
events that will test our mettle…
322
 
While all four scholars acknowledge that to judge an image as unjust human 
suffering does not directly result in action, they do not go as far as Milbank in declaring 
the spectatorship of violence to be a violent cultural practice. Peters describes witnessing 
as participation and Sontag argues for spectatorship as an opportunity to think, reflect and 
question. Sontag states that there is nothing morally wrong with: 
the standing back from the aggressiveness of the world which frees us for 
observation and for selective attention. But this is only to describe the 
function of the mind itself. There‘s nothing wrong with standing back and 
thinking. To paraphrase several sages: ‗Nobody can think and hit someone 
at the same time.‘
323
  
Spectators of tragedy, whether at a dramatic theatre production or the television broadcast 
of suffering, create a collective of focused attention on the important issue of social 
justice. The common symbolic interaction of cultivating sites for compassion such as 
broadcast news of distant human suffering is itself a significant cultural practice. This 
alone is participation on behalf of audiences, but audience agency can move even further. 
Spectators can potentially participate in ‗publics‘. 
3.3 Spectators’ Agency for Reciprocal Participation 
I now turn to the possibilities for active audience reception. Milbank is rightly 
concerned about the agency afforded to television audiences when they witness injustice. 
He claims that after the judgment of violence, there is no possibility for moral action. I 
claim that there are potential, albeit modest, possibilities for spectators to act. Active 
audience response is found in the reciprocity and participation between and among 
spectators. Media Studies scholar Daniel Dayan‘s work on television publics has showed 
how audiences move from being spectators to being participators. Dayan uses the 
metaphor of birthing in this move from spectatorship to participation.
324
 This metaphor 
provides the room for the potentiality of fully-formed publics, but with the nuanced 
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awareness that full gestation, maybe even conception, does not always occur. The 
potentiality for publics to be born does not always result in the existence of actual 
publics, an actual social body linked by common cause.  
In this section, I look at how publics might come into existence. The concrete and 
real life example of Charles Breen, a spectator of distant suffering, will serve to illustrate 
the argument of how spectators can potentially form publics. Breen is involved in public 
advocacy with the Washington D.C.-based organisation Save Darfur Coalition. My 
interview question to Breen was: Do you see yourself as having a role in bearing witness 
to genocide?
325
 Breen answered with the story of how he became involved in bearing 
witness to the genocide in Darfur. In 2004, Breen saw the film Hotel Rwanda. He was 
disturbed that he could not recall any discussion about the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
when it happened. He did not remember talking about Rwanda at university or at his 
church or anywhere else. Soon after the film, Breen heard about the situation in Darfur 
through television news coverage on C-SPAN. A US senator presented images from 
Darfur and declared that the situation in Sudan was genocide. 
Breen registered for membership on the Save Darfur Coalition website. For over a 
year, he followed the news and activities of the organisation, and then took an active step 
in becoming involved in the organisation‘s plan for a national Darfur prayer day. Breen 
asked the pastor of his church, The First United Methodist Church of South Haven, 
Michigan, if their church could participate in the prayer day. The pastor suggested that 
Breen should give a short sermon about Darfur and the prayer day. Breen focused the 
sermon on his experience as a film and television spectator and about how he could be 
doing more to help. The church congregation responded positively to Breen‘s sermon. 
Some members of the congregation also joined the on-line Save Darfur Coalition; others 
began to follow the story in the news and cut out newspaper articles about Darfur. The 
church appointed Breen to the role of Darfur justice coordinator. In this role Breen 
updates prayers regarding Darfur, he arranges monetary offerings for Darfur Aid Relief, 
and he edits a current news section featuring Darfur in the church‘s newsletter and email 
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correspondence including internet links to important information about Darfur. Breen 
also arranged for his church to display a large banner on an outside wall of the church 
with the words ‗call to your conscience‘ and the internet address for the Save Darfur 
Coalition.  
Breen‘s initiative moved beyond the walls of his church. Soon after he preached 
he was contacted by a few people in Grand Rapids, Michigan asking him to start a Save 
Darfur, Grand Rapids group. At the time of this interview with Breen, the Save Darfur, 
Grand Rapids group numbered over one hundred people. Breen‘s work with the Save 
Darfur Coalition put him in alliance with other organisations of common cause. He 
volunteered for the role of West Michigan contact for the Michigan Darfur Coalition, and 
he became involved in the Michigan Divestment Campaign based in Detroit. Breen‘s 
story is not the everyday response to televisual suffering in distant places, but his story is 
not completely atypical or outside of the realm of the possible. Breen provides an 
illustration to the process Dayan describes as television audiences ‗going public‘. 
3.3.1 Collective Attention  
Dayan charts the potentiality involved in how spectatorship might lead to the 
formation of publics. He begins with spectatorship as the possibility of collective 
attention. Dayan‘s ‗collective attention‘ parallels John B. Thompson‘s concept of 
‗mediated quasi-interaction.‘ Thompson defines the kind of interaction that television 
creates as ‗a certain kind of social situation in which individuals are linked together in a 
process of communication and symbolic exchange.‘
326
 Spectators are exposed to the same 
material. Dayan describes the television spectator of broadcast news as always ‗watching 
with‘ others.
327
 ‗Watching television means being part of a ―reverse-angle shot‖ 
consisting of everyone watching the same image at the same time or, more exactly, of all 
those believed to be watching.‘
328
 In the ritual of watching the nightly news, ‗the public 
serves as a dimension of the spectator‘s experience.‘
329
 Publics are constitutive of 
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collective attention. Günter Thomas argues that in modern, mediated society attention 
and awareness is a commodity of scarcity. Attention is a ‗contested cultural property and 
resource.‘
330
 Like Dayan, Thomas argues that collective attention has the potential to lead 
to the formation of publics: ‗If this accumulation of attention is centred on specific topics 
and attains some stability over time, it results in the creation of a public.‘
331
 
Dayan identifies several types of publics, for instance, there are ‗taste publics‘. 
Taste publics are usually birthed into the world by demographers aiming to sell to them. I 
concentrate on what Dayan calls ‗issue publics‘, or political publics, for these publics are 
constitutive of focused attention on a particular issue ‗aimed at determining certain 
courses of action.‘
332
 This is closest to the kind of public the Global Samaritan makes, an 
‗issue public‘ concerned with humanitarian care for human suffering in far away places. 
Collective attention may produce publics, but it produces other groupings as well. Dayan 
distinguishes publics from crowds that also emerge from shared attention.
333
 A crowd is a 
collective of attention that requires spatiality and temporality. Publics do not; publics can 
be constructed through shared symbolic interaction that can be accessed from any space 
and time. I emphasised this aspect of publics in relation to Hannah Arendt‘s public realm 
in the previous chapter. Arendt argues that public realms are artefacts constructed for a 
common cause that do not require everyone being present in the same place, at the same 
time.  
3.3.2 Social Integration 
The narrative of global compassion is a narrative that is cultivated and maintained 
in a media environment. It is not always tied to the same physical and temporal location. 
Social integration is maintained through the on-going coverage of distant human 
suffering framed by the need for a humanitarian response from the Global Samaritan. 
Conceptualising media as environments of social integration removes the emphasis of 
television as a medium to extend face-to-face interaction. Seen in this light, James W. 
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Carey‘s ritual understanding of television news watching as communion fits as a better 
model than the transmission models of media theory as sending and receiving. This 
concept is well illustrated by empirical findings in research on the power of images over 
audiences.  David Domke, David D. Perlmutter, and Meg Spratt examine the power of 
visual images on audiences.
334
 They argued that the transmission view of communication 
is ‗overly simplistic‘. They essentially argued Carey‘s ritual view of communication, 
‗that images most often interact with individuals' existing understandings of the world to 
shape information processing and judgments.‘
335
 In their findings, they concluded that: 
visual news images (a) influence people's information processing in ways 
that can be understood only by taking into account individuals' 
predispositions and values, and (b) at the same time appear to have a 
particular ability to 'trigger' considerations that spread through one's 
mental framework to other evaluations.
336
 
Their findings corroborate Susan Sontag‘s argument that the pictures that do not 
numb us from habituation or lose their meaning are the pictures we have picked out for 
iconic representation because they are associated with our narratives, our convictions, 
either reinforcing or corroborating them. ‗Pathos, in the form of a narrative, does not 
wear out.‘
337
  Sontag suggests using pictures as secular icons given that they nurture the 
belief and the values behind the image.
338
 The iconic picture of the starving child 
reinforces the narrative that we, the West, are a people of global compassion who care 
about the innocent victims of genocide and famine. Sontag argues that it is not for the 
photographers to solely determine what is representative of their time.  The pictures will 
be iconic only if a community already holds the narratives as chronicles of their time. 
‗The photographer‘s intentions do not determine the meaning of the photograph, which 
will have its own career, blown by the whims and loyalties of the diverse communities 
that have use for it.‘
339
  The interpretation of images, the hermeneutics of images, is done 
by the community. While communities are collectives of focused attention that promote 
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social integration and shared meaning-making, Dayan distinguishes communities from 
publics. Communities do not need to make themselves understandable beyond their 
community, whereas publics must be understood by a wider general public. What does it 
take for a community‘s interpretation to ‗go public‘? The community‘s concern has to be 
constructed as a reason why others beyond the community should care about the issue. 
3.3.3 Going Public 
Dayan argues that crowds, spectators, witnesses, and communities may become 
publics if they ‗go public‘, that is, if they seek visibility for their collective concern. Most 
audiences do not become publics. Dayan reasons that it is not because they are ‗lazy‘ it is 
just that collective audiences generally do not seek visibility. There has to be a reason for 
‗going public‘. ‗Going public involves, on their part, the construction of a problem, a 
reflexive decision to join, commitment, performance, etc.‘
340
 The concern for human 
suffering has been a concern of communities for a long time, but in order for this concern 
to ‗go public‘ beyond communities, it takes a birthing process. In the last chapter (2.4 and 
2.5), I discussed the sociological and technological changes to viewing distant suffering. 
Michael Ignatieff argues that global compassion has gone public because of ‗aid workers, 
reporters, lawyers for war crimes tribunals, human rights observers all working in the 
name of an impalpable moral ideal: that the problems of other people, no matter how far 
away, are of concern to us all.‘
341
 Ignatieff describes the process of going public in 
language similar to that of Thomas on the formation of publics through the accumulation 
of attention on a specific topic that attains some stability over time. Ignatieff describes 
global compassion as a public issue that has increased over time: 
Weak as the narrative of compassion and moral commitment may be, it is 
infinitely stronger than it was only fifty years ago. We are scarcely aware 
of the extent to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 
1945 by the growth of a language and practice of moral universalism, 
expressed above all in a shared human rights culture. Television in its turn 
makes it harder to sustain indifference or ignorance.
342
  
Collective attention focussed on the topic of distant human suffering promotes social 
integration and shared meaning-making around the theme of human rights. A shared 
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human rights culture in the West is a result of collective attention on human rights issues. 
Now there is a human rights culture, a human rights public. Once spectators can be called 
the public, what agency does the public have? 
3.3.3.1  The Public as a Persona Ficta 
‗The public‘ is often spoken of as a persona ficta with references such as the 
voice of the public (vox populi), or taking the pulse of public perception, or in the 
discourse on mediated global suffering ‗the public‘ is clinically diagnosed with 
compassion fatigue.  Dayan identifies the public as a fictive and sociological dialectic. It 
is at once a social reality, the gathering of an audience for an event, as well as an 
intellectual construct produced by observing and defining it. In his analogy of birthing 
publics into the world, Dayan describes some as mothers, some as midwives, and some as 
abortionists.
343
 Publics are never totally autonomous in their constructions: ‗Publics need 
co-producers to help them exist and to advertise their claims.‘
344
 These co-producers, or 
obstetricians in Dayan‘s vocabulary, might be journalists, politicians, social action 
groups, or religious bodies. They deliver the newborn public into the light of publicity. 
Ignatieff identifies ‗aid workers, reporters, lawyers for war crimes tribunals, human rights 
observers‘ all as co-producers of publics involved in the narrative of global compassion. 
Audience member, Charles Breen played the role of midwife birthing the concern of 
genocide in Darfur into his church and beyond the walls of his church. 
The journey from thousands of dimly-lit sitting rooms where spectators witness 
suffering, and judge it as so, to a collective mobilisation of those television witnesses is a 
long and involving process. That journey might begin with informal water-cooler 
conversations or café conversations, not yet public, but also not completely private.  The 
next stage is still not formal politics but a discussion of ideas and opinions in letters to the 
editors, web blogs, and discussions on talk shows.
345
 Dayan believes audiences can foster 
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civic culture, an informal politics.
346
 Publics are finally birthed when political discussion 
takes place: 
Formal political debate is the moment when the talk of publics is invited 
into the discourse of politicians or journalists. Turned into an 
argumentative resource, this talk is now offered in quotes, excerpts or 
paraphrases that are supposedly expressive of the publics‘ will and serve 




The process for a group of common cause to be ‗turned into an argumentative 
resource‘ is a process developed over time.
348
 In the last chapter (2.5.2), I discussed how 
the social imaginary of genocide awareness and prevention had a specific history. The 
Global Samaritan is a persona ficta, it is the public concerned with humanitarian and 
moral intervention in far away places. According to Dayan, the Global Samaritan 
functions more as a public than as a community because a public represents a generalised 
cause. 
3.3.3.2  The Public is a Voice for the Generalised Other 
Dayan distinguishes publics from communities because communities deal with 
particulars and publics deal with the general. Dayan also distinguishes publics from 
witnesses. The privileged status of the witness in a court of law is completely contingent 
upon the person having been witness to a particular event, not to a similar event. In 
contrast, ‗publics do not relate to particular situations but to the principles or issues that 
these situations exemplify and to the values involved.‘
349
 Both witnesses and 
communities are contingent on the particular in ways that publics are not. Witnesses and 
communities are not solely confined to particulars as in the case of an ‗expert witness‘ on 
ballistics or a community held up as an exemplar for neighbourhood crime reduction. 
Nevertheless, the strength of witnesses and communities‘ testimony is in their proximity 
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to the issue. Moral obligation differs from communities to publics. Moral philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre describes three levels of moral obligation practiced by communities. 
The first obligation involves those in our immediate families and communities and the 
second level of obligation is to the stranger who enters our families or communities.
350
 
Publics appeal to the third level of moral obligation that MacIntyre identifies, a 
commitment to justice that extends beyond our relationships of close proximity. Dayan 
argues that in order to go beyond relationships of close proximity, ‗publics are submitted 
to the normative requirements of the general public sphere. They must offer a discourse 
directed towards the common good, a discourse that is potentially universal.‘
351
  
Televisual witnessing, and the communities formed by such collective attention 
on human suffering in far away places, is attention directed at the generalised other who 
Ignatieff calls the ‗pure victim‘. Televisual spectators witness far beyond their ability to 
act. Attention is focused on the many victims of famine, genocide, or war, but it is a 
generalized victim. J. Ian H. McDonald argued that the parable of the Good Samaritan 
speaks of the identity of communities being rooted in positive practices, and that is true 
for the analogy of publics as Global Samaritans. The good resulting from the public‘s 
focusing of collective attention on a common cause results in an argument for social 
justice about a condition. Moral philosopher Lawrence Blum argues that compassion is 
an emotion that focuses on the condition more than on the person suffering: ‗Although it 
is the person and not merely the negative condition which is the object of compassion, the 
focus of compassion is the condition.‘
352
 News media practitioners are often reliant on an 
individual as an iconic representation of a larger condition. The BB, the journalistic 
shorthand for famine victim with a ‗bloated-belly‘, serves as a metonym for the entire 
famine. According to Blum, the emotion of compassion is much more likely to be 
focussed on the general condition, famine, rather than the immediate object of 
compassion, the person with the bloated-belly. 
While spectator agency includes the potential to participate in publics, the work of 
the public does not necessarily correspond to that which the spectator was first 
eyewitness to. The agency available to the spectator presents the following logic: You 
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can do nothing for this one dying, but now that you are aware you can do something for 
others like her. This is evident in the example of Charles Breen, who had a 
compassionate response to the story of genocide presented in the film Hotel Rwanda. He 
then became involved in genocide prevention in Darfur, Sudan. He is expressing 
solidarity with a cause rather than with a person. This poses a problem for the use of the 
Good Samaritan as an analogy for the Global Samaritan. Theologian Luke Bretherton 
argues that: ‗the Good Samaritan responds to one he finds nearby, not some generalised 
―Other‖ who exists nowhere and everywhere.‘
353
 Then again, to express solidarity with a 
cause does include solidarity with others committed to the same belief that human beings 
should not be victim to genocide. The story-formed community that takes up the narrative 
of global compassion is not one community, but many communities coming together to 
form a public working for social justice. Social justice is not the same as individual 
justice. Publics produce discourse that is potentially universal, whereas communities, that 
do not seek the light of publicity beyond their members, do not need to produce universal 
discourse.  
3.3.4 Audiences as ‘Bearing Witness’ 
What can John Howard Yoder‘s argument, that bearing witness is a method of 
ethics, contribute to our understanding of televisual audiences as ‗bearing witness‘ to 
genocide, famine and other suffering? The active engagement and participation of 
audiences in publics can be an ethical act. Milbank is right to point out that it is unethical 
to judge evil and do nothing, but he is wrong to claim that audience moral agency ends 
there. The potential for moral agency, the ability to respond to images and stories of 
suffering on television, is found in audiences gathering around a common cause with the 
purpose of bringing about action. Yoder contends that there is moral agency involved in 
freely associating with others who all have a common cause; he calls these groups 
‗voluntary associations‘. He argues that members in voluntary associations cannot be 
reduced to mere audiences. Membership requires the performative action of joining. 
Voluntary membership makes clear who is a part of a group and who is not. Civil society, 
made up of varying groups of voluntary societies, is defined by active participation that is 
not backed by the state or commercial agencies, although it might of course be influenced 
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by state or commercial forces. This definition of civil society is akin to Hannah Arendt‘s 
‗public realm‘ and to Jürgen Habermas‘s ‗public sphere‘. 
Habermas is in agreement with Yoder‘s position that voluntary associations are a 
necessary part of transforming social and political structures. What Yoder calls voluntary 
associations, Habermas calls opinion-shaping associations. Habermas claims that these 
associations include the church but can also include a range of other communities from 
‗cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, 
debating societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grass-roots petitioning drives all the 
way to occupational associations, political parties, labor unions, and ―alternative 
institutions.‖‘
354
  For Habermas these associations are the core of ‗civil society‘ which is 
‗constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy.‘
355
 
Habermas identifies how voluntary associations can have political and social impact. It is 
when a community‘s projects advocate alternatives to conventional wisdom: ‗the 
programmatic character of their activities sets examples through which they implicitly 
contribute to public discussion.‘
356
 Habermas is essentially arguing for witness, or 
embodied testimony, as their form of communication. Habermas agrees with Yoder, that 
when a community‘s activities represent their beliefs, then their beliefs are made public. 
Yet, as we saw in this chapter, that in order for the community‘s beliefs to ‗go public‘ in 
an amplified way, an ‗obstetrician‘ may be required. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that engaged spectatorship is not confined to 
a mere telos of reception. Like Milbank, I agree that the spectatorship of violence begins 
with the actively, engaged judging of violence as violence. In the case of the 
spectatorship of suffering, spectators judge suffering to be unjust. It is through the 
emotion of compassion that spectators make the moral judgment that those suffering are 
not at fault and that they should not have to endure such pain and deprivation. I argued 
that the cultural form of television, and other forms of the televisual, is not for extending 
face-to-face conversations. It is to focus collective attention on issues providing 
spectators with the opportunity to focus on a common cause. I diverge with Milbank 
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when he restricts spectator agency to mere reception because there is no reciprocal 
interaction with the object of the spectator‘s gaze. I argued that the reciprocal 
participation that spectators engage in may not be directly with those they witnessed on 
television. The potential participation spectators can actively engage in may well begin 
with other audience members. The focus of collective attention and shared meaning-
making around the same issue potentially creates publics who in civil societies exert 
political, economic, and social pressure on governments, businesses, and other 
institutions to act in a way that will relieve human suffering in the lives of those far away. 
This is what it means for audiences to bear witness to human suffering. Clearly audience 
spectatorship does not involve reciprocal participation with the object of the spectator‘s 
gaze. Multiple levels of mediation take place between the ‗victim‘ and the spectator, and 
the likelihood of the spectator‘s extension of the good reaching the ‗original victim‘ is 
minimal. In this chapter, I have only considered the levels of mediation involved in 
spectator agency. 
I began this chapter with the question: How convincing is the analogy of the 
audience as the Global Samaritan? Throughout this chapter I argue that the analogy of the 
Good Samaritan breaks down, but can be built back up in other ways. Because the 
cultural form of television news is not simply about extending the proximity of face-to-
face interaction, spectator agency should not be measured by reciprocity with the object 
of the spectator‘s gaze. When television news features three recently orphaned children 
under-clothed and under-nourished in a Darfur refugee camp, how ought thousands of 
spectators to respond? Thousands of offers of the good (clothing, food and protection) 
extended to just these three children? An extension of the good in the spectatorship of 
distant human suffering is about publics arguing for potentially universal principles. 
Engaged spectatorship is not about turning our gaze away from these three children. 
Engaged spectatorship has to do with becoming committed to positions and organisations 
that work toward representing the needs of all suffering children.  
I have argued that the analogy of the audience as the Global Samaritan does not 
work. Television technology cannot restore the proximity of the Samaritan to the man 
suffering on the side of the road. The analogy of the audience as a part of the Global 
Samaritan, like fingers, for example, or toes works a bit better. Global compassion 
involves a long chain of audiences, aid workers, governments, and journalists. The chain 
of links does move toward incarnating the Samaritan in distant places. To be involved in 
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this long chain is to direct more than a passive gaze at suffering. There is participation; it 
may not be reciprocal participation with the actual object of the spectator‘s gaze. Rather 
it is participation in a general or universal cause. In the next chapter, I investigate another 
level of mediation in the narrative of global compassion. Audiences witness distant 
suffering because their gaze is often directed there by the embodied witness on the scene, 
the foreign correspondent. 
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Chapter 4:  The Foreign Correspondent Bearing Witness 
In the last chapter I addressed the cultural practice of audiences bearing witness to 
distant suffering. The largest hurdle in imagining audiences as Good Samaritans has to do 
with the fact that audiences are not physically present with those suffering. In this 
chapter, I focus on the cultural practice of foreign correspondents gathering the news of 
distant suffering. Do foreign correspondents make Good Samaritans? After all, they are 
present on the scene. Nonetheless, the analogy of the Good Samaritan remains 
problematic. While physical presence is an aspect important to foreign news reporting, 
the aid that journalism can offer to those suffering is not immediate aid. The journalist‘s 
role in global compassion is not the direct equivalent of the part played by the Samaritan, 
rather it is part of a larger enterprise, to raise public awareness and to document history. 
In this chapter, I explore the claim that foreign correspondents ‗bear witness‘. 
John Howard Yoder‘s work on the moral agency involved in the Christian 
practice of bearing witness provides interesting points of comparison with the ethical 
questions related to being a journalist involved in investigative journalism. I make two 
parallels between Yoder‘s Christian social ethics and investigative journalism practices. 
In section 4.1, I consider the parallel practice of holding those in power to account. The 
second parallel I consider is Yoder‘s claim that presence, or being there, is a way to 
authenticate truth claims. I investigate this parallel through the journalist‘s dual function 
as a proxy for the public and a proxy for the voiceless.  
Central to the claim that a journalist is ‗bearing witness‘ is the fact that they are 
there, on-the-scene as history unfolds. As a way to explore the journalistic claim of 
bearing witness, I will look at two separate groups of people for whom journalists bear 
witness: for their audiences and for those at the scene. First, journalists bear witness on 
the frontline of wars and disasters because their audience cannot be there themselves. 
Journalists act as the stand-in or proxy eyes and ears for the public (section 4.2).
357
 
Second, journalists bear witness by being there with and there for those who have 
suffered great injustice or trauma but do not have the means to give voice to their 
experience. In this way, journalists are the proxy voice for those who have suffered but 
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do not have the means to testify before a wider audience that may be able to assist in 
righting the injustice or perhaps providing some relief from their suffering. I consider 
journalists as the proxy voice for the voiceless in section 4.4. Between the sections on 
journalists as proxy for the public and proxy for the voiceless, in section 4.3 I explore the 
question: Can women be proxies? Before I address the role of journalists as proxies, I 
consider the journalistic claim of bearing witness within the frame of a liberal democratic 
press.   
4.1 Investigative Journalism in a Liberal Democratic Press 
 The practices of a liberal democratic press emphasise ideas of press autonomy and 
objectivity. Journalist scholar James Curran lists the three key concepts in the traditional 
or conventional accounts of the democratic role of the media as: the watchdog role, the 
public representative or ‗fourth estate‘ role, and the public information role.
358
 The liberal 
democratic tradition of the press is also referred to by William Hatchen as the ‗Western 
concept‘ of the press.
359
 Hatchen enfolds the Libertarian and Social Responsibility 
theories of the press
360
 in addition to the Democratic Socialist concept and the 
Democratic Participant concept of the press
361
 all into the Western concept of the press.  
In the Western press, the watchdog function of a free press, the role of the press to 
criticise and scrutinise its own government, is the paramount value. A very close second 
is the value of a free press as the ‗fourth estate,‘ that is, the press imagined as a fourth 
branch of government representing the will of the people.
362
 The third role is the 
informational role of the press. This role supports the claim that the public should be 
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exposed to a free marketplace of ideas and the ideas that the public deem most important 
will set the agenda for the news industry. This is the theory of the Western concept of the 
press; practice is variable. 
The functioning of a democratic society relies on a free press to inform citizens, 
provide a public sphere for debate, and look after the public‘s interests by keeping watch 
over government. A free press derives objectivity through being largely independent of 
government control. In order for the press to sustain the practice of truth-telling to the 
citizens of a democracy, the value of objectivity plays an important role. Objectivity has 
to do with autonomy. While objectivity is considered an ethical imperative in American 
journalism, Europe has had a strong tradition of partisan press reporting that is still 
recognisable in some quarters today. Nonetheless, what is held in common in American 
and European journalism is that the news organisation whether partisan or not, is 
independent from government control of censorship.
363
 To be otherwise in Western 
journalism is to be a propagandist tool of the state.  
The Christian practice that John Howard Yoder identifies as Lay Empowerment 
shares some understanding with the Western concept of the press. Both practices involve 
moral reasoning which communities need in order to hold those in power publicly 
accountable. Lay Empowerment is based on Paul‘s analogy of the church functioning like 
a human body. Like individual body parts, all of the church members work together to 
create a whole body. Yoder reasons that if all members have roles, ‗we need to challenge 
the concentration of authority in the hands of office-bearers accredited on institutional 
grounds.‘
364
 The parallel is clear. Journalism in a liberal democratic press is meant to 
serve as a check on governmental power, corporate power and other areas of concentrated 
power. The role of the journalist is to be sceptical and critical of those with political, 
financial, and cultural influence. 
Yoder claims that those with rhetorical influence will steer society. Yoder cites 
the epistle of James chapter three as providing this warning to teachers and all other 
leadership roles. The role of the leader within a community is a dangerous role ‗because 
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the tongue is hard to govern‘ and communities are steered by language.
365
 ‗[L]ike the 
small bit turning a horse around or the small rudder turning a ship around, or the small 
flame setting a forest ablaze, language has a dangerously determining function.‘
366
 Yoder 
focuses the James text much more on the social ‗phenomenon of language‘ over the 
‗modern psychologizing individualism‘ as the context for James‘ admonition.
367
 The 
journalist‘s role is to scrutinise public rhetoric. 
Yet journalists themselves are public rhetoricians not only because they can 
persuade publics and even ‗birth‘ publics as discussed in the previous chapter, but 
journalists can direct the public toward what to think about in the first place. Journalists 
and news media agencies can act as agenda-setters and gate-keepers. Yoder identifies 
journalism as among the influential leadership roles ‗engaged in steering society with the 
rudder of language.‘
368
 The roles of leader, teacher and journalist are all important roles 
that Yoder claims should be approached by people acting as ‗Agents of Linguistic Self-
Consciousness‘.
369
 Despite doubts of translatability from Christian practice to other 
practices, Yoder is willing to consider a conversation between the practical moral 
reasoning used by Christians in the role of agent of linguistic self-consciousness, with the 
practical moral reasoning used by people in the wider world fulfilling similar roles of 
leadership in their community. Yoder claims that the moral reasoning of a leader in a 
Christian community and that used by a journalist in liberal democratic society will be 
similar, as both will:  
watch for the sophomoric temptation of verbal distinctions without 
substantial necessity, and of purely verbal solutions to substantial 
problems. [They] will scrutinize open-mindedly, but skeptically, 
typologies that dichotomize the complementary and formulae that 
reconcile the incompatible. [They] will denounce the diversion of attention 
from what must be done to debate about how to say it, except when 
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The moral reasoning required of the teacher and leader in the Christian community is 
consistent with the moral reasoning required of the journalist in a liberal democratic 
society. Agents of linguistic self-consciousness help shape a community‘s conversation 
by the words that they use, or do not use. Yoder rightly emphasises that this is an 
important and ethically significant role in a community. 
Well-known investigative journalist John Pilger edited a collection of 
‗investigative journalism that changed the world‘. In his collection, Pilger commends 
several investigative journalists who have acted as ‗agents of linguistic self-
consciousness‘ through illuminating the language of obfuscation used by governmental 
and corporate powers. Pilger includes Martha Gellhorn‘s reportage from Dachau, 
Germany as a commendable performance of truth-telling. She was among the first 
journalists on the scene in Dachau following Germany‘s unconditional surrender in May 
1945. Pilger reflects on his years of correspondence with Gellhorn: 
we agonised over the gulf between the morality in ordinary people‘s lives 
and the amoral and immoral nature of power: a distinction she believed 
journalists were duty-bound to understand. ‗Never believe governments,‘ 
she wrote, ‗not any of them, not a word they say; keep an untrusting eye 
on all they do.‘
371
  
Investigative reporters like Pilger and Gellhorn have a clear understanding of the 
journalist‘s role, in Yoder‘s words, to ‗challenge the concentration of authority in the 
hands of office-bearers accredited on institutional grounds.‘
372
 Pilger recognises that 
journalists and news media organisations do steer society with the rudder of language. 
Pilger admonishes news organisations in Britain, ‗from the Murdoch press to the BBC,‘ 
and more broadly Western news practices for their failure in acting as agents of linguistic 
self-consciousness. ‗The fate of whole societies is reported according to their usefulness 
to ―us‖, the term frequently used for Western power, with its narcissism, dissembling 
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 Speaking truth to power and speaking truth to one another involves the ethical 
practice of linguistic self-consciousness. Speaking truth requires self-reflexivity on the 
part of the reporter: Am I coercing the audience in my account? Authenticating truthful 
speech often involves physical presence. Pilger asked Gellhorn how she was able to 
report on the war in Vietnam in 1966 in a way which was unlike any other American 
news coverage. Gellhorn told Pilger: ‗All I did was report from the ground up, not the 
other way round.‘
374
 In Pilger‘s collection of heroic reportage, the journalists held those 
in power to account and the journalists were present, on the ground. Pilger works these 
two ideas into his redefining of investigative journalism: ‗I have applied a broader 
definition than detective work and included journalism that bears witness and investigates 
ideas.‘
375
 Journalism that ‗bears witness‘ does not at first seem to belong among the 
journalistic practices which constitute a liberal democratic press. If objectivity has such a 
vital role to play in the Western concept of the press, what happens when journalists 
claim that some modes of journalism engage the journalist in a very self-involving way 
such as in the journalistic claim to be bearing witness to the events they report?
376
 
4.1.1 Journalistic Claim of Bearing Witness 
The concept of journalists bearing witness is a phrase used in academic 
discussions,
377
 but it is also a claim made by journalists themselves.
378
 The question is 
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now, how does the role of bearing witness differ from the traditional roles of the press in 
a liberal democratic society? I consider this question by focusing on Western news 
coverage of distant suffering. In many ways the conventional roles of the Western 
press—scrutiny of the state, representing and informing the public—still exist in the 
journalistic practice of bearing witness to global suffering. The watchdog function of 
Western journalism now becomes the global watchdog function. The public‘s right to 
know goes beyond national borders; they have the right to know what is happening in far 
away places. In the Western concept of the press, global news coverage is about the ‗free 
flow‘ of information. This does not necessarily mean two-way dissemination of global 
news, but basically the unimpeded ability of the Western correspondent to gather news 
from foreign countries for dissemination to the Western public.
379
 The current popularity 
of the claim that journalists bear witness has in part to do with advances in technology, in 
both transportation and telecommunications, that enable journalists to witness 
extraordinary events. 
The central characteristic of the journalistic practice of ‗bearing witness‘ is ‗being 
there‘ at an event to provide first-hand, or eyewitness, testimony. Stuart Allan and Barbie 
Zelizer in their research on war reporting suggest that it is times of crisis, such as natural 
disasters, war, and crimes against humanity, that provide the starkest contrast with which 
to investigate everyday modes of journalistic practice.
380
 Journalistic negotiation of 
objectivity and engagement in covering stories is part of the everyday practice of 
journalism. Here this negotiation will be investigated against the extraordinary and 
extreme backdrops of war and genocide. In the Western concept of the press, a free press 
is reliant on the concept of objectivity, but the claim of reporters ‗bearing witness‘ calls 
into question practices of objectivity. Of the genres of journalistic reporting, the role of 
the foreign correspondent best epitomizes the journalistic claim of ‗bearing witness‘.
381
 
4.1.2 The Foreign Correspondent 
What is a foreign correspondent? They are also known by other names such as 
foreign news reporter, war correspondent, global crisis reporter, and frontline reporter. 
Several studies on war reporting emphasise that reporters of war do not want to be 
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identified as ‗war reporters‘ or ‗war correspondents‘ because they also cover other 
foreign news events such as humanitarian crises as well as the Olympics.
382
 The foreign 
correspondent as traditionally understood in Western journalism was a journalist native to 
the country of the news organization but living long-term in another country, with 
fluency of language, knowledgeable of the culture and confident in it, and increasingly 
building a network of contacts as well as continuing the contacts from the previous 
correspondent.
383
  Such a practice of foreign correspondence provides the perfect 
illustration of the function of witness as ‗being there‘ as a long-term witness. Changes in 
modern journalism, however, alter the kind of witness provided by the foreign 
correspondent. With both technological changes and decreased attention to foreign news 
coverage, the picture of the correspondent spending years in a foreign country is fading. 
More often, news organisations send foreign correspondents from hubs in major cities—
London, New York, Tokyo—thanks to quick and easy modern travel, or they ‗parachute‘ 
star journalists into foreign locations when events happen.
384
 
In extensive interviews with journalists, Howard Tumber and Frank Webster 
found that besides the romantic and exciting lore of the life of the foreign correspondent, 
journalists were drawn to frontline journalism for the social value of ‗truth seeking‘ and 
for the sense of having a front-row seat to the making of history.
385
 The moral duty of 
‗truth seeking‘ as a motivation for frontline journalism elevates the profession to a 
‗vocation‘.
386
 Allan and Zelizer write that the journalistic practice of truth-telling rests on 
the authority of ‗presence, on the moral duty to bear witness by being there.‘
387
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As discussed in the previous chapters, witness is contingent upon presence and 
proximity both concepts redefined by modern advancements in technology that 
increasingly allow us the ability to witness live events in multiple places within a short 
amount of time. Televisual witness allows us intimacy at a distance, a new kind of 
proximity. Televisual witness brings live pictures to us, and we can see events unfold for 
ourselves.  So, if we can witness for ourselves, given the modern technology that delivers 
images to our own homes, why do we need the additional mediation of journalists 
physically present trying to describe the scene? Modern televisual viewers are suspicious 
and savvy viewers well aware of the manipulation of images.  In order to restore the 
authenticity of the image, the presence of frontline journalists risking their lives in order 
to capture the image imbues the audio/visual testimony with authenticity. Mortal 
contingency restores the credibility that widespread image manipulation has corrupted.
388
 
This is the value of the foreign correspondent, physically being there. The televisual 
witness of the audience is mediated by a machine, audio and video technology, and also 
by the mediation of the journalist. Frontline journalism provides ‗visual authentication as 
well as personal testimonies, and thereby positions itself (and us the viewers) as ―bearing 
witness‖.‘
389
 Witness, inextricable from the word martyr, still involves the physical 
significance of being there, or of someone being there in the name of the public. 
4.2 Proxy Eyes and Ears for the Public 
 A fundamental reason for frontline reporters being on the scene of wars is to 
provide the public with eyewitness testimony of war being fought ‗in the name of the 
public‘. In this section, I explore some of the challenges journalists faced when trying to 
provide the public with truthful and critical accounts of the 2003 Iraq war. In order to be 
the proxy eyes and ears of the public, journalists put themselves at grave risk to be there 
on the scene. Bearing witness to war is dangerous because being there is dangerous. The 
year 2007 was the most dangerous in over a decade for journalists‘ worldwide. The 
Committee to Protect Journalists reported that sixty-five journalists were killed in direct 
relation to their work in 2007, the highest death toll since 1994 when sixty-six journalists 
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were killed amid conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia, and Rwanda.
390
 With thirty-two deaths, 
Iraq was the deadliest location for reporters in 2007 and Iraq has continued to be the 
deadliest location for journalists since the US-led invasion in 2003. I look at some of the 
ways in which journalists gain access to the frontlines of war. 
4.2.1 Embedded Journalism 
The practice of being ‗embedded‘ has a long history: ‗from the earliest 
correspondents in the nineteenth century through to . . . the Second World War and 
Vietnam‘ and most recently with the unprecedented numbers of embedded journalists in 
the Iraq war.
391
 In 2003 the US Pentagon offered over 700 embedded slots to US and 
non-US journalists. The Pentagon realised that with the widespread use of real-time 
communication technology, news organisations would be more difficult to manage than 
in the past. For instance, the press pools of the first Gulf War under the first George Bush 
would not be as effective in this war. Thus, they proposed ‗embedding‘ journalists with 
troops. The US Pentagon, in their proposal for implementing the embedded journalist 
program for the 2003 Iraq war, stated this as their reason: 
Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region 
will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic 
ideals. We need to tell the factual story—good or bad—before others seed 
the media with disinformation and distortions.
392
  
As embeds, news teams would be given access to Iraq and could broadcast within the 
constraints of the Pentagon‘s guidelines. The most prominent guideline cited was 
censoring material that would compromise the security of the troops. Other guidelines 
embedded journalists agreed to included that, ‗journalists were forbidden to report who 
the USA thought were legitimate targets, the methods the troops used to distinguish 
between legitimate targets and innocent civilians and the ways that soldiers were 
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―engaging with‖ legitimate targets.‘
393
 The US Pentagon offered over 700 slots to US and 
non-US journalists. It was the American taxpayers who paid the bill for the training, 
outfitting, transporting, sheltering and feeding of the journalists, as Seib says, ‗not the 
news organizations‘. Seib claims that news organisations could determine the market 
value and reimburse the government and that ‗[f]ailing to do so is the kind of thing that 
undermines the public‘s perception of journalists‘ independence.‘
394
  
The practice of embeds challenges the claims that a free press is free from 
government control. Philip Knightley in The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as 
Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq chronicles how journalists‘ 
pursuit of reporting the truth is ‗the first casualty‘ of war because of governments‘ 
increased management of the media during war time.  The First Casualty was published 
in 1975 and Knightley continually updates the work to include recent wars. After 
reflecting on the 2003 Iraq war, he concludes his latest update with the pessimistic view 
that journalists in future will either be embedded or face the dangers as a unilateral 
journalist if they want any real autonomy. He surmises that the age of the war 
correspondent ‗as hero appears to be over‘.
395
  
News organisations recognise that embedded reporting poses a threat to the value 
of objectivity and the related value of independence. On the other hand, news media 
organisations also recognised that journalists embedded with Coalition troops would 
provide an unprecedented view of modern war in action. Journalistic coverage from the 
position of ‗embed‘ produced spectacular and epic images of war as well as close-up 
footage of Coalition military troops in-situ. Embedded journalists were able to produce 
frontline footage from the relative safety of an armoured tank and were generally safe 
from ‗friendly-fire‘ as well as free from suspicion when crossing Coalition check-points. 
These are generally not advantages afforded journalists making their way to the frontline 
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of war independent of government assistance. News organisations gained increased 
numbers of viewers who wanted up-to-the-minute coverage of ‗reality TV‘ focused on 
the everyday life of the troops. 
Ultimately embedded journalism leaves us with the question: Can embedded 
journalism fulfil the watchdog function of Western journalism when in bed with the very 
people meant to be scrutinised? The US Pentagon claimed that the significance of 
embedded journalists was ‗to tell the factual story—good or bad‘, but guidelines 
restricted journalists from reporting on how the military determined who legitimate 
targets were. Embedded reporters were not free agents to question the government‘s 
framing of who is targeted as an ‗enemy‘, and thus they were limited to reporting on the 
accepted ‗enemy‘. Without the process of deliberation, reporting in such a situation is 
reduced to the topos of patriotism standing against the ‗enemy‘ who is trying to take 
away ‗our way of life‘. Tumber and Webster argue that this is the information war that 
governments and military fight to get the public behind the war effort.
396
 Their research 
concluded that embedded journalism in the opening of the war produced stories that 
promoted patriotism more than stories that encouraged deliberation. Stories of patriotism 
automatically legitimise the war as a sacrifice to protect ‗our way of life‘ circumventing 
the step of debate on the legitimacy of declaring war in the first place. The practice of 
journalism in a democratic society involves providing a public forum for deliberation; 
embedding journalists with the military omits this process. 
Journalists reflecting on their experience as ‗embeds‘ with the military reported 
that they felt conflicting loyalties and they commented on the one-dimensional nature of 
their reports. Detached observation is not easy when sharing lived experience, and is that 
much more difficult when the experience is in such an extreme, life-or-death situation. 
Tumber argues that reports quickly become ‗I was there‘ stories.  David Morrison and 
Howard Tumber found the ‗I was there‘ form of reporting in their research of the British 
coverage of the Falkland conflict where the access of British journalists was restricted in 
number and managed by the British military.
397
 Tumber notes the same ‗I was there‘ 
form in the reports filed by embeds at the start of the Iraq war.
398
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Allan Little criticised the reporting done by embeds. He argued that the journalist‘s job is 




 Journalists are reliant on multiple sources and in the case of being an embed, 
military sources are the only sources available. This resulted in one-dimensional 
reporting, and contributing further to the myopic dimension was real-time broadcasting. 
Seib described an embedded reporter‘s real-time coverage of Iraqi soldiers fleeing Basra 
that gave the impression of widespread spontaneous surrender which turned out not to be 
the case. Seib concluded that one ‗reporter‘s snapshot of events became transformed into 
a definitive panoramic view.‘
400
 Live stories, while exciting, are often incomplete. Seib‘s 
concern is that the trust between the audience and journalist is being further eroded. 
Journalists can only be the proxy eyes and ears of the public when there is trust. 
 The normal practice for journalists to gather information from multiple sources is 
severely limited when embedded with one battalion or even restricted to safe-zones in 
Baghdad. The journalist is not in a position to observe what the war is doing to the 
civilians, and as ‗our eyes and ears‘ neither is the public able to witness the distant 
consequences of the war in which their government is engaged. It was weeks before the 
embedded journalists had the opportunity to observe and interview the Iraqi people. 
Again, this is government‘s management of the press as well as management of public 
perception of the war ‗back home‘. 
The Project for Excellence in Journalism conducted a content analysis of US 
television coverage from the first week of the war produced by embeds: ‗The reports 
avoided graphic material; not one of the stories in the study showed pictures of people 
being hit by weapons fire.‘
401
 The Cardiff School of Journalism had similar findings of 
reports filed by British embeds; the coverage was ‗full of action, but without the grisly 
consequences.‘
402
 At the start of the Iraq war, the West witnessed war without 
consequences. Another barrier that journalists faced when trying to gain access to 
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ordinary Iraqi people, involved military flights direct to Baghdad. Journalists were 
essentially positioned on rooftops. 
4.2.2 Rooftop Journalism 
Those who flew direct to Baghdad were mainly stuck in the Palestine Hotel 
because of the dangerous situation throughout most of Baghdad. Rooftop journalism was 
not just a consequence of embedded journalism, it reflects the growing pressure for 
round-the-clock, real-time news coverage. The correspondents with the 24-hour news 
organisations were under pressure to produce live footage throughout the day and 
consequently earned the nickname ‗roof monkey‘.
403
 The news organisations received 
live pictures of their correspondent standing on the hotel rooftop with bombs blasting in 
the background.  Bill Neely of ITN described the scene: 
You have your hotel and up on the top you have your satellite dishes and 
cameras, and you have your journalist in front of the camera and they‘re 
just there all day long, talking to the camera – ‗And now we can go back to 
Baghdad live and talk to our correspondent. What‘s happening there now?‘ 
And the correspondent will say, ‗Well, what‘s happening in Baghdad, is 
this . . .‘ But they haven‘t left the roof. They‘re just getting their 
information from other people. … You‘re just feeding a beast that‘s all-
consuming, that wants instant information, instant judgements – what 
happened, how did it happen. It often takes a very long time to work out 
how something happened. But there you are, on the roof, [and] you‘ve got 
to give answers. You can‘t keep saying, ‗Well, frankly, I don‘t know,‘ 
otherwise you‘d be out of a job.
404
 
Neely argues that there has to be a place for the ‗journalism of discovery‘ and discovery 
takes time. He argues that as well as the roof monkey, there needs to be the journalist ‗on 
the ground ferreting away to get the story.‘
405
 
In the experiment with ‗embedded journalism‘, what resulted was exciting visual 
coverage without much thick, contextual description about what was being witnessed. 
Simon Cottle differentiates between the reporting frame and the reportage frame. The 
reportage frame includes the ‗aims to provide the means for generating in-depth 
understanding by going behind the scenes of ―thin‖ news reports and providing ―thick‖ 
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 Rooftop reporting is display rich, but very little contextual 
framing, that is, Cottle‘s reporting frame. Cottle argues that the reportage frame can 
provide the display of reporting with images as well as the deliberation of contextualizing 
the account. Yet, as ITN reporter Neely pointed out ‗ferreting away‘ checking sources 
takes time and does not make for real-time or visually interesting footage. Moreover the 
‗live exposure portrays the embedded war reporter as a human figure who is as concerned 
about being live as about staying alive.
407
 The excitement of liveness gives authority to 
the frontline reporter as bearing witness to actual war. In the midst of a conflict, this is 
true both for a journalist on a hotel rooftop and for another in a US tank. Physical and 
temporal proximity position the journalist as witness, while live broadcast positions the 
audience at least as temporal witness. While rooftop journalists were reliant on the 
display of live images, those journalists who were on the ground and interacted with Iraqi 
people found themselves embedded in another kind of reliance. 
4.2.3 Local Fixers  
While the practices of embedding and rooftop journalism can put restraint upon 
journalists‘ mediation of news in Iraq another issue that affects their testimony is their 
reliance on local fixers. Because of dangers and unfamiliarity with the local area, 
Western journalists use local fixers. Fixers are local residents who can potentially play 
multiple roles such as driver, interpreter, security guard, tour guide, and someone to read 
and translate the local newspapers, in addition to working as a freelance journalist for a 
Western news agency. Local fixers are very important to the foreign correspondent who 
may cover a vast area, as for example the Africa correspondent for a Western news 
organisation. They are equally important to the parachute journalist who is likely to be 
unfamiliar with the local culture and language. Using fixers is another mode of the 
journalist ‗being there‘ to bear witness firsthand even though the testimony is mediated 
through the fixer. It adds a new dimension to the mediation of bearing witness: the 
dimension of reliance. 
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In Tumber and Webster‘s interviews with Western journalists covering war, they 
found that when it came to hiring local fixers, frontline correspondents identified 
‗reliability and quick-wittedness‘ as the most sought after attributes in a fixer.
408
 Western 
correspondents valued the fixer‘s ability to negotiate and react quickly in intense and 
potentially dangerous situations. Jerry Palmer and Victoria Fontan conducted interviews 
with seventeen Western journalists and fourteen local fixers operating in Iraq. They 
identified the most important attribute of fixers was their access to local contacts, in a 
context where ‗religious, tribal, political and personal affiliations are crucial in the 
creation of trust.‘
 409
 The researchers also reported that the Iraqi fixers‘ predominant 
frustration with Western journalists was that they asked questions in ways that the fixers 
found culturally offensive. Iraqi fixers experienced the burden of translating the Western 
journalists‘ questions into culturally acceptable forms before posing the questions to Iraqi 
citizens. 
While objectivity is a highly revered aspect of Western journalism, it is not the 
norm by which Western journalists choose their fixers. The research on fixers conducted 
by Tumber and Webster as well as by Palmer and Fontan emphasized that word for word 
translation was not necessary, Western media agencies were not looking for professional 
interpreters where accuracy was of the highest value. Rather, they wanted someone who 
could give quick summaries with background information. Journalists provide their local 
fixer with a brief of what they want for the news piece. The fixer first finds the right 
person to interview and then translates for the interview. Because of the dangerous 
situation in Iraq, many fixers went without the foreign correspondent and conducted the 
interview on their own.
410
 Most of the people who reported for Western media sources in 
Iraq in 2007 are local journalists who now report for the Western media outlets. Western 
media is very heavily reliant on fixers given that many Western reporters do not speak 
Arabic let alone the Iraqi dialect of Arabic as well as the dangers faced. Many Iraqi fixers 
are now essentially proxy reporters for Western news agencies, which puts them in great 
danger. 
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The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that simply being associated 
with the practice of journalism can prove deadly for local fixers doing the job of 
translator, camera-operator, security guard or driver. There are additional risks for the 
local fixer which the foreign correspondent does not face. The foreign journalists arrive 
with flak-jackets and other security measures in place, and they can freely leave the area 
or be evacuated out in the case of an emergency. That is not the case with the local fixer 
as Bill Neely of ITN reflects: 
[T]he people that we work with, who help us, usually have to stay and 
suffer the consequences – of not just what has happened there but what we 
have done in publicising this conflict. And those people may sometimes 
feel emboldened by our presence and working with us, and they may say 
things to people in authority that they wouldn‘t have said otherwise. Then, 
when we leave, they‘re punished for it in some way.
411
  
The risk faced by the local fixer is magnified by virtue of their being dependent on the 
location. Fixers‘ families are at risk; this is a risk not faced by the foreign correspondent, 
who can leave a family safe in London or New York. Nonetheless, these are risks that 
fixers take voluntarily: perhaps they want to play a part in getting their local story told to 
a Western audience. Also of course, there are the financial pressures in a conflict-driven 
economy, where the fixer can make a substantial salary. 
Sometimes Western journalists can help get their local fixers and their families 
out of conflict areas, but more often the scenario is of the local fixer getting the Western 
journalist out of danger. The 1984 film The Killing Fields illustrates this scenario in the 
dramatic true story of New York Times reporter Sydney Schanberg who is saved by his 
local fixer in Cambodia, Dith Pran. Captured by the Khmer Rouge, Pran talked their 
captors out of executing himself and Schanberg, and Jon Swain, another Western 
journalist. The Khmer Rouge handed them over to be held by the French Embassy and 
later demanded that all Cambodians and other Asians be turned out of the safety of the 
embassy which meant into the killing fields.  Pran was forced to leave the safety of the 
embassy and his Western employer. In the end, Pran did manage to survive and escape 
into the countryside, but it was years before Schanberg knew the fate of his Cambodian 
fixer. 
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Many fixers believe that the mortal risk involved in working with Western news 
agencies is worth it. They want justice for their people and their country, and they believe 
that the light of Western publicity through the mediation of the foreign correspondent can 
help deliver justice. Caroline Wyatt of the BBC describes the motives for the fixers and 
interviewees she worked with in Chechnya: 
The people who helped us there or who were interviewed by us got into 
trouble afterwards. But they knew in talking to us how dangerous it was. 
… we said to people, ‗Are you sure you want to help us? Are you sure you 
want to be interviewed on camera? … Are you sure you want your real 
name put up?‘ And most of the time they said, ―Yes, for sure. I don‘t care 
what happens because I want the world to know what‘s happening.‘
412
  
As with embedded journalism, reliance on local fixers brings up questions of 
objectivity.  The local fixer might be partial toward a political party and therefore 
purposefully mistranslate or omit material. The research shows that Western journalists 
do not prioritise objectivity in their choosing of local fixers. The risk for Western 
journalists is that the fixers will shape their view of the situation by their selection of 
interviewees and locations. As the local fixer can become a proxy journalist for the West, 
so the Western journalist can become a propagandist for the local fixer.  Palmer and 
Fontan note that building trust is necessary between foreign correspondents and their 
local fixers in order for foreign correspondents to believe that they can pursue reporting 
the truth. The researchers found that the best assurance was found through the building 
up of networks of local fixers over time who could be vouched for and shared among 
Western news agencies (as well as poached). As the foreign correspondent is the 
audiences‘ eyes and ears in far away places, the local fixers are the eyes and ears leading 
the otherwise blind and deaf journalist in a foreign land. Being there to bear witness again 
proves to be risky for the foreign correspondent: there is not just the physical risk, but the 
risk of trusting strangers. 
Journalists necessarily have a specific and limited view from inside a tank or from 
a hotel rooftop. A news organisation with embedded and unilateral reporters throughout 
Iraq still cannot provide the viewing audience with the whole picture. If images were 
sufficient to testify to the whole picture, then satellite images could do the job of 
supplying eyewitness testimony to news audiences. The US Pentagon could have 
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mounted cameras on coalition tanks, and altogether avoided the controversial and 
expensive program of embedding journalists. How is video footage recorded by the hand 
of a journalist in a tank different from a recording made by the hands of military 
personnel? The argument against embedded journalism is that a recording from inside a 
tank by a journalist would not be any different from one made by a soldier. Nevertheless, 
the normative claim remains that journalists, who are supposedly independent of 
government control, should be on the frontlines of war to provide the public with an 
impartial testimony. Normative claims to impartiality and objectivity are further called 
into question in the discussion of journalists as proxy voices for the voiceless. Before I 
investigate journalists‘ second role as proxy, I consider the challenges women journalists 
face in their role as credible witnesses for the public. 
4.3 Can Women be Proxy Witnesses? 
Being present provides credibility to the journalist‘s claim of truthful reporting for 
the public. But, the fact of being present is not the only link to credibility. Sometimes the 
credibility of testimony is contested on the basis of sex. Can women be the proxy eyes 
and ears of the public when the testimony of women is considered suspect? I began this 
thesis with the focus on bearing witness as understood in the Christian tradition and I 
return there to consider the concept of credibility and the contested witness of women. 
The twelve apostles were not the first eyewitnesses of Christ‘s resurrection; nonetheless it 
was their witness which claimed the eyewitness authority in the early church. Witness is 
a fragile form of making a truth claim, because the credibility of the claim is inextricable 
from the perceived credibility of the witness. Such is the case with the first eyewitnesses 
of Christ‘s resurrection. The Synoptic gospels and John all agree that Mary Magdalene 
was the first eyewitness, but they do it reluctantly according to New Testament Scholar, 
Claudia Setzer. She argues that the gospel writers could not violate the fixed tradition that 
Mary Magdalene was the first witness, so the gospel writers‘ narrate the story in a way 
that diminishes the significance of Mary Magdalene being the first eyewitness. 
Setzer cites the example of the Gospel of John as offering a ‗confused 
choreography‘ to diminish the witness of Mary Magdalene:    
Mary Magdalene is the first to discover the empty tomb (20:1-2) and the 
first to meet the risen Jesus (20:14-18), but sandwiched between these 
incidents is the scene where Peter and the Beloved Disciple run to the 
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tomb and the Beloved Disciple is the first to arrive and the first to believe 
in the risen Jesus.
413
 
Setzer argues that while John‘s choreography ‗retains the tradition of Mary Magdalene as 
the first to discover the empty tomb … it also gives the Beloved Disciple pride of place 
as the first person … to actually believe that Jesus has risen.‘
414
 Setzer works through 
each gospel account of the discovery of the empty tomb.
415
 Like the gospels‘ tradition of 
muting the testimony of Mary Magdalene and the other women, Setzer finds the tendency 
of muted female witness ‗continued in later documents like Epistula Apostolorum and 
certain church fathers.‘
416
  And, further, some who contested the very idea of Jesus 
Christ‘s resurrection contested it on the grounds of Mary Magdalene‘s witness, ‗as 
Celsus‘s Jew does in the second century, ―But who saw this? A hysterical female.‖‘
417
  
Lucy Winkett, like Setzer, claims that Mary Magdalene‘s testimony continues to 
be suspect, and therefore muted, in contemporary Christian thought. Winkett argues that 
‗Mary of Magdala has been for centuries conflated with other Gospel characters.‘
418
 
These stories have contributed to the composite figure of Mary Magdalene: the woman 
who anoints Jesus Christ‘s head‘ with expensive oil (Mark 14. 3-9); the woman who 
washes Jesus Christ‘s feet with her tears and hair (Luke 7.36-50); and most often, the 
Samaritan woman at the well whom Jesus tells that she is not living with her husband and 
has five other husbands.
419
 Witness bearers, like Mary Magdalene, have little control over 
how their testimony will be received. Contested witness or contested testimony is part of 
the fragility of bearing witness as a method of making truth claims. Mary Magdalene‘s 
testimony was discredited based on her sex even though she met the requirements to be 
an apostle of Jesus Christ: she was an eyewitness to his life, death, and resurrection. 
While much of the privileged status of witness is contingent on ‗being there‘ as an 
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eyewitness, in this case being a woman cancelled out the authority that she had gained 
from being there, live-on-the-scene. To what extent has this been the experience of 
women frontline correspondents? 
The common gender bias that women journalists face in reporting on the 
frontlines of conflict and disaster zones is that women should focus on ‗women‘s issues‘ 
which does not include serious issues such as international politics, war and genocide. 
While women reporting on war has a long history, Martha Gellhorn being a very 
prominent case in point, nonetheless, women war reporters ‗disrupt still-lingering 
stereotypes of women‘s conventional roles in journalism and the wider society.‘
420
 I 
explore two ideas with regard to the contested or challenged testimony of women war 
reporters. First I consider the issue of ‗women as spectacles‘, and second I consider the 
accusation of the ‗feminisation of news‘. 
4.3.1 Women Journalists as Spectacles 
 The authority that journalists gain from being there, on the scene, is undermined 
by the fact that once they appear on the screen they themselves become a spectacle. 
Earlier I discussed how visual spectacle characterised journalistic reportage at the start of 
the 2003 Iraq war. We saw spectacular images of journalists trying to stay alive in 
coalition tanks or on the rooftop of the Palestine Hotel. The focus was not so much on 
uncovering and scrutinising information, so much as directing the audience‘s gaze to 
journalists‘ bodies in mortal danger, and this was all the more the case when the bodies 
were female. Deborah Chambers, Linda Steiner and Carole Fleming, scholars in the 
fields of media and journalism, explore the concept of ‗women as spectacles‘ in 
journalism. They begin theorising from Jürgen Habermas‘ critique of the refeudalization 
of the public sphere. In chapter two I discussed this critique, which describes a mass 
mediated public sphere controlled by a concentration of media ownership, which 
produces a sphere for show and spectacle, rather than a sphere for public deliberation. 
Chambers, Steiner and Fleming are concerned with the way women journalists ‗find that 
they are not only deliverers but also objects of news.‘
421
 Steiner claims that women‘s 
reportage ‗is most controversial in sports and war,‘ and it is no coincidence that both are 
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‗arenas in which physicality and bodies are very much at issue.‘
422
 This was true with 
regard to news coverage at the start of the Iraq war when women war reporters 
themselves were the object of news reports. 
BBC foreign correspondent Hilary Andersson wrote that the ‗Iraq war was a good 
war for women war reporters.‘
423
 She was among five BBC reporters, three women and 
two men, at the British Divisional Headquarters in southern Iraq. It seemed to Andersson 
that women frontline war reporters were in ‗vogue‘ and the focus was on attire, hair, 
personal histories, and occasionally ability.
424
 Some reportage had a meta quality, there 
were stories about women reporting on war: ‗Sky‘s Emma Hurd spent one evening in the 
crucial run-up to the fall of Basra answering on-air questions, not about the advancing 
British troops, but about what on earth women were doing reporting wars anyway.‘
425
 
Women became newsworthy spectacles because of the oddity of women being there in 
the first place. Andersson called this the ‗wow factor‘ for news media agencies. Since the 
‗wow factor‘ does not give gender parity in frontline war reporting, Andersson worries 
about when the novelty of women war reporters is no longer novel.
426
 Will the number of 
women reporters decline? 
 Women reporters‘ credibility as the public‘s eyes and ears on the scene is 
diminished when focus is shifted from the scene and onto the bodies of women. The 
focus on the body as spectacle detracts from the deliberative function of the press. Again, 
this is in part the case with the spectacular images that men and women embeds and 
rooftop journalists produced in Iraq, but here is the added dimension of the exploitation 
of sexuality. Steiner cites an example from 2002 of CNN reporter Paula Zahn. CNN ran 
an advertisement campaign asking, ‗Where can you find a morning news anchor who‘s 
provocative, super-smart, oh yeah, and just a little bit sexy?‘
427
 Steiner acknowledges that 
the sexual exploitation is not without the complicity of women reporters: ‗Much of the 
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pandering is done by women. It is women newscasters who smile flirtatiously, ask 
personal questions, hug rapists, and show cleavage. Women are manipulated to attract 
male and female audiences.‘
428
 Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised how physical 
presence is a means to authenticating truth claims, but the exploitation of human bodies 
diminishes the authority of presence. Steiner and Andersson share the concern that 
female presence on the scene of wars may be reduced to the ‗wow factor‘, a gimmick to 
attract viewers. Mary Magdalene‘s testimony was contested because she was a woman 
and her testimony was further diminished by conflating her with women of ill-repute in 
the gospel stories. The credibility of Mary Magdalene‘s physical presence is discredited 
because of sexual exploitation of her body. Paula Zahn‘s credibility as a journalist is 
discredited by the sexual exploitation of making her female body a spectacle for 
broadcast news. 
4.3.2 The Feminisation of Journalism 
 Another instance of contesting journalistic testimony that is connected to women 
involves the criticism of the ‗journalism of attachment‘. Later in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, 
I explore the journalism of attachment in more detail, but here I want to highlight the 
connection of the journalism of attachment to the gender debate in investigative 
journalism. The journalism of attachment is a style of journalism that calls into question 
journalistic impartiality. It is a style of reportage which emphasises the ‗human face of 
war‘. One way critics attack the credibility of women and men sympathetic to the kind of 
stories produced by the journalism of attachment, is to characterise the reportage as 
resulting from the ‗feminisation of journalism‘. 
Journalism scholar Greg McLaughlin connects ‗journalism of attachment‘ to the 
increased number of women war reporters.
429
 He made a direct correlation between the 
increase of women reporters and the increase of reportage on civilian experience and 
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other personal stories. Researchers Cinny Kennard and Sheila T. Murphy found that there 
were qualitative differences in the reports filed by women and men journalists during the 
war in Bosnia. They found that women filed more ‗coverage of victim-based stories‘, 
‗soldiers‘ profiles, ‗human rights stories‘, and that women reporters more often brought 
attention to the systematic rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia than men reporters did.
430
 
Linda Steiner offers a critical reading of the statistical evidence of women reporters filing 
more human interest stories than men. She investigated feminist scholarship of war 
reportage on Vietnam and Bosnia and found that there was little ‗evidence that men and 
women ―essentially‖ acted differently as reporters or editors.‘
431
 Steiner reasons that in 
the competitive news business, women may have pandered to get assignments by 
claiming to ‗provide a women‘s angle.‘
432
 ‗To the extent that women adopted a human-
interest approach … may reflect what editors assigned women to do or how men edited 
women‘s stories. It reflects what women promised to do to get a job and connived to do 
when sexist male/military sources denied them access.‘
433
 
Rather than the connection between the ‗human face of war‘ and the presence of 
women on the frontlines, some researchers have reasoned that a trend toward 
investigative journalism as bearing witness has resulted in more reportage on the human 
face of war. Howard Tumber, Philip Seib and John Pilger connect the idea of 
investigative journalism as bearing witness with the conversation about the journalism of 
attachment. Tumber, along with researchers Marina Prentoulis and Frank Webster, 
explored the connection between the increase in women war reporters and the increase in 
human interest stories from the frontlines. They concluded that the correlation should not 
be reduced to gender differences. They explain: 
The shift towards human interest stories, encapsulated in the phrase ‗the 
feminisation of news,‘ may be paradigmatic of a broader cultural shift, 
consonant with moves towards a ‗journalism of attachment.‘ The latter, 
favoring more ‗human‘ stories of civilian victims and some degree of 
emotional involvement, may be allowing women reporters more space for 
approaching war stories in their own way and, at the same time, allowing 
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male correspondents to respond to the intensity of the war, without the 
‗macho‘ bravado often associated with the war correspondent.
434
 
I have found Prentoulis, Tumber, and Webster‘s conclusion to be consistent with my 
research findings. In the next chapter, I consider the way two men and one woman 
reported ‗human‘ stories from the frontlines of war and genocide. In their memoirs, the 
three journalists are very forthright about their emotional involvement with the stories 
they reported. I agree that the human face of war is not a feminisation of war reporting, 
but a cultural shift toward ‗bearing witness‘. Gendering what kind of stories female or 
male journalists should tell, limits both women and men. Central to the concept of 
bearing witness is the claim that the person who is there on the scene, is the person who 
has the credibility to tell the story. It is true that women reporters may have more ready 
access to ‗be there‘ in a room with Bosnian Muslim women who testify to their 
experience of rape, but this does not mean that men reporters are incapable or exempt 
from bearing witness for the Bosnian women. 
 The root gender bias in the accusation of the ‗feminisation of journalism‘ is the 
false dichotomy that women more naturally report on subjective, emotional experiences 
while men tend to report on objective, factual stories. The gender bias involves one more 
step; objective stories are more credible than subjective stories. By this account, when 
journalists, women or men, file stories in which they testify to some sort of emotional 
involvement, their testimony may be contested as corrupted testimony. Pilger avoids the 
false dichotomy of female journalism versus male journalism by broadening the 
definition of investigative journalism to include ‗journalism that bears witness and 
investigates‘. He begins his account of ‗investigative journalism that changed the world‘ 
with Martha Gellhorn whose famous reportage is collected under the title, The Face of 
War.
435
 Instead of arguing that Gellhorn feminised war reporting, I agree with the 
arguments that reportage like Gellhorn‘s opens up journalistic space for women and men 
to provide truthful accounts from zones of conflict. In this next section, I explore the idea 
of the journalist giving voice to the voiceless as the second proxy role of the journalist 
who bears witness.  
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4.4 Proxy Voice for the Voiceless 
The second group of people for whom journalists bear witness is those people at 
the scene who have suffered but do not have the means to testify before a wider audience. 
The journalist is the proxy voice for the voiceless, hoping to assist in righting the 
injustice or perhaps providing some relief from the suffering. Here, I particularly focus 
on the difficulties encountered by Western journalists bearing witness to crimes against 
humanity. There is a sense in which all reporters are engaged witnesses, as opposed to 
impartial witnesses, even when they are just reporting the facts. When it comes to 
reporting on crimes against humanity some journalists admit to being motivated by a 
human rights agenda. BBC correspondent Fergal Keane is one of these journalists. His 
practice of journalism is motivated by the ‗concept of international justice‘ and the belief 
that, ‗the weak need protecting; the powerful need to be challenged.‘
436
 This kind of 
journalism challenges the strongly held principle of reporter impartiality. Journalistic 
impartiality is strongly linked to the idea that in order to maintain objectivity, journalists 
must be detached from the subject of their reporting. I considered this concept in section 
4.2.1 questioning the impartiality of journalists embedded with coalition troops. Bearing 
witness to genocide poses new sets of questions to consider with regard to journalistic 
impartiality. In this final section, I focus on four controversial issues concerning 
journalists‘ role as proxy for the victim: testifying in court, the advent of the journalism 
of attachment and its critics, and lastly, ‗do something journalism‘. 
4.4.1 Testifying at International Criminal Tribunals 
When, if ever, should journalists testify at international criminal tribunals? There 
is a range of views from those who believe that journalists should be granted the privilege 
of being able to disregard court subpoenas, to those who argue that journalists who 
witness crimes have a duty to testify. There is a noticeable American and British divide 
running along the continuum regarding testifying. This may partly be due to the US‘s 
more rigid tradition of the ‗objectivity norm‘ and the specific appeal to ‗shield laws‘ that 
protect reporters from revealing sources.
437
 Jonathan Randal of The Washington Post is a 
well-known case of a journalist who received a subpoena for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCFY) and refused to testify. Randal was part of 
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an appeal by over thirty international journalism organisations to the international court 
to create the privilege of a journalist‘s right to refuse to testify. Their aim was to establish 
that journalists first be seen as ‗independent observers rather than potential witnesses.‘
438
 
In response the Tribunal Appeals Chamber outlined a two-part test: 
First, the petitioning party must demonstrate that the evidence sought is of 
direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case. Second, 




By contrast to Randal, Lindsey Hilsum, freelance reporter for the BBC, The Guardian 
and The Observer, was issued a subpoena and testified at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Hilsum was one of the few Western correspondents in 
Rwanda when the Rwandan President was assassinated. She believed it was her 
obligation to testify at the ICTR about the ‗general situation‘ of Rwanda, but Hilsum felt 
she could not testify against any one ‗individual to whom I have had privileged 
access.‘
440
 Hilsum argues that the opposition against journalists becoming legal witnesses 
is mostly an American criticism: 
They [Americans] say that if we act as witnesses in such tribunals, we lay 
ourselves open to charges of bias, cross the line between being observers 
and participants in a story, and endanger ourselves and fellow reporters 
trying to cover war crimes and other human rights abuses.
441
 
Hilsum was also critical of the British newspaper journalist Ed Vulliamy, who not only 
testified against a specific Serbian individual but also attempted to cover the proceedings 
of the ICTFY for The Guardian before and after he took the stand. For Hilsum, this 
action was ‗a blurring of the line between the journalist as observer and as participant in 
the story.‘
442
 In spite of this criticism Hilsum admits that she became a participant in 
covering the Rwandan genocide because she thought is was ‗the right thing to do.‘  
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The normal rules of journalistic ethics are overwhelmed by murder on this 
scale. I was aware of crossing the line and becoming a participant rather 
than an observer, but I felt it was a moral duty to use my unique position to 
influence the historical record in the court. By accident of history, I 
happened to be there.
443
  
Ed Vulliamy, of The Guardian, testified at the ICTFY twice and even inadvertently 
revealed a source. Nevertheless, Vulliamy was concerned with what kind of history is left 
on the records:  
I decided this was a chance for some kind of reckoning for the only people 
I really cared about—the victims. I threw aside any pretence of neutrality 
and went to The Hague. I gave the prosecution in the Tadic case all my 
notebooks and I told them everything I knew.
444
 
The duties that accompany the journalistic practice of foreign correspondents being there, 
Vulliamy argues, may include abandoning ‗neutrality‘ and ‗to reckon with what we 
witness and to urge others to do the same.‘
445
  
4.4.2 The Journalism of Attachment 
As can be seen from the proceeding discussions, journalists who reported on the 
genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in the early 1990s began asking 
related questions about the roles of objectivity and impartiality in reporting on crimes 
against humanity: How can we be detached about covering mass atrocities against 
civilians? How can we be dispassionate when we are walking among the rotting corpses 
of slaughtered innocent populations? How can we not become engaged? How far does 
being a witness to human atrocity carry with it an obligation to those who suffer?  
The BBC reporter Martin Bell coined the phrase ‗the journalism of attachment‘, 
which he defined as ‗a journalism that cares as well as knows; that is aware of its 
responsibilities; that will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the 
victim and the oppressor.‘
446
 His experience reporting on Bosnia was essentially as an 
embed with the civilians of Sarajevo when it was under siege. Like embedded reporters, 
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Bell was in physical solidarity with those on whom he reported, in this case the civilians 
of Sarajevo. This and related experiences in the Balkans led him to suggest that in ‗our 
anxiety not to offend and upset people, we were not only sanitizing war but even 
prettifying it‘.
 447
 In this context he argues that journalists must avoid ‗shading the truth‘, 
highlight the fact that ‗war is a bad taste business‘ and therefore not be afraid to show the 
bloody reality of the effects of war.
448
  
Reporters advocating a ‗journalism of attachment‘ argue that in the coverage of 
ethnic cleansing or genocide, treating both sides as holding a reasonable position would 
be to ‗equate aggressor and victim.‘
449
 The CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour, 
developed this point further:  
I have come to believe that objectivity means giving all sides a fair 
hearing, but not treating all sides equally. Once you treat all sides the same 
in a case such as Bosnia, you are drawing a moral equivalence between 
victim and aggressor. And from here it is a short step to being neutral. And 




The logic here is rooted in her personal experience of covering the Bosnian conflict in the 
early 1990s. Both Amanpour and Bell acknowledge that for journalists, while there is no 
possibility of bearing witness neutrally from above, the validity of their singular and 
limited view from the ground was susceptible to manipulation.  
4.4.3 Criticisms of the Journalism of Attachment 
Some critics describe the journalism of attachment as ‗advocacy journalism‘, 
suggesting it is flawed in several ways. Two lines of criticism are particularly 
noteworthy. First, attachment to the civilians of one side may be at the expense of other 
civilian populations. This may result in overlooking atrocities committed by the side to 
which the journalist is ‗attached‘. Second, advocacy journalism is not as independent 
from government as it claims. Philip Hammond believed that the ‗journalism of 
attachment‘ was just as susceptible to becoming a tool of propaganda during war as 
impartial and detached journalism.  
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Instead of truthful reporting, the agenda of advocacy journalism has 
sometimes made reporters highly selective, leading them to ignore 
inconvenient information… And despite claims to be pursuing a moral, 
human rights agenda, the journalism of attachment has led to the 
celebration of violence against those perceived as undeserving victims.
451
  
Hammond cites as examples the bombing of Serbian civilians during the Bosnian war 
and the emptying of the refugee camps sending the Hutus back into Rwanda where they 
would likely become victims of revenge attacks by Tutsis. One reason why journalism of 
attachment is susceptible to such faults is because of what Hammond calls a simplistic 
reportage framing of ‗good versus evil morality.‘
452
 As for Hammond‘s second criticism, 
questioning the actual independence of advocacy journalism, he found that advocacy 
journalism has frequently coincided with the perspectives and policies of powerful 
Western governments. 
The debate between the journalism of attachment and the journalism of 
detachment is commonly framed in a polarized fashion, with advocates and opponents 
coming down forcefully on either side of the discussion. Nevertheless, journalists do 
move from observer to witness, from a level of detachment to engagement, whenever 
they embark on covering a story about violence or suffering. Even if they do not 
recognize it, they do make a moral judgment when they decide to show certain images 
and not others, when they select one local eyewitness, when they put themselves in a 
vulnerable position to cover a story or when they decide to testify at a war crimes 
tribunal.  
4.4.4 Do Something Journalism 
Related to the conversation of ‗advocacy journalism‘ and the ‗journalism of 
attachment‘, many journalists covering extreme stories of conflict and suffering feel that 
they must galvanise their public to do something. Journalists might feel this tension as the 
result of their double role of proxy. In their role of proxy witness for the public, 
journalists might have expectations that the public, once aware, should ‗do something‘. 
Yet, a journalist‘s success at bearing witness should not be measured by whether or not 
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the public act. This is an important claim, for as I concluded in the last chapter the 
potential for audience agency to act like the Good Samaritan is limited. After many 
successful years as a war correspondent, Martha Gellhorn came to understand that the 
success of her reporting was not premised on galvanising the public to do something. 
Gellhorn began her career believing that her job was to motivate the public to do 
something; she came to disavow this reasoning and she asserts that the role of the 
journalist is to bear accurate witness as an end in itself.
453
 It is worth quoting her at length 
to understand the evolution of her motivation for reporting on conflicts and suffering over 
a sixty-year span:  
When I was young I believed in the perfectibility of man, and in progress, 
and thought of journalism as a guiding light. If people were told the truth, 
if dishonour and injustice were clearly shown to them, they would at once 
demand the saving action, punishment of wrong-doers, and care for the 
innocent. How people were to accomplish these reforms, I did not know. 
That was their job. A journalist's job was to bring news, to be eyes for their 
conscience. I think I must have imagined public opinion as a solid force, 




Gellhorn‘s initial reasoning is similar to the role of the news media in the narrative of 
Global Compassion. For instance, Philip Seib argues that the ‗news media must serve as 
the persistent conscience of the newest world order‘ of moral interventionism, and further 
that the journalist‘s most important role is ‗to be the witness who arouses conscience‘.
455
 
In contrast to Seib as well as her earlier position, Gellhorn questions arousing 
consciences as the telos of journalism. Note Gellhorn‘s change from the journalist as the 
public‘s conscience to the maintenance of trust between journalist and public: 
Now I have different ideas. I must always, before, have expected results. 
There was an obtainable end, called victory or defeat. One could hope for 
victory, despair over defeat. At this stage in my life I think that I think this 
is nonsense. Journalism is a means; and I now think that the act of keeping 
the record straight is valuable in itself. Serious, careful, honest journalism 
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is essential, not because it is a guiding light but because it is a form of 
honourable behaviour, involving the reporter and the reader.
456
  
Keeping the record straight is important for the journalist‘s relationship with the public, 
but it is also important for the journalist‘s role of proxy for the victims. While foreign 
correspondents may begin with objective and impartial coverage that represents the 
interests of their public, the ideas in this chapter suggest that the relationship between the 
journalist and the victims of suffering become a powerful motivation for ‗keeping the 
record straight.‘ In the end, an accurate record will better serve public deliberation. While 
the journalist is the public‘s proxy eyes and ears on the ground, she may also be the only 
voice on the ground capable of achieving publicity at a global level. 
Repeatedly journalists claimed that frontline correspondents are recording history, 
they have ‗a sense of making history.‘
457
 As Gellhorn reflected, the value of journalism is 
‗the act of keeping the record straight‘ as a form of honourable behaviour. With reference 
to Gellhorn‘s insights, Allan Little responded: 
You want to be true to the people. You don‘t want to let them down. … 
How can I do justice to these people? I must get it right. … that is why I 
was there on the ground.
458
 
Through ‗getting it right‘ and ‗keeping the record straight‘, journalists empower both the 
public and the people on the ground. Media Studies scholar Jean Seaton claims that the 
victim is less of a victim when he or she takes on the role of a witness. Journalists can 
give agency to victims by bearing witness on their behalf, becoming witnesses for the 
witnesses. When a victim is given the opportunity to narrate the events, the victim is able 
to ‗exercise some control and to regain some kind of authority in the most harrowing of 
circumstances‘.
459
 The victim is thus able to become ‗an active shaper of the story of 
what happened and less merely a victim.‘
460
 A journalist who provides a public platform 
for a victim to testify has done something. It may not result in a judgment from an 
international court, but giving voice to the voiceless is a ‗form of honourable behaviour‘ 
and can be an end in itself. 
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 The nascent journalist may think that his reportage will cause direct action, but 
the veteran journalists cited throughout this chapter emphasise that good journalism is not 
measured by direct results. John Howard Yoder‘s discussion on the moral agency 
involved in bearing witness sheds light on the practical moral reasoning behind 
journalists‘ claim to bearing witness. Yoder fought against the charge that bearing 
witness is a passive, ineffective and irresponsible form of social ethics. Yoder argued that 
simply by being there, ‗intractably present on the social scene‘,
461
 to provide truthful and 
faithful accounts is an end in itself. This is an insight which contributes further to the 
discussion of the ethical claim of journalism that bears witness. Effective journalism 
should not be measured simply by action: getting it right through honourable behaviour is 
also efficacious. 
Conclusion 
 The journalistic claim that bearing witness involves acting as proxy for the public 
and proxy for the victim is not without controversy. Some of the wariness generated by 
the term proxy is inherent in the risk and fragility in being represented by others and in 
representing others. There are many risks in acting as a proxy. In the Western 
understanding of journalism, journalists practice their trade with constant radar scanning 
for press manipulation. War reporters fear becoming a tool of the state or a tool of their 
local fixers. In the case of embeds, they need to be wary of the risk of ‗going native‘ and 
joining the camaraderie of the troops. Journalists reporting on genocide are wary of the 
staging of atrocities where they might essentially become a proxy for one faction. Yet 
many journalists understand their trade as a vocation, a calling worthy of their lives 
despite the risks, and even despite the action, or inaction that results from their reportage. 
I return to my initial question: Do reporters make Good Samaritans? Like the 
Samaritan, the journalist most often arrives at the scene after the violence has occurred, 
but in time to be present for the suffering. Yet the attention the Samaritan gave the Jewish 
man in the parable is not commensurate with the attention a journalist can give. In a 
documentary on war photography James Nachtwey explains that whenever he shows 
pictures of starving people he is inevitably asked if he stopped to give them food. He 
replied that most journalism coverage of mass starvation is done at refugee feeding 
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centres where the starving people are beginning to receive nourishment.
462
 The Samaritan 
cannot be a very exact analogy with the journalist. The man in the ditch in the story was 
just one man. The mass atrocities and calamities that journalists cover are mass.  
The journalist can shine the light of publicity on the situation. Sometimes the 
publicity will result in some kind of civic or governmental relief and aid, but sometimes 
success simply means that the reporter accurately records an event. The journalist can 
report that a Jewish man was violently accosted by robbers on the road from Jericho to 
Jerusalem. The journalist can report that the Jewish people have been suffering under 
socio-economic pressures exerted by Herod‘s government. The journalist can still further 
report that criminal activity, such as roadside muggings, has risen with the increase of the 
urban-poor in the southern part of the kingdom. The journalist can give possible 
explanations for why other Jewish people, such as the priest and the Levite, have failed to 
assist the man in the ditch. The journalist can broadcast this story with accompanying 
images to millions of viewers. However, the journalist cannot assist the man from the 
ditch and help bear him to hospice care as the actual story will most likely involve not 
one man in the ditch, but hundreds and thousands. There are occasions in journalists‘ 
careers where they have personally assisted, in Samaritan-fashion, a person in distress.  
 Journalists alone do not make Good Samaritans. As discussed in the last two 
chapters, journalists are among several players in the story of global compassion. Foreign 
correspondents extend the boundaries of our neighbourhoods, our reach of moral 
obligation, by introducing new neighbours into our communities. The role of the Western 
foreign correspondent understood within a human rights community, extends the 
traditional role of the watchdog function of a Western press to include the function of the 
West as global watchdogs. Thus the news value of the genocide in Rwanda is understood 
within Western communities as an event that demands attention by a community that has 
promised that ‗never again‘ should genocide go unnoticed, and ‗never again‘ will it turn a 
blind eye. The onus is not on the journalist alone. The obligation is on the community. 
 In the final chapter, I consider the experience of three journalists involved in 
bearing witness to distant suffering. By considering their accounts of being in particular 
places—Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia and Rwanda—we can see how being there in extreme 
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situations can lead to engagement in the stories reported in a way that everyday 
journalism does not.  
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Chapter 5: The Lived Experience of Bearing Witness 
 In this final chapter I consider the lived experience of three journalists who bear 
witness to war and genocide. Award-winning journalists John Simpson, Ǻsne Seierstad, 
and Fergal Keane write about what it was like to report on extreme and extraordinary 
events. Through their reflections, we can begin to understand the challenges foreign 
correspondents face when bearing witness. In the narrative of global compassion the 
journalist might be the first link in the intermediary chain of humanitarian action. The 
community of the Global Samaritan, at its most robust, may be able to effect change at 
the political level, and may be able to deliver humanitarian aid for relief, recovery and 
even sustainable projects. The majority of stories that frontline correspondents file do not 
ignite a robust response. Nonetheless, many journalists feel that their presence, being 
there in person, somehow made the situation different. 
 In this chapter, I investigate the experience of Simpson (5.1), Seierstad (5.2), and 
Keane (5.3) practicing journalism in the midst of war and genocide. In these three 
sections I give attention to the voice of each journalist as they provide a thick description 
of the perilous experience of bearing witness to extraordinary events. In the final section 
(5.4), I offer an analysis of journalists bearing witness in the light of John Howard 
Yoder‘s work on witness as social ethics. This chapter is followed by the conclusion of 
the thesis in which I return to the full figure of the Global Samaritan, journalists and 
audiences alike, to consider the efficacy of bearing witness to distant suffering. 
Reflections on Bearing Witness to War and Genocide 
In order to investigate the lived experience of journalists bearing witness to 
extraordinary times, I use the journalists‘ memoirs. Using memoirs is not an 
unprecedented way to investigate moral responses or motivations of journalists. It is a 
methodology used by Journalist Studies researcher Howard Tumber to look at how 
journalists ‗operate in the field‘ and to examine journalists‘ experiences and motives.
463
 
Moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues that in order to discern a person‘s 
compassion, ‗we need only look at the perceptions and thoughts expressed in what he 
writes (assuming that he is sincere). When we do this, we see in his opinion all the 
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 While Nussbaum was making particular reference to 
discerning a judge‘s compassion through his or her written opinion on a case, I believe 
that a journalist‘s memoir on his or her reporting of a significant event is comparable to a 
judge writing an opinion on a case. Both are acts of explaining and working out why the 
writer acted and thought in the manner that they acted and thought, both were written for 
the public record. Further, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that to understand moral reasoning, 
it is ‗always at the level of practice a sufficient answer to the question: ―Why did you do 
that?‖‘
465
 In their memoirs, Simpson, Seierstad, and Keane reflect on why they performed 
their journalistic practice in the manner that they did. Their memoirs provide a 
contextualised and reflective retelling of the practical moral reasoning involved in their 
practice of investigative journalism. 
5.1 John Simpson 
To understand the risks of being there to report from a war zone, I consider the 
experience of the BBC‘s World Affairs Editor, John Simpson, when covering the 
beginning of the 2003 Iraq war. Simpson believed that his presence in Iraq as a unilateral 
journalist rather than an embedded journalist would somehow render things different for 
the people of Iraq and the public of the BBC audience. His lived experience highlights 
many of the concepts I discussed in the last chapter such as the dangers faced by frontline 
journalists, media assistants and their fixers, and the challenge of maintaining journalistic 
independence from the military. Simpson recorded his experience of his second Gulf War 
in The Wars against Saddam: Taking the Hard Road to Baghdad.
466
 In the first Gulf War, 
Simpson was frustrated by the US Pentagon‘s press management.
467
 For Simpson, 
embedded journalism had the same ring to it as press pools.
468
 Simpson had two central 
concerns after his press pool experience from the first Gulf War. First, the press pool 
system limited journalist access to only the information the military willingly supplied. 
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Simpson‘s second concern had to do with the limited contact with the civilian population 
of Iraq. Simpson did not want to work under similar constraints when covering his 
second Gulf War. He declined an embedded slot with coalition forces attacking Baghdad 
from the South.
  
He chose instead to independently travel through Kurdish northern Iraq 
to reach Baghdad. Simpson and his BBC crew left from Turkey and travelled through 
Kirkuk, Mosul and Tikrit before arriving in Baghdad. Simpson reasoned that retreating 
Iraqi soldiers and ‗shoot now, think later‘ American soldiers at check points would be his 
news team‘s greatest dangers. Simpson‘s criticism of US troops comes across very 
clearly in his memoir on his second Gulf War. His thoughts on American soldiers are that 
they are not careful and that they are poorly trained in discernment.  
If you are a scared, indifferently trained, heavily armed nineteen-year-old 
from Mobile or San Bernardino, any vehicle which drives up to your 
position is a likely threat. And if your officers have told you that the 
preservation of your own life comes before any other consideration, then 
you are quite likely to shoot someone, just in case.
469
  
Unilateral news teams were more at risk than news teams embedded with 
coalition troops. Simpson and his news team consisted of cameramen, security adviser, 
producer and local fixers. Simpson‘s wife, Dee, is usually his producer and travels with 
him, but not this time into Iraq for which he was ‗profoundly glad‘. On the morning of 6 
April, Simpson discussed with Kamaran Abdurrazak Mohammed, his Kurdish translator, 
the risks of working with a non-embedded BBC crew, like ‗the lack of a flak-jacket‘, and 
asked Kamaran if his family knew the risky work he was doing. Kamaran answered, ‗No, 
they think I stay in the hotel and translate the newspapers. It is easier that way.‘
470
 Later 
that day Simpson and his crew followed Kurdish and American Special Forces in route to 
Dibarjan. The troops sighted a couple of Iraqi tanks in the distance, stopped and called 
for American air strikes to take out the tanks.  Simpson shouted, ‗Flak-jacket time‘. The 
BBC crew stopped at a crossroads behind the military troops and prepared cameras to 
record the two incoming US Navy F-14s.   
By chance, there was a wrecked Iraqi tank lying right beside the 
crossroads; it must have been attacked and destroyed earlier in the day. It‘s 
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not impossible that the presence of this tank, when an attack was being 
requested on another tank nearby, caused the disaster that followed.
471
  
An American missile landed about twenty yards away from the crossroads where the 
vehicles had pulled to the side, among them Simpson and his crew. 
Fourteen pieces of shrapnel hit me altogether, and I was knocked to the 
ground. Most were pretty small, like the ones that hit me in the face and 
head, but two the size of bullets were big enough to have killed me. One 
lodged in my left hip, the other stuck in the plastic plate of my flak-jacket 
right over the spine.
472
  
With head, legs and arms bleeding and a left eardrum ‗completely blown away‘, Simpson 
gathered himself and his colleagues near him and they started the process of 
broadcasting. Simpson soon discovered that Kamaran had been severely wounded. In 
route to hospital, Kamaran died of his wounds inflicted by American ‗friendly fire‘. All 
of Simpson‘s crew had been wounded to varying degrees, aside from Kamaran‘s mortal 
wounds, Simpson‘s wounds were the most severe and with long lasting effect: ‗the 
shrapnel in my hip will probably remain slightly painful for the rest of my life.‘
473
 Upon 
returning to the UK, medical specialists advised that it was best not to remove the 
shrapnel, as his body will grow around the metal and it will become a part of him. 
Simpson named the shrapnel ‗George W. Bush‘. In his book, Simpson emphasises that 
Kamaran‘s mortal injury, a severed artery in his leg caused by shrapnel, could not have 
been prevented by a flak-jacket. What is evident in Simpson‘s book on the Iraq wars is 
that journalists are at great risk from the friendly-fire. In the first four weeks of the 2003 




By choosing not to accept the free US Pentagon flight directly into Baghdad or to 
accompany coalition ground troops as an embedded journalist, Simpson incurred 
additional risks to himself and his news team. Simpson‘s criticism of embedded 
journalism is similar to the criticism I discussed in the last chapter (4.2.1). Simpson 
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claims that while there is a heavy price to pay as a unilateral, there is also a price to pay 
for embedded reporting: 
[I]t became quite difficult for all but the hardest-nosed reporters to be 
absolutely honest about the soldiers who fed them, transported them, gave 
them the power they needed for their equipment, and (when necessary) 
saved their lives from the enemy. That mere word, ‗enemy‘, shows how a 
mind-set was created, … If you are with one side in a war, your fortunes 
and those of the soldiers you are with are pretty tightly intertwined; deep 
down, you are praying that they won‘t fail.
475
  
Large media organisations, such as the BBC, were in the position to send teams of 
correspondents and their crews both as ‗embeds‘ as well as operating as independents. 
Simpson and his BBC crew chose to be unilateral: 
We didn‘t want to be beholden to the very people whose actions we were 
obliged to report on impartially. Nor did we think that it was right that the 
only reporting on this war should come from the embedded correspondents 
or else from those based in Baghdad.
476
  
Simpson, in his effort to hear more voices from the Iraqi people, found he was more 
reliant on the local people. 
Personally, much as I appreciated the remarkable possibilities which 
‗embedded‘ correspondents would have for reporting from the front line, I 
could not myself think of joining their number. Maybe I was wrong; if I 
had, I would not have led my friend and translator Kamaran Abdurrazak 
Mohammed to his death, nor suffered mild but lasting injuries myself. But 
you are what you are, and if I had to make the decision again I would do 
exactly the same thing.
477
 
Simpson‘s criticism of the first Gulf War most likely led to his decision to cover the 
second Gulf War as a unilateral. In a report Simpson filed from Baghdad at the end of the 
first Gulf War he said, ‗As for the human casualties, tens of thousands of them, or the 
brutal effect the war had on millions of others ...we didn't see so much of that.‘
478
 Both 
Gulf Wars lacked detailed coverage of the suffering of the Iraqi people. At the start of 
both Gulf Wars, Western audiences largely witnessed war without consequences. 
Simpson was determined to make public the voice of ‗ordinary‘ Iraqis. 
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 Like Simpson, the next journalist I consider did not want to be under government 
restraint, in this case the restraint of the Iraqi government. Also like Simpson, she took 
great personal risks in order to find ways to circumvent government‘s management of the 
press. In her case, government management came through the Iraqi government. 
5.2 Åsne Seierstad 
Norwegian journalist, Åsne Seierstad, essentially became a rooftop journalist 
during the beginning of the Iraq war. Her work as a whole is not characterised by rooftop 
journalism, a kind of journalism where the reporter rarely speaks to citizens dwelling in 
the city because the journalist does not leave the five-star hotel. Nonetheless, in Iraq, like 
many other journalists in the Palestine Hotel located across the Tigris from Saddam 
Hussein‘s Presidential Palace in central Baghdad, Seierstad became a rooftop journalist 
on 19 March 2003, the start of the ‗shock and awe‘ US-led coalition bombing. In Iraq as 
well as in other places, Seierstad characterises her journalism as being driven by 
friendship with ordinary people in extraordinary times. Seierstad is insistent on being 
there on the ground with the people. In the last chapter, I cited Martha Gellhorn‘s belief 
that the job of investigative journalism is to ‗report from the ground up, not the other way 
round.‘
479
 Seierstad‘s style of journalism is similar, ‗I want to talk to people, find out how 
they live.‘
480
 Like a personal mantra, she repeats this phrase throughout her reflective 
books about reporting from Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. Before I focus on 
Seierstad‘s experience in Baghdad, I briefly consider her motivation to ‗find out how they 
live‘ during wars in Serbia and in Afghanistan. 
Seierstad claims that her motivation for writing With Their Backs to the World: 
Portraits from Serbia was a corrective to the criticism that coverage of the spring 1999 
war in Kosovo lacked a Serbian perspective. Seierstad had been a part of that single-sided 
Kosovo coverage in her reportage for the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, NRK. 
She offers this book as a corrective, a chance for Serbs to tell their story. During the 
winter and spring of 2000, Seierstad lived in Belgrade and interviewed thirteen 
individuals from Serbia and one family of Serbian refugees who fled from Kosovo. She 
left Serbia in the summer and the book was published by September. One of her 
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interviewees, Snezana, thanked Seierstad for writing about Serbia when Serbia was 
‗world enemy number one‘.
481
 Seierstad updated the stories for two subsequent 
publications. The second edition was published in 2001 following the arrest of Slobodan 
Milosevic, and the third edition was published in 2004 as a follow-up to life three years 
after the end of the Milosevic era. In Portraits from Serbia, Seierstad wanted to hear the 
voice of the everyday people in Serbia. She spent time just hanging out with the people 
she chose to interview, going to a baptism or making sausages, and allowed these people 
to freely speak and be heard. She explains her motivation for the 2004 edition, ‗I had 
turned my attention to other wars in other hemispheres, leaving Serbia to stumble and 




This style Seierstad experimented with in Serbia, befriending and often living 
with her interviewees and then publishing the stories, became a format that she repeated 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. I primarily focus my attention on how she heard the 
voices on the ground in Iraq throughout this section, but the motif is evident in her other 
writing. In the foreword to The Bookseller of Kabul, she writes that after six weeks 
accompanying and reporting on the Northern Alliance for Scandinavian media 
organisations, ‗weeks of gunpowder and gravel, where the conversations concerned 
military tactics and advances‘, she enjoyed conversations with a bookseller in Kabul.
483
 
She wanted to talk with the ‗real‘ people of Afghanistan. At the end of this section, I will 
return to Seierstad‘s The Bookseller of Kabul in connection with the issue of contested 
testimony. For now, it is important to realise that when she left for Baghdad in January 
2003, The Bookseller of Kabul had only been available in Norwegian since September 
2002 and was not yet available in an English translation. While Seierstad was in Baghdad 
she had not yet achieved the international acclaim and criticism that has come with the 
publication of The Bookseller of Kabul. 
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I began this section claiming that Seierstad was a rooftop journalist in Baghdad. 
In the last chapter (4.2.2), I discussed how parachute journalism is closely associated with 
rooftop journalism. News media agencies ‗parachute‘ their star reporters into the thick of 
things to provide spectacular coverage. In January 2003, Seierstad was not considered a 
star reporter and she was not a regular employee of any news media agency. She 
primarily works as a freelance foreign correspondent. In my discussion on John Simpson, 
I emphasised how risky Simpson‘s decision was to enter Iraq as a unilateral reporter, that 
is, not as an embed of the coalition troops, but he was accompanied by a BBC production 
crew and the crew was supported by the institution of the BBC. As a freelance journalist, 
Seierstad was on her own. She did not have the backing of a news organisation to obtain 
a visa for her entry into Iraq. She managed to obtain a visa through connections with a 
friend working with Norwegian Church Aid in Iraq.
484
 She had to supply her own safety 
equipment like a gasmask and bulletproof jacket. Seierstad reflected on her lack of 
preparedness compared to other foreign correspondents: 
I am probably the only journalist in Baghdad who has not attended a 
survival course. There they learnt how to don a gasmask and slip on safety 
clothing in a flash, how to measure the air‘s gas content, how to fall down 
during a possible attack, how to evaluate dangerous situations. Most 
editors would not send their journalists into crisis zones without such a 
course, but no one has sent me; I sent myself.
485
 
 In A Hundred and One Days: Fear and Friendship in the Heart of a War Zone, 
Seierstad reflects on the challenges of actually hearing the real voices of the Iraqi people. 
Broadly, the two main challenges were circumventing Iraqi government censorship and 
trying to stay alive while reporting from the center of a bombing campaign. Seierstad 
filed reports from Baghdad between January 2003 and April 2003, with an intervening 
two weeks in February spent in Syria where she eventually obtained a visa renewal. 
Seierstad experienced both official censorship and self-censorship. She primarily 
experienced official censorship through the watchfulness of her Iraqi government-
assigned ‗minder‘. As we saw with Simpson‘s experience, given the language and 
cultural differences in Iraq most Western journalists were reliant on local fixers. In 
Baghdad in order to receive a press visa, Seierstad was assigned an official fixer or 
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minder. Takhlef was Seierstad‘s official minder, interpreter and monitor from the Baath 
Party. She found him at odds with her purposes: ‗I am here to find dissidents, a secret 
uprising, gagged intellectuals, rights violations, expose oppression.‘
486
 Instead, Takhlef 
identified interviewees from Baath Party representative families, and he escorted 
Seierstad only to official sites ‗approved by the Ministry of Information.‘
487
 Seierstad 
managed to get a new minder, Aliya. While Aliya was not a member of the Baath Party, 
she was still not willing to go outside of the government‘s regulations. ‗It is her job to 
report on where we have been, with whom we have spoken and what we have spoken 
about.‘
488
 Seierstad found that when her minders were briefly away, Iraqi citizens would 
speak soft enigmatic statements in English: ‗They don‘t say what they really mean. No 
one can say what they really think.‘
489




Under the restrictions of the government, Seierstad found it difficult to get the 
kinds of stories she wanted to tell. Her editor in Norway wanted a long feature article for 
the weekend. Seierstad reflected on the tensions of trying to report from such a restricted 
zone. ‗It‘s hard to work. It‘s hard to find stories. As the limits are so strict, good ideas, 
ideas that could be carried through, are few and far between.‘
491
 The tension came from 
both Iraqi government restrictions and from self-censoring in order to retain her visa. She 
eventually submitted a story about what life was like under sanctions for those who thrive 
in a black market economy and for those who barely manage to scrape by like the woman 
who was forced to sell her UN soap ration. Seierstad‘s story of ordinary Iraqis is not 
unlike the stories she filed of ordinary Serbians. 
In A Hundred and One Days, Seierstad is free to describe the details of 
interviewing an Iraqi who was critical of the Baath Party, but when she originally filed 
the story she censored many of the important details for the protection of her source. She 
interviewed Father Albert a priest at St. Joseph, a Chaldean Catholic church in Baghdad. 
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Seierstad had slipped away from her minder and was able to interview the priest in 
French. The priest spoke critically of Saddam Hussein. Seierstad asked Father Albert 
‗repeatedly whether I really might write down what he has said, which he confirms.‘
492
 
She included most of what Father Albert said in the article she filed that afternoon, but 
she took precautions.  
I call the priest something else and do not mention Tariq Aziz by name 
[the Deputy Prime Minister who is Chaldean Christian and a friend of the 
priest]. I describe him as ‗one of Saddam Hussein‘s closest collaborators‘. 
That the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister is busy preparing a hideaway 
for the aftermath of the war could be dangerous if it were known.
493
  
Even after the bombing began, the Iraqi government still censored the foreign 
press. Journalists were banned from having satellite telephones in their rooms. If 
journalists were found with satellite phones, the phones were confiscated and the 
journalist‘s visa revoked. Seierstad found a way around this censorship. She kept her 
satellite phone and continued to give live reports to the ever-growing number of news 
agencies paying for her freelance coverage from Baghdad. Seierstad circumvented the 
Iraqi guards by appealing to their sense of modesty toward women: 
When talking on the phone I turn the shower on full, undress and wind a 
towel around me. If anyone knocks on the door I call out: Who is it? If it is 
the guards I pour some water over myself, open the door a crack and ask 
them to wait while I get dressed. That gives me time to hide the satellite 
telephone and the antenna.
494
  
During the bombing, Seierstad found another opportunity to circumvent official Baath 
Party minders. She simply spoke Norwegian. Minders‘ linguistic training did not include 
Norwegian. Minders stood next to all foreign journalists to prohibit ‗words such as 
―dictator‖, ―tyrant‖ or ―brutal‖ to characterise Saddam Hussein, or to pinpoint targets that 
have been hit. [Journalists] can be no more specific than ―a large building, close by‖.‘
495
 
While bearing witness to the voice of the people in Iraq was a challenge, Seierstad found 
ways to gather stories and to get those stories to a wider audience. 
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 The second main challenge Seierstad faced in Baghdad was physical danger. As a 
freelancer, she was able to take more risks. Many foreign news agencies forced 
evacuation of their news teams from Baghdad. The editors who Seierstad did freelance 
work for could not force her to leave. Weeks before the bombing began, Seierstad‘s visa 
expired and she was sent out of the country. While waiting at the Iraqi Embassy in 
Amman, Jordan Seierstad met an exodus of foreign journalists. Journalists from ‗leading 
British and American newspapers‘ told her, ‗You should go [home] too‘.
496
 Her editor in 
Norway, her mother, father, sister and brother all wrote to ask her to leave. Her visa was 
renewed and Seierstad decided to return to Baghdad. 
 Most of the foreign journalists still in Baghdad stayed at the Palestine Hotel. At 
the Palestine, Seierstad received advice from the more veteran journalists. She gathered 
supplies for her room and taped her windows to prevent glass from shattering after a 
bomb blast. Her equipment for filing stories consisted of little more than her satellite 
phone and laptop computer. Compare this with the Channel Four‘s equipment: 
computers, several satellite telephones, editing equipment, generators, and three satellite 




 As I discussed in the last chapter (4.2.2), rooftop journalism from the Palestine 
Hotel was characterised by the spectacle of live coverage where the ‗war reporter as a 
human figure … is as concerned about being live as about staying alive.‘
498
 Seierstad 
experienced this first hand. At 5:30 a.m. on 19 March the shock and awe bombing 
campaign began. She reflects that all the journalists piled out onto their balconies to 
transmit live feed to their home studios. ‗From the balconies above I hear a Babelesque 
confusion of voices – Spanish, Arabic, English, French.‘
499
 Seierstad called NRK, the 
Norwegian public service channel. She reflects that all she could do was focus ‗on the 
horizon and describe what I see.‘
500
 She had no other information apart from the fact that 
the bombing startled her from her bed and what she could see out her window. Seierstad 
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is self-reflective about those opening days; her reporting was more about the spectacle 
out of her window than in-depth analysis. The NRK radio host asked her if she knew if 
‗Saddam Hussein might have been killed‘. In her memoir she writes: ‗How the hell 
would I know? I think. But choose to say: So far we have no information as to whether 
the Iraqi president has been hit in the attack.‘
501
 A few nights later, again from her room, 
she reports on the coalition bombing of the Presidential Palace. She called it perfect 
timing for the live News Night broadcast in Norway. The palace was in flames and there 
were continual explosions. She writes: 
I report what I see. The bangs are audible in the studio via the telephone 
receiver. Some of them cause the enormous concrete hotel to shake and the 
windows to vibrate. A crash, I speak, another crash, I continue to speak, 




Seierstad became a valuable freelance news source for many news agencies as so 
many reporters were made to evacuate. Over the first three weeks of bombing her 
workload increased: ‗I report for Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish and Dutch TV, as 
well as several radio stations. Occasionally, I work for BBC World and CBC in 
Canada,‘
503
 Her employers began booking ten minute slots, at the cost of ‗thousands of 
pounds‘, for her to use the ‗live point‘ set up by news agencies like Reuters and AP, 
where they provide cameras and satellite connections.
504
 Once the coalition forces arrived 
in Iraq, Seierstad found that she could venture into the city and that people would speak 
more freely since they no longer feared Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. In her final 
month in Baghdad she reported on the new freedom to criticize the Hussein era, she 
reported on the death and devastation resulting from the bombing campaign, and she 
reported on the latent tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. 
 Seierstad became a valuable witness in Baghdad because so many other witnesses 
for the foreign press were forced to leave. Her credibility, in part, came from her ‗live‘ 
presence. In this thesis, I have argued that presence contributes to the authority and 
credibility found in bearing witness. In her books on Serbia and Baghdad, Seierstad 
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intertwines reports from the field with the narrative of how she went about gathering the 
stories in the first place. In both books, there is a clear sense that she is the narrator, and 
when she writes of thoughts and impressions they are her thoughts and impressions. 
When she does report the thoughts and feelings of other people, her report is clearly 
based on interviewing these people. She cites them as the sources that provided her with 
the information. In her books on Serbia and Belgrade, Seierstad‘s presence, actually 
being there on-the-scene, is central to the narrative. Yet, controversy follows Seierstad‘s 
testimony. Her testimony is contested based on her internationally best-seller, non-fiction 
novel The Bookseller of Kabul. 
Seierstad is criticised for removing her presence from the narrative; she literally 
wrote herself out of the story. While Seierstad is an investigative journalist, we need to 
ask:  Is The Bookseller of Kabul investigative journalism? Seierstad arrived as a journalist 
in Afghanistan in September 2001. As I noted earlier, after months of frontline reporting 
on military tactics she wanted to have conversations with the ‗real‘ people of 
Afghanistan. The centre of the controversy regarding The Bookseller of Kabul is her 
decision to write a book in the hybrid style of literary form and investigative journalism. 
The controversy began when Mohammed Shah Rais read an English translation of 
The Bookseller of Kabul and received many requests for interviews from international 
journalists. In the book, Seirstad gives Rais the alias of Sultan Khan, but there was little 
anonymity for the Rais family, one of only a few bookstore owners in Kabul. Had 
Seierstad known that her first novel would become Norway‘s top selling nonfiction book 
in history and translated into twenty-six languages, she may have taken more precaution 
in what she wrote about Rais and his family. Seierstad writes of gender relations in 
Afghanistan. She claims in the foreword that one of her reasons to write on the Rais 
family was in order to reveal the experience of the silent women. Rais had invited 
Seierstad to his home for dinner, she wrote of her first impression: 
Sultan recounted stories; the sons laughed and joked. The atmosphere was 
unrestrained, … But I soon noticed that the women said little. Sultan‘s 
beautiful teenage wife sat quietly by the door with a baby in her arms. His 
first wife was not present that evening. The other women answered 
questions put to them and accepted praise about the meal but never 
initiated any conversation. When I left I said to myself: ‗This is 
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Rais went to Norway and threatened Seierstad and her publishers with a 
defamation and libel lawsuit. He was particularly ‗incensed by her suggestions that his 
daughters had premarital sexual relations—an allegation which, if it became known, 
would jeopardize their marriages and threaten their lives.‘
506
 According to anthropologist 
Knut Christian Myhre, many of Norway‘s anthropologists became interested in the 
debate. He writes that their concerns focused on ‗social and political repercussions texts 
may have when they ―make it back‖ to the context of study,‘ as Seierstad‘s book did 
make its way back to Kabul.
507
 This is a concern that many investigative journalists 
consider: How do I protect my sources? What Myhre found lacking in much of the public 
debate was a critique based on post-colonial concerns.  
No one raised the question of whether Seierstad‘s representation of ‗the 
Afghans‘ as a totalitarian-minded people hell-bent on subjugating women 
provided a rationalization for Norwegian participation in a Western neo-
colonial project in the Middle East.
508
 
Myhre questioned Seierstad‘s project because she began with the intention of telling the 
‗real‘ story of the oppressed lives of women in Afghanistan. Others defended Seierstad‘s 
position as a journalist‘s right and a mission to reveal injustices. For example, book 
reviewer Carol Bere acknowledges the suspect journalistic methods in The Bookseller of 
Kabul, but argues that revealing the abuse of women trumps the other concerns: 
Whether fiction, nonfiction, or so-called immersion journalism, 
provocative works like The Bookseller of Kabul add to the growing body 
of literature that explores the situation of Afghan women from historical, 
social, and cultural perspectives. Women‘s rights to freedom, to personal 
choices—whether in work or in marriage—and to education in a country 
where the literacy rates for women are marginal, are certainly the subtext, 
indeed the implicit argument of The Bookseller of Kabul.
509
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 In her role as the proxy voice for the voiceless, Seierstad has an amplified voice 
largely through the celebrity she has achieved with The Bookseller of Kabul. Yet, 
following the controversy her testimony is at times considered suspect. In 2008 Christina 
Lamb, a reporter for the Sunday Times of London, asked Seierstad about her 
controversial journalistic practices, ‗she replied evasively that she had never expected the 
book to do so well.‘
510
 In Lamb‘s review of Seierstad‘s latest book on Chechnya, The 
Angel of Grozny: Orphans of a Forgotten War, Lamb found herself suspicious ‗about the 
line between reportage and imagination‘ in Seierstad‘s writing.
511
 In the books following 
The Bookseller of Kabul, Seierstad‘s presence is firmly established. In her reports from 
Baghdad, Seierstad is careful to identify when her minder provides translation or when 
she interviews people on their own. As we saw in her interview with Father Albert, the 
Chaldean Catholic priest, Seierstad noted the language they spoke, that the translator was 
not there, and she described how she filed the story in order to protect the safety of 
several people.  
 Both Simpson and Seierstad have faced the perilous dangers involved in bearing 
witness to war in Iraq. Through their stories we can begin to understand the mortal 
danger journalists face as well as the danger the local minders and sources face. 
Journalistic testimony authenticated through presence is tied to the theological 
understanding of witness. As I discussed in chapter one under the title ‗The Fragility of 
Witness‘ (1.3.2.2), the New Testament Greek word for witness is martur. Because 
bearing witness involves the physical risk of being there, the phrase ‗bearing witness‘ 
remains inextricably linked to martyrdom. Yet, the fragility of witness experienced in 
frontline journalism is not only the physical risk, there is also emotional risk involved in 
bearing witness to atrocities. War correspondent Ernie Pyle wrote in 1954 near the end of 
his life, ‗I’ve been immersed in it too long. My spirit is wobbly and my mind is confused. 
The hurt has become too great.‘
512
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Anthony Feinstein, a psychiatrist who focuses on post-traumatic stress syndrome 
(PTSD), conducted in-depth interviews with over one hundred war journalists and over 
one hundred journalists who did not report on war, he concluded: 
War journalists have significantly more psychiatric difficulties than 
journalists who do not report on war. In particular, the lifetime prevalence 
of PTSD is similar to rates reported for combat veterans, while the rate of 
major depression exceeds that of the general population.
513
 
Given the many risks of getting the story wrong and getting hurt in the process, why do 
they do it? The third journalist on whom I focus allows us to explore the idea of bearing 
witness to crimes against humanity and the difficult decisions that journalists face when 
bearing witness to genocide.  
5.3  Fergal Keane 
In this section, I consider the work of another well-known BBC correspondent, 
Fergal Keane, in order to reflect upon the difficulties inherent in bearing witness to 
crimes against humanity. This is by no means a new practice. It is hard not to be haunted 
by Richard Dimbleby‘s 1945 radio report of what he saw at the Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp, or John Pilger‘s photographic record of the Khmer Rouge‘s killing 
camps in Cambodia in 1979, or John Sweeney‘s exposing of the massacre by Bosnian 
Serbs of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. Keane‘s award-winning reports in 
the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide stand within this tradition of journalists who 
have borne witness to genocidal crimes against humanity.
514
  
In the last chapter, I discussed some of the challenges encountered by Western 
journalists who report on genocide and who choose to testify in international criminal 
tribunals. I suggested that all reporters are engaged as active witnesses even when they 
are just reporting the facts. I cited Keane as an admittedly engaged frontline reporter in 
some of the stories he covers. As I previously noted, Keane himself writes that his 
practice of investigative journalism is motivated by a human rights agenda, the ‗concept 
of international justice‘ and the belief that, ‗the weak need protecting; the powerful need 
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 Through Keane‘s lived experience of reporting on the Rwandan 
genocide, we can see how some stories challenge the strongly held principle of reporter 
impartiality. 
 Keane claimed that if he was to bear witness, what else could he do but record 
what he has seen. He wrote, ‗This is especially true of Africa, where a journalism of 
passion and involvement is essential. We must not report countries like Rwanda as if they 
were demented theme parks, peopled by savages doomed to slaughter each other in 
perpetuity.‘
516
 Keane saw much reporting on Africa reduced down to an explanation of 
the ‗old bogey of tribalism‘ and ignoring the ‗fact that [Rwanda] was an act of 
systematically planned mass murder, a final solution of monstrous proportions‘.
517
 He 
reflected that his reporting would probably do little, but he was convinced that he must 
testify to what he saw: 
To witness genocide is to feel not only the chill of your own mortality, but 
the degradation of all humanity. I am not worried if this sounds like a 
sermon. I do not care if there are those who dismiss it as emotional and 
simplistic. It is the fruit of witness. Our trade may be full of imperfections 




These are Keane‘s reflections from October 1995 just after filming for Panaroma a story 
on the Rwandan genocide, eight years before he testified at the criminal tribunal. While 
the decision of journalists to testify at criminal tribunals is controversial, we can see that 
Keane was already committed to testifying, journalistically or otherwise, to the fact that 
what happened in Rwanda was ‗an act of systematically planned mass murder‘. 
Keane, as the BBC Africa Correspondent, was covering South Africa‘s first 
multi-racial elections when his editors sent him to investigate the stories of atrocities in 
Rwanda following the assassination of President Habyarimana on 6
th
 April 1994. Before 
then Keane was covering the turbulent run up to Mandela‘s election as South Africa‘s 
                                                 
515
 Keane, All of These People: A Memoir, 365. The title of Keane‘s memoir, All of these People, is after a 
poem by Michael Longley. Keane felt Ulster writer Longley was, ―one of the most sensitive chroniclers of 
the pain caused by the Troubles. It is his tribute to those who have inspired him; I carry a little photocopy 
of this poem wherever I travel in the world. All of these people,/ alive or dead,/ are civilized.‖ (xv) 
516





 Ibid., 163. 
 170 
first post-apartheid president. He had seen suffering, but what he witnessed in Rwanda 
had a profound impact upon him. Keane saw limits in the wars he had covered before 
Rwanda; he felt the atrocities committed in Rwanda had no limits. He did not feel 
journalistically prepared for what was required of him in order to cover such a story. In 
the following discussion I consider not his memorable reports for BBC News and 
Panorama,
519
 but his controversial decision to testify at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Keane‘s decision raises ethical questions about the 
responsibility of a journalist to bear witness to what he or she has seen in a legal context. 
Keane‘s own story provides two contrasting cases of what journalistic testimony might 




In the first case, Keane was first a witness for the defence. Keane and his BBC 
television news team produced a story about the Hutu Mayor of Butare, Sylvain 
Nsabimana. The Mayor organized a convoy to remove Tutsi orphans out of Butare and to 
safety in Burundi.
521
 When Nsabimana was arrested by the ICTR and charged with 
genocide, Nsabimana‘s lawyer asked Keane to testify on behalf of the man being charged 
with crimes against humanity. Keane had since read of the atrocities Nsabimana was 
accused of committing; nonetheless, Keane chose to testify in the war crimes court as to 
the good act he witnessed. Keane‘s testimony at the ICTR testified to the veracity of the 
story he filed. He explains his position thus:  
We could only report what we saw him doing. … I had seen Nsabimana do 
something that was ostensibly good. But I now knew about the 
circumstances in which he had taken power and I had read human rights 
reports which alleged he was an active participant in the slaughter of local 
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Tutsis. Because I believe in the principles of international justice, and 
because the right to a fair defense should be an integral part of that system, 
I said I was willing to appear.
522
  
In the second case, Keane was a witness for the prosecution. It is illuminating to 
place this brief first account alongside Keane‘s decision to testify at the ICTR in the case 
against a second Hutu mayor, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi. Gacumbitsi was Mayor of 
Nyarubuye a town near the Tanzanian border. For Keane Gacumbitsi ‗would become a 
key figure in my Rwandan story, someone who would follow me past the borders of 
place and time, a sinister presence which frightened and angered me, and which I would 
one day have to return and confront.‘
523
 In the chain of command, there may have been 
others more senior than Mayor Gacumbitsi who instigated the systematic killing of the 
Tutsi population, but according to Keane for the victims of his district, it was the arrest 
and conviction of their mayor that approximated anything near justice.  
 Keane put together the story of what happened in Nyarubuye based on his 
interviews with many eyewitnesses. Mayor Gacumbitsi instructed the Tutsi people of his 
district to stay where they were and they would be safe. Days later he instructed them to 
gather at the local, Nyarubuye Catholic Church and school compound for a safe refuge. 
On 15 April, Gacumbitsi ordered ‗as many as 7,000 men‘, the local military and police 
officers as well as the Hutu men from the district, to attack the church. Many of them 
‗covered their faces with banana leaves, hiding their faces from their neighbours they 
were about to attack.‘
524
  
[Gacumbitsi] gave orders to the police to open fire. ... Grenades were 
exploded among the densely packed crowd of Tutsis, splashing blood and 
flesh onto the walls. All of the survivors remember the terrible noise – the 
crashing of automatic rifle fire, the explosions, people screaming, babies 
dropped by their mothers howling. This went on for about twenty minutes. 
… Then the order was given for the Hutu peasants to move in and kill. 
There were many Tutsis still alive, and Gacumbitsi and his cohorts wanted 
as many Hutus as possible to be complicit in the killing. It was the work of 
true Hutu patriots. That is what the architects of genocide called it: work. 
… they hacked, slashed and bludgeoned their neighbours to death.
525
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A few survived the onslaught. Keane focused on one of them: Valentina Iziribagwaya. 
She was still alive and pulled out of the church with other remaining survivors. 
Gacumbitsi ordered the survivors to be killed. Valentina remembered, ‗He said they 
should kill us as they would kill a snake by hitting it on the head.‘
526
 Two of Valentina‘s 
schoolmates were ordered to kill her; she pleaded with them by name to have mercy on 
her. They hit her on the shoulder with a club and then smashed her fingers into the 
ground and finally slashed her on the head with a machete knocking her unconscious. 
They left her for dead. Valentina regained consciousness and survived for thirty days 
among the dead. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers eventually found her and 
brought her to a clinic where Keane first met her. 
Keane was not in Rwanda when Gacumbitsi gathered the Tutsis of his district into 
the churchyard and then had them slaughtered. According to Gérard Prunier, the genocide 
claimed an estimated 640,000 people ‗in about six weeks between the second week of 
April and the third week of May.‘
527
 Another 160,000 would be killed in the succeeding 
weeks. Up until mid-May Keane had been in South Africa reporting on the elections. His 
narrative coverage of what happened in the Rwandan town of Nyarubuye is pieced 
together from the multiple sources of Tutsi survivor testimony, Hutu farmers who 
observed from the hillsides, and his own visit to the churchyard weeks after the atrocities 
to witness for himself the decaying bodies in the tropical heat. 
Sylvestre Gacumbitsi did not become a ‗key figure in [Keane‘s] Rwandan 
story‘
528
 because Keane was an eyewitness to the slaughter of Tutsis in the churchyard; 
rather Keane was an eyewitness to the suffering caused by Gacumbitsi. He was witness to 
the aftermath. Gacumbitsi was the name Keane heard again and again in his interviews 
with survivors at the clinic where he met Valentina. Upon hearing the survivor testimony, 
Keane and the BBC television crew went to Nyarubuye to see the churchyard. The 
reporter needed to corroborate survivor testimony with physical evidence. The RPF 
escorted the news team to the village. The suffering of those Keane interviewed and the 
churchyard of corpses he witnessed gave impetus to a somewhat audacious plan. Keane 
                                                 
526
 Ibid., 321. 
527
 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 261. Estimates range form half-a-million to one 
million victims. In his discussion of ‗How many were killed?‘ Prunier makes a strong case for their being 
about 850,000 victims. 
528
 Keane, All of These People: A Memoir, 318. 
 173 
admits that it was his feeling of rage at what he saw that inspired him and his BBC crew 
to go after Gacumbitsi: 
I could never feel what the survivors felt about him; his role in their lives 
had been catastrophic, while I had been simply a witness. But I knew that 
if we could find him there was a chance of some justice for Valentina, and 
the murdered thousands of Nyarubuye. What we were seeing in Rwanda 
inspired rage. It would be wrong to say we felt a responsibility towards the 
dead. That is too neatly defined a way of putting it. … But here there was 
a chance to use our journalism to hold a killer to account. By that time we 
also knew that the country had been abandoned by the international 
community. The extremists knew this too. Wherever Gacumbitsi was 
hiding he would not be expecting a visit from a BBC television crew.
529
  
Keane heard that Gacumbitsi had fled to the refugee camp at Benaco in Tanzania. 
There were an estimated quarter of a million refugees in the Benaco camp. Gacumbitsi 
had managed to obtain a ‗community leader‘ role in the international camp and was in 
charge of distributing food to the refugees who had fled his district. In reflecting upon 
actually confronting Gacumbitsi face to face, Keane writes that he felt ‗a great deal of 
fear and boiling anger.‘ In an effort to apply the journalistic principle of objectivity, 
Keane knew his ‗questions could be firm,‘ but he could not lose his temper.
530
 
Gacumbitsi responded coolly, denied everything, and suggested that Tutsis would indeed 
come up with such a story. Five years later, Keane faced Gacumbitsi again, this time at 
the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The evidence UN 
prosecutors wanted from Keane included the video footage of the aftermath of the 
massacre and his interview with Gacumbitsi, ‗our documentary had been influential in 
making sure that Gacumbitsi was placed on the priority list for arrest by the International 
Tribunal.‘
531
 The recorded documentary and interviews were not sufficient for evidence, 
Keane‘s physical presence was necessary as an eyewitness to verify the footage. 
Keane‘s testimony was contested. The defence lawyer tried to prove that Keane‘s 
footage was propaganda from the Tutsis of the RPF given the fact that Keane and his 
crew were escorted to the massacre site by the opposition force.
532
 This was not an 
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unusual charge by the defence teams of people charged with crimes against humanity. At 
both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the 
ICTR this charge was used when Western journalists were escorted to massacre sites. The 
defence lawyer argued that the RPF staged the event at the churchyard for publicity and 
as an attempt to draw in the international community. A year after Keane testified at the 
ICTR, ‗Gacumbitsi was convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and rape and 
sentenced to thirty years‘ imprisonment.‘
533
 
In the last chapter (4.4.1), I discussed the debate surrounding the issue of 
journalists who choose to testify at international war crimes tribunal. Before he was asked 
to testify at the ICTR, Keane was determined to report to the world that what happened in 
Rwanda was ‗an act of systematically planned mass murder‘.
534
 His conviction of this 
fact was based on the results of his investigative journalism. Keane walked through the 
churchyard filled with decaying bodies, he interviewed survivors with wounds still 
festering, while he is not an eyewitness to the mass murder at the church, he is a witness 
to the immediate aftermath and he is a witness for the eyewitnesses. Keane spent the time 
interviewing many and varied sources. He followed the line of eyewitness testimony to 
reveal the role of Mayor Gacumbitsi in the systematic killing of the Tutsi population in 
his district. When the ICTR requested that Keane testify, Keane had the ‗journalist‘s right 
to refuse to testify‘.
535
 As we have seen, Keane did not refuse to testify. The opportunity 
to testify at the ICTR provided one more opportunity to bear witness to the genocide of 
the Tutsi population in Mayor Gacumbitsi‘s district. Keane‘s decision to testify at the 
ICTR is not a typical result of his investigative journalistic practice, but in this situation 
he found that ‗the journalism of objective assessment and rational comparisons meant 
nothing‘ when set ‗against the vastness of the evil of genocide.‘
536
 Keane‘s Rwandan 
story illustrates journalism motivated by compassion and moral judgment where the 
institutional principles of impartiality and neutrality would result in false witness.  
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5.4 An Analysis of Journalists Bearing Witness in the light of Yoder’s Work 
In the last chapter, I discussed parallel practices of bearing witness found in 
Christian witness and in journalistic witness. I showed how John Howard Yoder‘s work 
on the moral agency involved in the Christian practice of bearing witness could help us 
understand moral agency involved in the practice of investigative journalism. The two 
main parallels I explored were the practice of holding those in power to account and the 
claim that presence, or being there, is a way to authenticate truth claims.  
Through the investigative journalistic practices of John Simpson, Ǻsne Seierstad, 
and Fergal Keane, we have seen the difficulties involved in holding power to account. 
Simpson worked hard to retain autonomy in order to avoid becoming a mouth-piece for 
the U.S.-led coalition forces. Seierstad had to find ways around the Iraqi government‘s 
restrictions of topics and people on whom she could report. Keane made the difficult 
decision to testify beyond the typical practice of journalism in order to hold Mayor 
Gacumbitsi to account. The lived experience of these three journalists illustrates that the 
ethical act of holding power to account is performed differently according to the situation 
in which they find themselves. What was common among the three journalists was their 
conviction that not to bear witness to the situation, or failure to bear witness, was 
tantamount to false witness. 
In the last chapter, I investigated the claim that presence is a way to authenticate 
truth claims. This is particularly the case when journalists are acting as witnesses for the 
witnesses. That is, they are acting as the proxy voice for the voiceless. Moral philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that a key role in communities is the proxy, ‗someone who 
acts as a proxy for … those who will only have a voice …, if someone else speaks for 
them.‘
537
 In the community of global compassion, the role of proxy voice for the 
voiceless often begins with the frontline correspondent. MacIntyre argues that the only 
people capable of systematically speaking for those unable to speak are ‗friends‘. A 
journalist has the ability to speak systematically for others, ‗that is, to assert, to question 
and to prescribe in the light of the other‘s conception of … good.‘
 538
 We have seen 
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through the journalistic practices of Simpson, Seierstad, and Keane how they came to 
befriend people who had experienced unfathomable suffering. All three journalists 
provide accounts of friendships with specific people either in Iraq, Serbia or Rwanda. 
They cite these relationships as motivating factors in their practice of investigative 
journalism. 
MacIntyre pairs the ability to be a proxy, a friend who speaks for those unable to 
speak, with the virtue of truthfulness. Truthfulness includes the duty of justice for the one 
being represented as not to be truthful is an ‗act of injustice that deprives the other of 
what we owe to her or him.‘
539
 As Martha Gellhorn reflected, the value of investigative 
journalism is ‗the act of keeping the record straight‘
540
 the practice of working toward the 
truthful representation of other people‘s experience. Frontline correspondents‘ presence 
on the scene of war, genocide, or some other devastating situation, will not necessarily 
stop injustice but their presence may somehow render the situation different. Journalism 
scholars Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer explore this idea, ‗Being there suggests that the 
violence, devastation, suffering, and death that inevitably constitute war‘s underside will 
somehow be rendered different—more amenable to response and perhaps less likely to 
recur—just because journalists are somewhere nearby.‘
 541
  
The concept that a journalist‘s presence may somehow render the situation 
different, can be illuminated by what John Howard Yoder calls the ‗efficacy of a sign‘ or 
the efficacy of presence.
542
 Yoder argues that just being there, being present is an 
effective form of engagement. Presence, not results, is how to judge the efficacy and 
value of an ethical practice. How does this help us evaluate journalistic practices? When 
Allan and Zelizer suggest that the injustices of war ‗will somehow be rendered different‘ 
because of the presence of a journalist,
543
 does this mean that a journalist‘s reportage led 
to a ceasefire? Yoder gives us the opportunity to speak about the faithful presence of 
journalists without having to measure the efficacy of journalists‘ reportage as a result of 
international military intervention, humanitarian aid, or even the prevention of genocide. 
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In the previous chapter, I discussed ‗do something journalism‘ (section 4.4.4). Journalism 
that bears witness should not be quickly categorised as ‗do something journalism‘. The 
telos of journalism should not be coercing powers into action; rather the telos should be 
what Gellhorn called the ‗maintenance of trust‘ between the journalist and those whom 
the journalist represents: the public and the victims. If the telos of journalism is the 
maintenance of trust, we can measure Simpson, Seierstad, and Keane‘s performances 
with these primary questions: Did they provide a truthful account for the public?  Did 
they provide a truthful account for the victim? These secondary questions might follow: 
Did their journalism motivate the public to act? Did their journalism result in the 
alleviation of suffering?  
 Yoder‘s interest in bearing witness as a way of doing social ethics brings his 
pacifist concerns to the fore. He is interested in identifying the least coercive way of 
doing ethics. An ethic focused on results, such as utilitarianism or even an ethic of ‗do 
something‘ journalism, is a method focused on the ends. Bearing witness is a method 
focused on the means. Yoder argues that it is a less coercive way to make truth claims 
because bearing witness is a practice contingent on the vulnerability of the witness. 
Having foreign correspondents bearing witness involves the journalist being there and the 
risks associated with being there in extraordinary times of volatility, danger and suffering 
regardless of the results. The hope, as well as the belief and conviction, is that the 
presence of a journalist will somehow render the situation differently. As Yoder claims, 
the ‗efficacy of a sign‘, which might be the presence of a journalist, is first its 
effectiveness as a ‗sign of hope‘.
544
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Thesis Conclusion 
 In the opening paragraph of this thesis, I asked: How do witness bearers 
authenticate their truth claims? I claimed that I was primarily interested in a project of 
comparative ethics and issues of translatable ethics from one field to another were of 
secondary interest. John Howard Yoder has proved an illuminating conversation partner 
for this project. His constructive theology of witness as Christian social ethics was a 
particularly helpful way to investigate the comparative moral agency involved in the 
media practice of bearing witness to human suffering. From specific practices such as 
‗agents of linguistic self-consciousness‘ to the overarching concept of the 
‗phenomenology of social witness‘, Yoder‘s theological and ethical category of witness 
served as an effective and insightful analytical lens through which to view the media 
practice of bearing witness. Following the summary of chapters, I outline how my thesis 
research contributes to Media Studies and Christian Theology. 
Summary 
In chapter one I demonstrated that Yoder‘s work on witness can be understood as 
Christian social ethics because witnessing is the act of embodying practices central to the 
Christian message. Yoder argues that witness is a non-coercive form of social ethics. 
Witness is a method of ethics in which the witness bearers are not responsible for 
determining whether or not their message was effective; they are responsible for the 
truthfulness of their message. The persuasive power of witness does not lie in forced 
acceptance. The persuasive power of the witness lies in the vulnerability of embodying 
beliefs. Christian practices include the act of servanthood as well as the practice of lay 
empowerment where all members of the community contribute to the well-being of the 
community through social roles such as leadership. Yoder counted journalists among the 
leaders of communities and claimed that all leaders ought to be ‗agents of linguistic self-
consciousness‘ because they are engaged in ‗steering society with the rudder of 
language.‘
545
 I would include in Yoder‘s cautionary recommendation that journalists and 
news organisations ought also to be agents of visual culture self-consciousness, for both 
language and visual culture work as rudders in steering the public imagination. This is 
especially the case where audiences would not be likely to encounter similar situations in 
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their own lives, as for example when Western audiences watch news media coverage of 
genocide. 
Yoder argues that the Christian practice of lay empowerment publicly witnesses 
to the belief that all members of the church have empowered roles regardless of social 
position. Paul‘s metaphor, the Christian church working as a single body yet constituted 
by many, serves as more than a metaphor for empowerment. It is also a metaphor of 
mediation. Christ is communicated to the world through the church. Christ serves the 
world through the body of the church. The analogy of the Global Samaritan caring for 
mass suffering only works when these two ideas of mediation and embodiment through 
multiple communities come together. The participation of these multiple communities 
involves a long line of mediation constituting the persona ficta of the Global Samaritan 
present and bearing witness. 
 Yoder‘s concept of the ‗phenomenology of social witness‘ can help explain the 
symbolic world of the Global Samaritan cultivated by means of media practices. Yoder 
describes the social phenomenon of the existence of a people who gather together under a 
common conviction. The more a people practice their belief together, the stronger their 
notion of themselves as a polis becomes. As their identity as a people strengthens, the 
more intractable their presence becomes in the public sphere. Their presence in the public 
sphere is their social witness. Yoder‘s thought on social witness strongly parallels 
Hannah Arendt‘s tables of common cause and Jürgen Habermas‘s claim that 
communities implicitly contribute to the public sphere through the ‗programmatic 
character of their activities‘.  
In chapter two, we learn that the activities of the Global Samaritan have to do 
with providing humanitarian care for those who are suffering. The analogy of the Global 
Samaritan, based on the Christian biblical parable of the Good Samaritan found in the 
Gospel of Luke, served my argument by providing a way to discuss news reporting and 
reception of distant suffering. In the Biblical parable, a lawyer asks Jesus, ‗Who is my 
neighbour?‘ Jesus tells a story where all who are near are our neighbours and all who act 
in a neighbourly way are neighbours. Modern media technology and practices broaden 
our neighbourhoods. People suffering in far away places are brought near to us through 
the social practice of foreign news coverage of humanitarian disasters. Why are these 
people from far away places brought into the living rooms, the neighbourhoods, of the 
West? I argued that the narrative of global compassion provides a Western framework to 
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legitimise foreign news coverage after Cold War politics. This narrative is based on the 
belief that other people in need, often in distant locations, are the responsibility of the 
West. This politics of pity is narrow as it is practiced in some distant places while not in 
others, and therefore the distribution of charity is uneven. Charity received by suffering 
peoples from the West is in correlation to publicity received from the West—the more 
public attention focused on the visual display of human suffering in distant locations, the 
more likely those people will receive aid. The politics of pity and the pursuit of publicity 
are linked concepts in the study of news coverage and reception of distant human 
suffering and humanitarian intervention, or as I have called it, the narrative of global 
compassion. The analogy of the Global Samaritan illustrated how media can mobilise 
morality. Media technology and social practices can work to cultivate a global media 
sphere where the appearance of distant suffering positions audiences as witnesses. None 
who have seen or heard can pretend that they did not know. 
 Not all spectators become participants in the stories they see and hear. Those who 
choose to participate, position themselves as witnesses to injustice. They have judged that 
those suffering are not at fault. And further, spectators may judge that those suffering 
deserve justice. As I argued in chapter three, audiences alone are not directly analogous 
to the Good Samaritan. Spectators have little to no agency to respond directly to the 
human suffering that they witness on television. While audiences may witness a close-up 
shot of a baby dying of tuberculosis in a refugee camp, audiences can do nothing for that 
baby. Television spectators‘ capacity for moral agency in the stories they witness has to 
do with representing general or universal causes rather than particular causes. Spectators 
can come to participate in campaigns for the funding of tuberculosis treatments in refugee 
camps and especially in treating childhood tuberculosis. The Good Samaritan gives 
immediate care to the man near to him; there is physical proximity between the two 
because they both travel on the same road. Western audiences only visit these remote 
roads through a process of mediation. Audiences as potential participants in the narrative 
of the Global Samaritan offer general care that requires multiple layers of mediation 
before achieving the goal of relieving human suffering. Audiences may never physically 
be there to administer care. 
 Yet journalists are physically present with those who are suffering. In chapter four 
I considered key concepts of investigative journalism in relation to the claim of 
journalists bearing witness. In chapter four and five, I argued that investigative 
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journalism should not be judged simply by results but rather by the practice of providing 
truthful and faithful accounts. This is an insight I arrived at through Yoder, and it is an 
insight that contributes further to the discussion of the ethical claim of journalism that 
bears witness. Effective journalism should not be measured simply by action that might 
result from it: getting it right through honourable behaviour is also efficacious. I explored 
truthful and faithful practices through the dual roles of proxy fulfilled by frontline 
correspondents. Journalists hold those in power to account in their role as the public‘s 
eyes and ears, and in their role of being a voice for the voiceless.  
 In chapter five, we saw the challenges involved in practicing truthful and faithful 
investigative journalism through the concrete examples of John Simpson, Ǻsne Seierstad, 
and Fergal Keane. Their credibility to speak for others and their credibility to direct the 
audience‘s gaze has to do with the credibility of journalists being there, on-the-ground. 
Their witness is credible because presence serves as testimony. Presence proves to be a 
central attribute of the act of witnessing and inextricably knots witnessing to the issue of 
martyrdom. The moral agency of the Global Samaritan, the chain of intermediaries 
involved in relieving human suffering, begins by being there as a witness. Being there 
may be the on-the-scene journalist or it might be the live-quasi-presence of the audience. 
By being there, witnesses are caught up in a web of complicity. 
Contribution to Media Studies and Christian Theology 
 In this thesis I have contributed to the emerging literature on the concept of 
witnessing.  The concept of bearing witness proves rich territory for exploration in both 
the fields of Media Studies and Christian Theology. My research contributes to an 
interdisciplinary conversation by investigating how the Christian theological category of 
witness can provide an analytical tool for understanding the media practice of bearing 
witness. While I am suggesting that a Christian theological account of witness can be 
helpful for Media and Communication Studies, I am aware that a multi-directional 
witness, from media to theology and from theology to media, can happen at the same 
time. Many of the questions that cultural critics, including journalists and others in Media 
Studies, ask are similar to the questions that theologians ask. The fields share an ethical 
concern for how humans can best flourish. Journalists have brought up concerns that are 
inherently theological, such as Fergal Keane‘s reasoning for engaged reporting based on 
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the belief that ‗the weak need protecting; the powerful need to be challenged.‘
546
 As well 
as journalist and cultural critic Michael Ignatieff‘s questions of ‗when is it right to speak 
for the needs of strangers?‘ And, is it ‗possible to define what human beings need in 
order to flourish?‘
547
 While Keane and Ignatieff are not writing specifically for the 
Christian church, as Yoder argues, the church would do well when ‗we do see Jesus‘ in 
people, communities and social institutions outside of the church, to make tactical 
alliances. When God‘s grace is revealed by other sources, Yoder argues that the church 
should follow it.  
The phenomenology of witness, witness as presence, has implications at both 
practical and theoretical levels for Christian Theology and Media and Communication 
Studies. I have predominantly focused on the theoretical levels in this thesis with the 
broader goal of contributing to how the concept of ‗witness‘ might be developed into an 
analytical and ethical category for Media and Communication Studies. Yoder claims that 
simply by being, the church is a public witness. He writes, ‗just being there as an 
unprecedented social phenomenon.‘
548
 Yoder‘s phenomenology of social witness has 
implications then for other social bodies gathered around ‗tables of common cause‘ (to 
borrow Hannah Arendt‘s metaphor). Yoder and Arendt would agree that existence 
publicly testifies. Media and Communication Studies scholar Paddy Scannell in his 
forthcoming book investigates the usefulness of phenomenology to the study of witness 
in the field of Media and Communication.
549
 My research contributes to both Media and 
Theology in the area of social ethics by thinking morally about the spectatorship of 
suffering. It is a contemporary practice of the Christian church and the wider world.  
I began my investigation suspicious of the use of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. I questioned whether it is an adequate analogy for the West cast in the role of 
the Global Samaritan keeping watch over the hot spots of the world. I was suspicious that 
the Global Samaritan was voyeuristic and exploited altruism in order to continue neo-
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colonialism. My research has broadened my understanding. The risks involved in the 
narrative of global compassion remain, but new possibilities also exist. My investigation 
has revealed that the narrative of global compassion is also about maintaining and 
cultivating a social imaginary of humanitarianism, finding common cause together, and 
reassembling our body politic in new places and in new ways. Originally I was suspicious 
of the use of the parable of the Good Samaritan as a frame for Western coverage of 
foreign news. My concerns ran along the same lines as John Milbank‘s concerns that 
because the spectatorship of violence creates a subject to object relationship, that there 
was little moral agency involved in audience spectatorship.  
Yet while I was deeply concerned that spectators had little agency, I also knew 
some other experience to be true. To use a colloquial expression, it appears that people 
often ‗cut their teeth‘ on one story, only to find themselves engaged in the next similar 
story. The spectator may not have been able to offer anything to the original object of his 
or her gaze, but the experience of spectatorship was not for nothing. As J.D. Peters, Jean 
Seaton, Susan Sontag and Martha Nussbaum all argue, there is educational civic value in 
being exposed to tragedy. Several examples emerged in my thesis research confirming 
my intuition of ‗cutting teeth‘ on one issue of injustice to impassion spectators to become 
involved in the pursuit of justice. Chuck Breen, the ‗average citizen spectator‘ whom I 
discussed in chapter three, became engaged in local Michigan community organising for 
the prevention of genocide in Darfur after being moved by the story of the Rwanda 
genocide as portrayed in the film Hotel Rwanda. HBO commissioned film director Paul 
Freedman to produce a documentary on the genocide in Rwanda. After making the 
documentary, Freedman, with no outside funding at the start and at great personal 
expense, took on the task of making a documentary about the genocide in Darfur and he 
is currently working on a documentary on the under-reported war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
550
 My own experience also serves as an example. In 1999 I wrote a 
research dissertation on the humanitarian situation in southern Sudan and the work of 
Christian NGOs.
551
 That spring after submitting the dissertation, I went to Kosovo to 
work in refugee camps. I teethed on the refugee situation in southern Sudan and I became 
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engaged in the refugee situation in Kosovo by working in the refugee camps in 
Macedonia. 
Milbank was right to say that the extension of the good to the object of the 
spectator‘s gaze is an unlikely occurrence. Moral agency in this direct manner is very 
limited, but what has emerged throughout my thesis and what seems to be the 
significance of the concept of bearing witness is that once a person knows that injustice 
exists, she can become engaged in the prevention of further injustice or involved in the 
restoration of justice. In his memoir about covering the Rwanda genocide, Fergal Keane 
writes of being formed by his first experience on foreign assignment in Africa. In 1983, 
he covered war between Eritrean guerrillas and Ethiopian soldiers. He writes of that 
moment as a ‗point of departure for me‘ and after covering this first story he continued to 
tell similar stories claiming, ‗how could one not tell those stories.‘
 552
 
I return to a story I told in the introduction. Part of the promise of Malcolm 
Muggeridge‘s claim to ‗never pretend‘ that he did not know what was happening on the 
Ukrainian collective farms, and part of the promise to ‗never forget‘ the atrocities of the 
Holocaust, is to bear witness to similar events. Bearing witness to similar events some 
how does justice to the events of the past. Even though people still commit genocide, the 
promise of ‗never again‘ is not a vain promise. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum‘s 
project of genocide prevention is premised on the hope that bearing witness to past 
genocide will help prevent future genocides. 
 Surprisingly, I have found the role of collective memory to be the most redeeming 
factor in the use of the analogy of the Good Samaritan. At first it appeared that the Good 
Samaritan as the Global Samaritan posed too many problems, such as restoring 
proximity, and the popular focus of the West as a benevolent and altruistic benefactor 
working from a place of plenty to serve the needy. Ian McDonald‘s socio-historical 
interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan as a story that helps form the 
character of a community, and reminds a people about who they have been in the past 
and who they want to be in the future, actually provides a strong case for foreign news 
coverage of distant human suffering as framed by the narrative of global compassion. The 
framing is done not just by news media organisations; the framing reflects larger societal 
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concerns of the West such as the growing human rights culture. The analogy of the West 
as Global Samaritan could be a reminder of the promise made: ‗never again‘. 
 A connected surprise revealed in the investigation of the narrative of global 
compassion, is an implicit critique of liberalism. While the Global Samaritan is a singular 
persona ficta, the Global Samaritan exists through the linking of many different levels of 
society. The lone foreign correspondent in some remote location and the isolated 
television viewer in the dimly lit sitting room seem to characterise the atomised 
individualism of modern liberalism. But the Global Samaritan is constituted and 
incarnated by the coming together of many individuals round the common cause of 
alleviating suffering. I was surprised that witnessing in this highly mediated form 
involves strengthening aspects of community, not reinforcing an atomised society, when 
people choose to become engaged participants over passive spectators. The Global 
Samaritan is a modern, globally networked body that can be materialised throughout the 
world in a multitude of configurations. The emphasis is on bodies networked to act 
together. J.D. Peters claims that this is the social significance on which media studies 
should focus. He identifies the social significance of the media as ‗their [media] 
rearrangements of our bodily being, as individuals and as bodies politic.‘
553
 The analogy 
of the Global Samaritan is a prime example of rearranging bodies politic by rearranging 
neighbourhoods, by bringing near those who are far and therefore establishing obligations 
to them. 
 Witnessing is a rich concept for exploration in Media Studies and Communication 
Sciences, indeed it is a concept already richly explored in Christian theology. As I have 
demonstrated, the work that the category of witness has done for theologians can be of 
service to media scholars. It seems crucial to follow this research further with inquiry into 
the ethical significance of witness in media studies. I will focus my attention in future 
research on how media mobilise morality. I also plan to contribute to practical theology 
on issues regarding Christian moral reasoning with regard to media practice and 
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